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INTRODUCTION
Securitization is one of the most significant legal and business
innovations of the last 30 years.
Securitization transforms
receivables—residential or commercial mortgage loans, automobile
loans, credit card receivables, equipment leases and loans, student loans,
trade receivables, and other receivables—into securities that can be sold
in capital markets.1 As of the end of 2002, there were more than 6
trillion dollars of outstanding securities issued in securitizations.2
Securitization has been the fastest growing form of capital formation3
because it gives originators of these receivables an additional way to
1 See generally Jason H.P. Kravitt, The Nature of Securitization, in SECURITIZATION OF
FINANCIAL ASSETS §§ 1.01-02, at 1-1 to 1-10 (Jason H.P. Kravitt ed., 2d ed. 1996 & Supp.
2002); 1 TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSET
POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES §§ 1.01-02, at 1-7 (1991); STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ,
STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION (3d ed. 2002);
Committee on Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization, Association of the City of New York,
Structured Financing Techniques, 50 BUS. LAW 527 (1995) [hereinafter Comm. on Bankruptcy,
Structured Financing Techniques]; Robert D. Ellis, Securitization Vehicles, Fiduciary Duties, and
Bondholders’ Rights, 24 J. CORP. L. 295, 299-310 (1999); Stephen I. Glover, Structured Finance
Goes Chapter 11: Asset Securitization by Reorganizing Companies, 47 BUS. LAW 611, 613-14
(1992); Charles E. Harrell & Mark D. Folk, Financing American Health Security: The
Securitization of Healthcare Receivables, 50 BUS. LAW 47 (1994); Charles E. Harrell et al.,
Securitization of Oil, Gas, and Other Natural Resource Assets: Emerging Financing Techniques,
52 BUS. LAW 885 (1997); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 133 (1994); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Parts are Greater Than the Whole: How
Securitization of Divisible Interests Can Revolutionize Structured Finance and Open the Capital
Markets to Middle-Market Companies, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 139; Joseph C. Shenker &
Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers, 69 TEX.
L. REV. 1369 (1991).
2 For example, the total debt of issuers of asset-backed securities backed by non-mortgage
business and consumer loans equaled $2.4 trillion as of the end of 2002. See Domestic Financial
Statistics, FED. RESERVE BULL. A38, tbl. 1.59, l.47 (2003) [hereinafter 2003 Domestic Financial
Statistics]. In addition, as of the end of 2002, about $8.5 trillion of single family and commercial
mortgage loans had been originated and remained outstanding, of which about $4.2 trillion had
been securitized. Id. at A33, ll. 1 & 53.
3 For example, the total debt of issuers of asset-backed securities backed by non-mortgage
business and consumer loans increased 237 percent from $713 billion as of the end of 1995 to
$2.4 trillion as of the end of 2002. See 2003 Domestic Financial Statistics, supra note 2, at A38,
tbl. 1.59, l.47; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Domestic Financial Statistics,
86 FED. RES. BULL. A40, tbl. 1.59, l. 47 (2000) [hereinafter 2000 Statistics]. In contrast,
outstanding corporate bonds of issuers in the non-financial sector increased 108 percent during
the same period from $1.3 trillion dollars as of the end of 1995, about twice the outstanding debt
of asset back issuers, $2.7 trillion dollars as of the end of 2002. See 2003 Domestic Financial
Statistics, supra note 2, at A38, tbl. 1.59, l.8; 2000 Statistics, supra, at A40, tbl. 1.59, l.8.
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raise capital to finance their operations or to extend credit to consumers.
It also has lowered the costs to lenders4 and to consumers.5
Notwithstanding this impressive record, some commentators have
questioned the utility6 of securitization, and a few have incorrectly
described patently improper transactions, such as the fraudulent use by
Enron of special purpose entities (“SPEs”), as “securitizations.”7 Others
have questioned the legal foundations8 of securitization. In my view
these critics are wrong. I believe that securitization benefits society and
rests on firm legal foundations.9 The purpose of this article is to explain
4 In 1986, for example, General Motors Acceptance Corporation (“GMAC”) securitized over
$4 billion of automobile loans. A study found that this securitization saved GMAC an annual
amount equal to 1.3% of the principal balance of these securities in comparison with GMAC’s
costs of raising money through traditional debt financing. See James A. Rosenthal & Juan M.
Ocampo, Analyzing the Economic Benefits of Securitized Credit, 1988 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 32,
36-40. This annual rate of savings (on a principal balance that declined from the original $4
billion) translates roughly, over the life of the deal, into between $80 and $100 million in cost
savings.
5 Several studies have shown that securitization has lowered mortgage rates. See, e.g., Steven
K. Todd, The Effects of Securitization on Consumer Mortgage Costs, REAL EST. ECON., Jan.
2001, at 50 (finding that in 1993 securitization of mortgage loans saved consumers more than $2
billion in mortgage origination fees, but criticizing the methodology of other studies all finding a
lowering of interest rates).
6 See, e.g., Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the
Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 550-65 (2002) (arguing that
securitization harms borrowers); Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and Corporate Risk
Allocation, 72 TUL. L. REV. 101, 102 (1997) (suggesting that securitization is detrimental to the
unsecured creditors of the originator); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1,
23-30 (1996) (suggesting that securitization can be a technique for judgment proofing); Lois R.
Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured Creditor’s Perspective, 76 TEX. L. REV. 595 (1998)
[hereinafter Lupica, Asset Securitization] (same); see also Lois R. Lupica, Revised Article 9,
Securitization Transactions and the Bankruptcy Dynamic, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 287, 31215 (2001) (arguing that securitization has the potential to pose a greater risk to a debtor’s
unsecured creditors in bankruptcy than ordinary secured credit transactions and therefore
questioning the wisdom of Revised Article 9’s facilitation of securitization); Lois R. Lupica,
Circumvention of the Bankruptcy Process: The Statutory Institutionalization of Securitization, 33
CONN. L. REV. 199, 200-02 (2000) (criticizing Revised Article 9’s putative facilitation of
securitizations).
7 See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Governance After Enron, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 99,
114-15 (2003) (describing Enron’s earnings manipulation as a “securitization policy”); DongJu
Song, Note, The Laws of Securities Lawyering after Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 DUKE L.J. 257, 288
(2003) (suggesting erroneously that Enron, “presumably on the advice or at least consent of its
lawyers, [obtained] off-balance sheet financing by placing its own stock, rather than hard assets,
into a securitization vehicle”). It is true that Enron used special purpose entities for fraudulent
purposes, but these transactions were not properly structured securitizations. See generally Steven
L. Schwarz, Enron, and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures,
70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1309 (2002).
8 See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1055 (1998) [hereinafter Carlson, Rotten Foundations]; Robert Stark, Viewing the LTV
Steel ABS Opinion in its Proper Context, 27 J. CORP. LAW 211, 212 (2002) (asserting that
“structured finance is not based on an entirely firm legal platform”).
9 I have personally benefited from securitization, both intellectually and financially. Before
becoming a full time law professor in 1994, I practiced law for nineteen years, the last seven of
which were serving as issuer’s, bankruptcy, and underwriter’s counsel for the issuance of
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why the legal foundations of securitization are very strong. In addition,
because securitization generates cost savings to the parties without
apparent detriment to others, and because it has created its own
constituency in the business and legal world, the future of securitization
is secure as a practical matter.10 Further, the success of securitization
reveals the inefficiency of the treatment of secured credit under the
Bankruptcy Code.11
Part I of this article describes the mechanics and the direct benefits
and costs of securitization. Although securitization entails costs that the
sale of receivables in whole loan sales and the pledging of receivables
as security for a loan do not, it generates cost savings that these other
transactions do not. These costs savings, which can be significant, often
will outweigh the additional costs of the transactions, which can be
small in relation to the size of the transaction.
There are two significant sources of the cost savings. The first
source is the conversion of reasonably liquid unrated receivables into
highly liquid rated securities that can be sold in the capital markets.
The second source is the avoidance of most of the costs imposed by the
Bankruptcy Code on direct secured lending—described by David
Carlson as a “bankruptcy tax” on secured credit.12 Purchasers of debt
securities from and lenders to SPEs do not have to charge a “bankruptcy
premium” to pay this “bankruptcy tax” that secured lenders must charge
in their loans to operating companies. I believe that the amount of the
“bankruptcy premium” that SPEs can avoid paying is significant.
As Part II explains, securitization is legally secure because it is
nothing more than a sophisticated combination of two well established
American legal principles: 1) the sale of property interests from one
legal person to another; and 2) the establishment of separate, artificial
legal persons. These principles are used throughout the economy in
many different ways. There is no reason to disregard either of these
mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities. Since 1994, I have served as a consultant for
Kutak Rock LLP, of which I was a partner from 1986 through 1994, and since June 2001 I have
been Of Counsel to McKee Nelson, LLP, in both cases providing advice on bankruptcy and
security interest matters in securitizations. I have also served as an expert witness in two federal
court cases involving securitizations, including serving as the expert witness for Abbey National
Treasury Services PLC, on the true sale of trade receivables and the proper structuring of the LTV
trade receivables securitization in In re LTV Steel Co., No. 00-43866 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000),
which is discussed infra Part III.B.
10 See also Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy Professionals, Debtor Dominance, and the Future
of Bankruptcy: A Review and a Rhapsody on a Theme, 18 BANKR. DEV. J. 337, 356-57 (2002)
(reviewing DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN
AMERICA (2001), and describing the unsuccessful attack by pro-debtor interests on securitization
and the unsuccessful efforts of the securitization industry to exempt securitizations from the
Bankruptcy Code).
11 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000), originally enacted by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
12 See Carlson, Rotten Foundations, supra note 8, at 1064.
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principles in the case of securitizations.
Part III describes several assaults on securitization: the argument
that securitizations should be disregarded because they are disguised
secured transactions; the desperate and unsuccessful attempt to collapse
a properly structured securitization in the LTV Corporation bankruptcy;
and David Carlson’s rarified challenge to securitization. Part III
explains why none of these attacks threaten the legal foundations of
securitization.
After describing and refuting Professor Carlson’s flight of fancy in
Part III, I take my own flight of fancy in Part IV. In this part, I present
my view of the limits of Congress’s and courts’ power under the
Bankruptcy Clause, showing that under this view, securitization is
secure. Under the Bankruptcy Clause, I believe that Congress may only
modify the nonbankruptcy entitlements of an insolvent debtor and its
creditors to the extent necessary to adjust the relationship among them.
It may not modify the nonbankruptcy entitlements of non-debtors, and it
may not alter the nonbankruptcy entitlements of debtors or creditors if
the debtor is not insolvent in either a cash flow sense or a balance sheet
sense. Accordingly, if a securitization meets the criteria of a true sale to
a separate legal entity under nonbankruptcy law, bankruptcy courts may
not disregard the structure.
Part V discusses the future of securitization. It describes the
unsuccessful efforts of the securitization industry to obtain additional
protection under the Bankruptcy Code. It also expresses my view of the
relative insignificance of state statutes that attempt to give special
protections to securitizations. Finally, it describes the tendency of some
investors and originators to blur the lines of securitization to enable the
investors to obtain additional protections from risk or to enable the
originators to retain more benefits. This blurring of lines could cause a
court to collapse a securitization. Such a collapse would not, however,
threaten securitization as a legal device. The collapse of an improperly
structured securitization will only strengthen those securitizations that
are properly structured.
Part VI discusses the implications of securitization’s secure future.
The success of securitization in eliminating the bankruptcy premium
that operating company borrowers must pay to their secured lenders
raises questions about the wisdom of the current bankruptcy regime. In
particular, it provides strong evidence that the Bankruptcy Code should
respect more fully the nonbankruptcy entitlements of secured creditors.
To this end, I propose two amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. First,
the Bankruptcy Code should reverse the result in United Savings Ass’n
v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates13 and require that secured
13 484 U.S. 365, 382 (1988) (holding that the right of an undersecured creditor to adequate
protection does not include interest payments to compensate the creditor for the delay of

PLANK.GALLEY

1660

5/25/2004 4:02 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:5

creditors receive interest on the lesser of their claim or the value of their
collateral until they obtain relief from the automatic stay. This should
apply to all collateral and all secured lenders. Second, creditors who
have a security interest in receivables should be allowed to liquidate the
receivables without regard to the automatic stay.
These two
amendments would reduce the bankruptcy premium in direct secured
lending. They would also eliminate the structural requirements in
securitizations for avoiding the bankruptcy premium. This elimination
would reduce the costs and the volume of securitizations.
I. DESCRIPTION OF SECURITIZATION
Except in the case of trade receivables, an originator of receivables
is in the business of making loans.14 To do so, it must raise money.
Depending on the size of its operations, the volume of originations, and
its financial strength, it can raise money in one or more ways. It can
obtain money from equity investors through private investment or, if
large enough, through the public securities markets. It also can borrow
on a secured basis from a lender, using the receivables as collateral.
This borrowing can be short term, under a “warehouse” lending facility,
until the originator sells the receivables; in this case, the originator may
be permitted to use the proceeds of these sales directly to originate more
receivables, or it may be required to repay the warehouse lender and
then borrow again to finance the origination of more receivables. The
borrowing also can be on a long term basis, in which the originator
retains the receivables, pledges them to secure a long term loan, and
uses the proceeds of the loan to originate more receivables.15 If the
foreclosure caused by the bankruptcy case).
14 Originators of trade receivables are generally in the business of selling goods or services.
When they sell their goods and services on account, they generate receivables that they can retain,
sell, or pledge as security for a borrowing.
15 Another method used for many years to finance the origination of single-family mortgage
loans was the short term borrowing of savings and loan associations from depositors and the
investment of those deposits in long term mortgage loans. This mismatch of assets and liabilities
was amply demonstrated in the movie, IT’S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films & RKO Radio
Pictures 1946), when the building and loan association was facing a liquidity crisis by the demand
of depositors to withdraw money from their savings accounts. Trying to persuade the depositors
from refraining from withdrawing more than they really needed, George Bailey explained that the
depositors’ money was not in the back in a safe but had been invested in their neighbors’ homes.
The regulatory regime for savings and loan associations required them to invest a large
proportion of their assets in long term mortgage loans. This regulatory regime eventually lead to
the insolvency of the entire savings and loan industry in 1979, as a result of high market interest
rates that depressed the market value of their long term holdings, and the elimination of interest
rate restrictions on rates that savings and loan associations could pay depositors in the 1982, and
the subsequent collapse of the industry in the later 1980s. See Robert J. Laughlin, Note, Causes
of the Savings and Loan Debacle, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 301, 302-11 (1991); Kenneth E. Scott,
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originator has a sufficiently high credit rating,16 it can issue debt
securities in the capital markets.
Originators of receivables face risks that can be separated into two
categories. One risk is that the receivables themselves will not generate
sufficient principal and interest to repay to the originator the cost of
lending money to the obligor. The other risk is that, for reasons
unrelated to the quality and cash flow from the receivables, the
originator suffers losses from its operations. If an originator borrows
from a lender, whether a direct lender or the purchaser of debt
securities, the lender shares these two risks. First, the lender bears the
risk that the receivables themselves will not generate sufficient principal
and interest to assure repayment of the debt. Second, the lender bears
Never Again: The S & L Bailout Bill, 45 BUS. LAW. 1883, 1885-93 (1990); Lawrence J. White,
The S&L Debacle, 59 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 61-65 (1991); see also Cottage Savings Ass’n v.
Commis., 499 U.S. 554, 556-58 (1991). This case involved a transaction in which Cottage
Savings Association exchanged approximately $6.5 million of single family mortgage
participation interests, which had a market value of $4.5 million, for similar mortgage
participation interests held by four other savings associations. The transaction was done pursuant
to a regulatory directive of the former Federal Home Loan Bank Board that allowed such an
exchange without requiring the associations to record a loss for regulatory accounting purposes.
The exchange did, however, generate for Cottage Savings a $2.4 million loss for income tax
purposes. The Court upheld the deductibility of the loss.
16 There are four nationally recognized rating agencies in the United States: Standard &
Poor’s Ratings Services, a division of McGraw-Hill (“Standard and Poor’s” or “S&P”); Moody’s
Investors Service, Inc.; Fitch, Inc.; and Dominion Bond Rating Service Limited. See Securities
and Exchange Comm’r, Rating Agencies and the Use of Credit Ratings Under the Federal
Securities Laws, 68 Fed. Reg. 35,258 (June 12, 2003).
These rating agencies assign ratings to debt securities. The four highest rating categories
(AAA, AA, A, and BBB for Standard & Poor’s and Fitch, and Aaa, Aa, A, and Baa for Moody’s,
for example) are generally considered “investment grade” securities. See, e.g., The Role and
Function of Credit Rating Agencies in the Operation of the Securities Markets, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/credratingreport0103.pdf; Peter V. Darrow et al., Rating Agency
Requirements, in 1 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS § 7.01 (Jason H.P. Kravitt ed., 2d ed.
2002-1 Supp.); Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency
Paradox, 2002 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 1, 7-9.
S&P describes its ratings as follows:
‘AAA’ An obligation rated ‘AAA’ has the highest rating assigned by Standard &
Poor’s. The obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitment on the obligation is
extremely strong.
‘AA’ An obligation rated ‘AA’ differs from the highest rated obligations only to a
small degree. The obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitment on the
obligation is very strong.
‘A’ An obligation rated ‘A’ is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects of
changes in circumstances and economic conditions than obligations in higher rated
categories. However, the obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitment on the
obligation is still strong.
‘BBB’ An obligation rated ‘BBB’ exhibits adequate protection parameters. However,
adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a
weakened capacity of the obligor to meet its financial commitment on the obligation.
Obligations rated ‘BB’, ‘B’, ‘CCC’, ‘CC’, and ‘C’ are regarded as having significant
speculative characteristics.
2001 STANDARD AND POOR’S, CORPORATE RATINGS CRITERIA 7-8.
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the risk that, for reasons unrelated to the receivables, the originator can
no longer repay its debt and must seek relief under the Bankruptcy
Code. In the case of a secured loan to an originator, the lender must
charge an interest rate that compensates it for both the risks related to
the receivables and the operational risks of the originator.
The principal value of securitization flows from the separation of
these two risks. In a securitization, the investors assume the risks
associated with the receivables but they avoid the risks associated with
the originator’s operations. In other words, each securitization isolates
the receivables from the risk of the bankruptcy of the originator. This
disaggregation of risk results in lower overall financing costs for
originators of receivables.
A.

Essential Features of Securitization

Securitization transforms receivables into securities backed solely
by the receivables. The investment return on the securities depends on
the receivables themselves and does not depend upon the
creditworthiness of the originator of the receivables or the issuer of the
securities.17 These securities, referred to as asset-backed securities,
generally take two forms: pure pass-through certificates and debt
securities. The sponsor of the asset-backed securities may be the
originator of the receivables or another person in the business of
acquiring receivables from originators and securitizing them.
In the case of pass-through certificates, the owner of the
receivables transfers them to a trustee pursuant to a trust agreement18 in
exchange for certificates that represent a 100 percent beneficial
ownership interest in the receivables. The owner then sells the
certificates in the capital markets. The trustee has legal title to the
receivables, receives the collections from the receivables and passes
them through to the holders of the certificates in accordance with the
operative document. For most purposes, the certificates are considered
equity interests.19
17 Some asset-backed securities have the benefit of third party credit enhancement, such as a
letter of credit or a financial guarantee policy. However, in these cases, the credit enhancer will
look only to the assets for reimbursement, and hence the structure is substantially the same.
18 Typically, this trust agreement is called a “pooling and servicing agreement.”
19 Thus, for state law purposes they do not directly represent debt of any party. The plan
asset regulations under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) treat an
investment in the certificates as an investment in the underlying receivables. See 29 C.F.R. §
2510.3-101(b) (2003) (defining equity interest as “any in an entity other than an instrument that is
treated as indebtedness under applicable local law and which has no substantial equity
features. . . . [Beneficial interests] in a trust are equity interests.”). Because they are equity
securities and not debt securities, the trust agreement and the trustee need not qualify under the
Trust Indenture Act of 1939. See 15 U.S.C § 77ddd(a) (2000) (providing that the provisions of
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In the typical case of debt securities, the owner transfers the
receivables to a separate, special purpose, legal person, which can be a
corporation, a limited partnership, a limited liability company or a
business trust, that is designed to be “bankruptcy remote.” This entity,
known as a “special purpose entity” or “SPE,” or a special purpose
vehicle or “SPV,” issues to the capital markets debt securities, backed
by the receivables in the form of notes or bonds. A variation of debt
securities are pass-through certificates that nominally represent
beneficial interests in the underlying receivables but that have the cash
flow characteristics of debt.20
The consideration for the sale of receivables will be the proceeds
from the sale of the securities and other cash or property in an amount
equal to the fair market value of the receivables. In the case of the sale
of receivables by an originator to a newly-created SPE that is a
subsidiary of the originator, the purchase price could include the stock
in the new SPE.21
the trust indenture act do not apply to “any security other than (A) a note, bond, debenture, or
evidence of indebtedness, whether or not secured, or (B) a certificate of interest or participation in
any such note, bond, debenture, or evidence of indebtedness, or (C) a temporary certificate for, or
guarantee of, any such note, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, or certificate”).
20 These consist of those classes of multi-class pass-through certificates that are entitled to
priority in the case of losses on the underlying receivables. In this structure, the different classes
of certificates will have different priorities of payment from the cash flow from the underlying
receivables. In the simplest example, the certificates can be divided into two classes, Class A and
Class B. The cash flow from receivables would be divided among the classes as follows: Cash
flow, to the extent available, would go to pay interest on the Class A certificates first, then on the
Class B certificates. Remaining cash flow would then be used to repay the principal of the Class
A certificates until the principal balance was reduced to zero, and then, to the extent available, to
pay the principal of the Class B certificates. If there are shortfalls in the cash flow because of
payment defaults by obligors, the Class B certificates will be the first class to absorb those short
falls and to suffer losses. From a bankruptcy perspective, the senior certificates—the Class A
Certificates—may represent debt, even if they are not be debt for other purposes. In this case, the
junior certificates—the Class B certificates—would represent the residual value of the
receivables, and the holder of the subordinate certificates may be deemed to be the owner of the
receivables underlying the certificates. Accordingly, if these subordinate certificates are not sold
to a creditworthy third party, they must be sold to a bankruptcy remote SPE. Hence, from a
bankruptcy structuring perspective, many multiple class pass-through certificates are essentially
the same as pure debt securities.
Often there are multiple classes and sub-classes, and there are many ways in which the
cash flow can be divided up. The cash flow structure of the certificates will be designed to meet
the desires of investors to the extent possible.
21 Other property could include a subordinated note from the SPE of sufficient credit quality
to assure repayment of the note. See, e.g., STANDARD AND POOR’S LEGAL CRITERIA FOR
STRUCTURED FINANCE TRANSACTIONS 28-29 (3d ed. 2002), available at
http://www.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/Legal2002.pdf [hereinafter S&P 2002
LEGAL CRITERIA] (noting that S&P will allow the use of subordinated notes as consideration for
the purchase of the receivables if the subordinated note has a likelihood of repayment that is of
investment grade quality and if the SPE has sufficient equity to assure that the risks and rewards
of ownership have in fact been transferred to the SPE). Another possibility is a capital
contribution of loans (or a portion of the value of the loans) by an originator to an SPE that is a
wholly owned subsidiary. If the SPE is solvent, the originator’s ownership interest in the SPE
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In addition, by selling receivables to an SPE that is a subsidiary of
the originator, the originator can retain, indirectly, the residual value in
the underlying receivables that it originated. The SPE owns the
receivables, which are now subject to a security interest to secure the
debt securities that it issued, and it therefore retains the residual value in
the receivables remaining after payment of the debt. This residual
value, less the general expenses and liabilities of the SPE, is the value of
the stock of or other ownership interest in the SPE owned by the
originator as parent of the SPE. The parent of the SPE ultimately will
receive most of this residual value in the form of dividends or
distributions from its subsidiary.
Both pass-through certificates and debt securities are structured to
insure that a bankruptcy of either the originator/seller of the receivables
or the parent of the SPE will not adversely affect payments on the
securities.22 In the first step of the securitization, to isolate the securities
from the bankruptcy risk of the seller, the seller must effect a “true sale”
of the receivables to the pass-through trustee or the SPE.23
Accordingly, to get the desired rating, the seller may retain little of the
benefits and burdens of owning the receivables.24 If the seller retains
too much risk or benefit from the receivables and later becomes a debtor
under the Bankruptcy Code, a bankruptcy court might include the
receivables in the bankruptcy estate of the seller.25
For pure pass-through certificates, assuring a true sale to the passthrough trustee will be sufficient to isolate the securities from the
bankruptcy risk of the seller or anyone else. For debt securities issued
by an SPE, however, isolating the securities from risks not associated
with the receivables requires additional protections. First, the
organizational documents for the SPE must limit the activities of the

will increase by the amount of the capital contribution. See Butler Aviation Int’l, Inc. v. Whyte
(In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 6 F.3d 1119, 1129 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that indirect benefits
to a parent for making payments owed by a subsidiary was value within the meaning of the
fraudulent conveyance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code); Rubin v. Mfrs. Tr. Co., 661 F.2d 979,
991-92 (2d Cir. 1981) (discussing the indirect economic benefit to a transferor as value).
22 This article focuses on originators who can be debtors under the Bankruptcy Code. Banks,
savings associations, and insurance companies are also originators of these receivables but are not
eligible to be debtors under the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) (2000). Most of the
concerns raised by a bankruptcy of a Bankruptcy Code eligible originator will apply to these noncode originators, but some will not. See infra notes 388-94 and accompanying text (describing
the different treatment of secured creditors in the case of the insolvency of financial institutions).
23 In addition, if the seller has acquired the receivables from the originator or other prior
owner, that transfer also must be structured as a true sale.
24 See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text (discussing the general requirements for a
true sale).
25 See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Grover (In re Woodson Co.), 813 F.2d 266, 269 (9th
Cir. 1987) (holding that the purported sale of participation interests in underlying loans was a
disguised grant of a security interest because the sellers retained all of the risk of loss on the
underlying loans).
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SPE to acquiring the receivables and issuing securities backed by or
With these limitations, including
secured by the receivables.26
limitations on issuing additional debt, the SPE should not become a
debtor under the Bankruptcy Code for any reason other than defaults
relating solely to the receivables. Because there should be no other
activities or other significant debt, the SPE will not have creditors other
than the holders of the asset-backed securities. Accordingly, there will
be no other creditors who could file an involuntary petition against the
SPE under the Bankruptcy Code27 or who could initiate collection
activity that would cause the SPE to file a voluntary petition. Of course,
every one understands—or should understand—that if the receivables
held by the SPE perform poorly and the holders of the asset-backed
securities are not paid, the holders could initiate collection activity that
would cause the SPE to file for bankruptcy.28
Second, the SPE is structured to prevent opportunistic behavior by
its parent if the parent were to become a debtor in bankruptcy. The
governing body for the SPE will include or consist of one person who is
independent of the parent. For an SPE that is a corporation,29 this
independent person will be an independent director.30 For an SPE that
is not a corporation, the independent person will often be an SPE, such
as a bankruptcy remote corporation with an independent director,
serving as the general partner in a limited partnership31 or a member in a
limited liability company.32 In the case of a limited liability company,
26
27

See, e.g., S&P 2002 LEGAL CRITERIA, supra note 21, at 19.
See 11 U.S.C § 303(a)-(b) (2000) (authorizing a specified number of creditors to file a
petition under the Bankruptcy Code against a person that can be a debtor other than a non-profit
corporation or a farmer); In re Kingston Square Assoc., 214 B.R 713, 724, 733-35 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1997) (upholding the filing of an involuntary petition against several insolvent,
defaulting SPEs by creditors solicited by the principal of the SPEs), which is further discussed
infra notes 100-107 and accompanying text.
28 Under the Bankruptcy Code, an entity eligible to be a debtor cannot effectively preclude
itself from filing a petition or being the subject of an involuntary petition. See Marshall E.
Tracht, Contractual Bankruptcy Waivers: Reconciling Theory, Practice, and Law, 82 CORNELL
L. REV. 301, 303-15 (1997) (describing and questioning the conventional wisdom of
unenforceability of bankruptcy waivers). Accordingly, the risk of bankruptcy cannot be
eliminated, and SPEs are known as bankruptcy remote entities, not bankruptcy proof entities.
29 See S&P 2002 LEGAL CRITERIA, supra note 21, at 22.
30 See id. at 21,161. An independent director is defined as a
duly appointed member of the board of directors of the relevant entity who shall not
have been, at the time of such appointment or at any time in the preceding five years,
(a) a direct or indirect legal or beneficial owner (beyond a nominal amount) in such
entity or any of its affiliates, (b) a creditor, supplier, employee, officer, director, family
member, manager, or contractor of such entity or any of its affiliates, or (c) a person
who controls (whether directly, indirectly, or otherwise) such entity or its affiliates or
any creditor, supplier, employee, officer, director, manager, or contractor of such entity
or its affiliates.
Id. at 161.
31 See id. at 8, 20, 22.
32 See id. at 20, 100.
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the independent person can be an independent manager whose function
is similar to that of the independent director of a corporate SPE.33 In
addition, the organizational documents of the SPE will require the
assent of the independent person to authorize or consent to the filing of
a bankruptcy petition.34 This requirement for the independent person’s
assent is designed to prevent the filing of a voluntary bankruptcy
petition (or the acquiescence in an involuntary petition) at the behest of
the parent for any reason other than the failure of the receivables to pay
as expected.35 This provision is primarily designed to prevent the parent
of the SPE from putting a solvent SPE into bankruptcy to capture excess
value in the receivables.36
Third, the SPE must be structured and operated so that, if the
parent of the SPE were to become a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code,
a bankruptcy court would not disregard the separateness of the SPE
under the doctrine of substantive consolidation and consolidate the
assets and liabilities of the SPE with the assets and liabilities of the
parent/debtor.37 The organizational documents will contain covenants
designed to ensure that the SPE operates as an entity independent of its
parent.38 The presence of the independent director or other person is
also a helpful element in preventing substantive consolidation.

33
34
35
36

See id. at 100.
See id. at 22, 100.
See id. at 20.
See infra notes 348-50 and accompanying text, which describes an attempt by the owners
of a solvent SPE to cause the SPE to file for bankruptcy to accelerate the debt of the SPE, which
otherwise was not subject to prepayment. By prepaying the debt at par, that is, one hundred
percent of the face amount, the owners could have sold the underlying collateral at a premium,
that is, at a price greater than par, and recaptured the excess value in the collateral that otherwise
would have gone to the debt holders.
37 See infra notes 109-11 and accompanying text (discussing substantive consolidation).
38 S&P requires the following separateness covenants on the part of the SPE: Maintain its
books, records, and accounts separate from any other person or entity; not commingle assets with
those of any other entity; conduct its own business in its own name; maintain separate financial
statements; pay its own liabilities out of its own funds; observe all corporate, partnership, or LLC
formalities and other formalities required by the organic documents; maintain an arm’s-length
relationship with its affiliates; pay the salaries of its own employees and maintain a sufficient
number of employees in light of its contemplated business operations [although it is not necessary
to have employees, if contractors will conduct the business of entity]; not guarantee or become
obligated for the debts of any other entity or hold out its credit as being available to satisfy the
obligations of others; not to acquire obligations or securities of its partners, members, or
shareholders; allocate fairly and reasonably any overhead for shared office space; use separate
stationery, invoices, and checks; not pledge its assets for the benefit of any other entity or make
any loans or advances to any entity; hold itself out as a separate entity; correct any known
misunderstanding regarding its separate identity; and maintain adequate capital in light of its
contemplated business operations. S&P 2002 LEGAL CRITERIA, supra note 21, at 21-22.
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Net Benefits of Securitization

The prime motivation for isolating the asset-backed securities from
the credit risk of the originator (or subsequent seller) of the receivables
and of the parent of an SPE is to enable the securities to receive an
investment grade rating from a rating agency.39 Properly structured,
asset-backed securities can receive a rating from a rating agency
regardless of the creditworthiness of the originator of the receivables.
Many originators cannot obtain any rating on their debt securities. For
other originators, the asset-backed securities would receive a higher
rating than the originators’ own debt securities.40 Indeed, even large,
credit-worthy originators of receivables use securitizations to maintain
favorable debt-equity ratios and to lower costs.41
With a pool of receivables of sufficient size, the risk associated
with the receivables can be more easily quantified than the risks
associated with an operating company. From studies of historical
defaults on receivables, ratings agencies have developed methodologies
by which they can predict, with reasonable certainty, the likelihood and
severity of loss on any pool of receivables. The rating agencies can
assign ratings to securities backed by the pool of receivables by
determining the amount of coverage for the predicted loss
commensurate with the rating.
This loss coverage—or credit
42
enhancement—may take many forms.
39
40

See supra note 16 (discussing the different rating agencies and the different ratings).
See generally Jason H.P. Kravitt & Jeffrey Seifman, Identifying Legal, Accounting &
Related Issues, in SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS §§ 3.02, at 3-4 through 3-11 (Jason
H.P. Kravitt ed., 2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2002) [hereinafter Kravitt & Seifman, Legal Issuers];
Comm. on Bankruptcy, Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 1, at 530-31.
41 See supra note 4 (discussing cost saving to GMAC from a $4 billion securitization of
automobile loans).
42 For example, if securities backed by a pool of receivables need loss coverage or credit
enhancement equal to seven percent of the original principal balance of the receivables to achieve
the desired rating, this loss coverage could be in the form of additional collateral: An issuance of
$100 million of debt securities backed by a pool of $107 million receivables; an issuance of $100
million of securities backed by a pool of $100 million receivables and a reserve fund or a letter of
credit or pool insurance policy from a highly rated issuer (in which case, the rating of the issuer
must equal the rating on the securities) in the amount of $7 million; or an issuance of a class of
senior pass-through certificates in the amount of $100 million to be sold to investors and a class
of subordinate pass-through certificates in the amount of $7 million either sold to investors or
retained by an SPE. See supra note 20 (describing senior and subordinate pass-through
certificates). Reserve funds are not the most economical form of credit enhancement for
mortgage loans because the moneys in the reserve fund would earn a much lower return than the
mortgages themselves. However, for asset-backed securities with a much shorter term, such as
securities backed by four and five-year automobile loans, a reserve fund is a common form of
creditor enhancement. In addition, in some transactions, the reserve fund will be financed not by
a lump sum deposit but by diverting to the reserve fund the excess spread between interest rate on
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Securitization provides several benefits to originators that reduce
the cost of capital. Securitization transforms somewhat liquid unrated
receivables into highly liquid rated securities that can be sold in the
capital markets. As a result, a larger universe of investors can purchase
securities backed by receivables than would buy the underlying
receivables or would lend money to the originator or purchase the
securities of the originator. The more buyers for the originator’s
receivables in the form of these securities, the higher the price for the
receivables that the originator can obtain or the lower the interest rate
the originator can charge on the receivables to begin with.43 The
pressures of a competitive market will lead the originator to lower the
interest rate that the ultimate borrower—the obligor on the receivable—
must pay.44
Securitizing receivables entails greater transaction costs than
selling the receivables in whole loan transactions or pledging them as
security for a loan. The two principal costs of securitization are the
costs associated with issuing rated securities and the costs of structuring
a separate SPE.45 The costs associated with issuing asset-backed
securities are similar to the costs of issuing rated securities by any
issuer, such as rating agency fees, attorneys’ fees, and registration fees
in the case of public offerings.
The costs of structuring a separate SPE, however, are peculiar to
securitization. The originator must establish a separate legal person and
must operate that SPE separately. This requires additional legal
expenses to ensure the proper creation of the SPE. The SPE also will
incur additional administrative and overhead expenses over the life of
the securities. In addition, the SPE must pay the fees and expenses of
the securities and the interest rate on the underlying receivables. As another alternative, the
securities themselves could receive credit enhancement, like a financial guaranty policy, from a
third party, whose debt securities have a rating equal to that of the asset-backed securities. The
insurer would then structure the securities with a sufficient loss coverage. Frequently, there is a
combination of any of the foregoing.
43 Securitization allows originators and purchasers to avoid a mismatch of assets and
liabilities. FRANKEL, supra note 1, § 3.02, at 69-72; Kravitt & Seifman, Legal Issuers § 3.02, at
3-10 to 3-11. Indeed the necessity to ameliorate a gross mismatch in assets and liabilities in the
home mortgage industry was the initial impetus for the development of mortgage backed
securities in the 1970s and 1980s. See Shenker & Colletta, supra note 1, at 1384-93.
44 See supra note 5 (discussing a study showing that securitization of mortgage loans save
mortgagors two billion dollars in 1993).
45 The cost of credit enhancement for the securities, however, is not a cost peculiar to
securitization. The risk of loss on receivables is inherent in the receivables and is accounted for
in the interest charged. Many forms of credit enhancement simply transform a diffuse risk of loss
spread throughout all receivables and accounted for in the interest rate on the receivables into a
more compact form. Much of the risk of loss will be removed from the securities—how much
depends on the rating that the securities receive—and transferred to the form of credit
enhancement, such as the reserve fund, the excess interest, or the over-collateralization. See
supra note 42 (describing different forms of credit enhancement). In effect, securitization distills
the risk of loss premium out of the interest rate on the receivables.
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the independent director or other independent person.46 These costs,
however, are not significant.47
The originator or the SPE also must pay legal fees to obtain
opinions peculiar to the structural features of securitizations.
Specifically, these are (1) a “true sale” opinion to the effect that, after
the transfer of the receivables from the originator to the SPE or the passthrough trustee, the receivables would not be included in the bankruptcy
estate of the originator if the originator were to become a debtor under
the Code,48 and (2) in the case of debt securities issued by an SPE, a
“non-consolidation” opinion to the effect that the assets and liabilities of
the SPE would not be consolidated with the assets and liabilities of the
parent of the SPE if the parent were to become a debtor under the
Bankruptcy Code.49
When the direct benefits of securitization outweigh the direct costs,
a rational originator will securitize its receivables. When the direct
costs outweigh the benefits, the rational originator will use some other
method to raise money for its business.
The net benefits of securitization derive from two distinct sources.
One source is the net benefits of issuing securities in highly efficient
capital markets, rather than borrowing from banks or other direct lender.
The second, and unique, source of the cost savings of securitization is
the structural feature of securitization that limits the credit risk of the
securities solely to that of the receivables and isolates the securities
from the bankruptcy risk of the originator of the receivables and other
third parties. Securitization accomplishes this isolation by a transfer of
receivables in a true sale to a bankruptcy remote SPE. This isolation of
risk enables the holders of the securities to avoid the bankruptcy costs
that would be borne by lenders who make secured loans to the
originator.
C.

The Bankruptcy Premium

Isolating the receivables from the bankruptcy risk of the originator
and seller of the receivables and the parent of the SPE is essential to
securitization. The holders of pass-through certificates must truly be the
beneficial owners of the receivables, and the holders of debt securities
must be secured creditors only of the SPE. If either the seller of the
46
47

See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text.
For pure pass-through certificates, there is no separate SPE, but a pure pass-through
securitization often offers less flexibility that has the effect of reducing slightly the attractiveness
of the certificates to investors.
48 See S&P 2002 LEGAL CRITERIA, supra note 21, at 7, 9; Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 135-36.
49 See S&P 2002 LEGAL CRITERIA, supra note 21, at 8-9; Schwarcz, supra note 1, at 135-36.
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receivables or the parent of the SPE were to become a debtor under the
Bankruptcy Code, the receivables must not be included in the
bankruptcy estate of such debtor and the holders of the securities may
not be treated as a secured creditor of the debtor. Although the rights of
secured creditors are respected to a large extent in bankruptcy, the filing
of a bankruptcy petition nevertheless adversely affects a creditor who
has a security interest in the debtor’s receivables.
The most significant adverse effect is the automatic stay that arises
upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The automatic stay prevents
creditors, including secured creditors, from taking any action to collect
their claims and therefore prevents the payment of the proceeds of the
receivables to a secured creditor.50 In addition, the bankruptcy trustee
(including the debtor in possession) could require the return of the
receivables in the possession of a creditor or third party.51 The trustee
could possibly use the collections from the receivables52 or give another
lender a superior interest in the receivables.53
50 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (2000) (providing that a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of
“any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title”). If a borrower becomes a debtor under the
Bankruptcy Code, the debtor will cease paying its debts. Secured creditors will not be able to
exercise their nonbankruptcy remedies, specifically foreclosing on its collateral pledge to secure
the debt.
Many courts and commentators believe that a secured creditor is stayed by § 362(a)(3),
which stays acts against property of the estate. See id. § 362(a)(3) (providing that a bankruptcy
petition operates as a stay of “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate”). As I have explained
elsewhere, the exercise by a secured creditor of its rights against collateral pledged by a debtor is
not exercising control over property of the estate, which consists only of the debtor’s rights in the
collateral, although for tangible property items in the possession of the debtor, it may be the
obtaining of possession of property from the estate. See Thomas E. Plank, The Outer Boundaries
of the Bankruptcy Estate, 47 EMORY L. REV. 1193, 1259-62, 1264-67 (1998) [hereinafter Plank,
Bankruptcy Estate].
51 See infra notes 187-97 and accompanying text (discussing 11 U.S.C. § 542(a), as
interpreted by United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 211 (1983)).
52 11 U.S.C. § 363 states:
(b)(1) The trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the
ordinary course of business, property of the estate.
...
(c)(1) If the business of the debtor is authorized to be operated under section 721,
1108, 1203, 1204, or 1304 of this title and unless the court orders otherwise, the trustee
may enter into transactions, including the sale or lease of property of the estate, in the
ordinary course of business, without notice or a hearing, and may use property of the
estate in the ordinary course of business without notice or a hearing.
(2) The trustee may not use, sell, or lease cash collateral under paragraph (1) of
this subsection unless—
(A) each entity that has an interest in such cash collateral consents; or
(B) the court, after notice and a hearing, authorizes such use, sale, or lease in
accordance with the provisions of this section.
Although the security holders would be entitled to “adequate protection,” that adequate protection
may not necessarily equal the protection that they had originally bargained for. See id.
53 See id. § 364(d)(1) (providing that the “court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the
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Further, the secured creditor would be entitled to the promised
interest only to the extent that it remained oversecured.54 If the secured
creditor were undersecured, it would not be entitled to interest.55 An
undersecured creditor would not be able to obtain relief from the
automatic stay if the receivables were deemed necessary for
reorganization.56 These provisions of the Bankruptcy Code essentially
allow for the transfer to the debtor in bankruptcy of some of the value to
which the secured creditor would be entitled outside of bankruptcy.
The secured creditor also must incur costs to participate in the
bankruptcy case to protect its interest. All of these potential adverse
effects impose additional costs on secured creditors for the benefit of
unsecured creditors and debtors. The secured creditors must recoup this
cost by including a bankruptcy premium in the interest that they charge
to their borrowers.
Recent developments in bankruptcy discussed in this Symposium57
and elsewhere58 suggest that some secured creditors have learned how
to use the bankruptcy process to obtain a larger portion of their claims.
This effect may reduce the size of the bankruptcy premium. These
developments, however, merely ameliorate and do not eliminate the
structural features imbedded in the Bankruptcy Code that require the
bankruptcy premium that direct secured lenders must charge.
II. THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF SECURITIZATION
The true sale of receivables from the originator or seller to a
separate legal entity, either a pass-through trustee in the case of pure
obtaining of credit or the incurring of debt secured by a senior or equal lien on property of the
estate that is subject to a lien only if [certain conditions are met].” Again, the security holder
would be entitled to “adequate protection.” Id.
54 See id. § 506(a).
55 See id. § 502(b)(2) (providing that, if an objection to a creditor’s claim is made, the court,
after notice and a hearing, shall allow the claim except to the extent that “such claim is for
unmatured interest”); United Sav. Ass’n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365, 381
(1988) (holding that the right of an undersecured creditor to adequate protection does not include
interest payments to compensate the creditor for the delay of the bankruptcy case).
56 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d):
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant
relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such as by
terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay—
...
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection (a) of this
section, if (A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and (B) such
property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.
57 Douglas G. Baird, Secured Lending and Its Uncertain Future, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789
(2004).
58 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN. L. REV.
673, 675, 682-85 (2003) (noting the increased creditor control in Chapter 11 cases).
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pass-through certificates or the SPE in the case of debt securities, is the
essential feature of securitization. Such a sale ensures that the
receivables would not be included in the seller’s bankruptcy estate if the
seller were to become a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code. In the case
of a transfer of receivables to an SPE, the separateness of the SPE also
keeps the receivables out of the bankruptcy estate of the SPE’s parent.
Hence, securitization relies on two long standing, well recognized legal
concepts: the sale of property, and the separateness of legal entities.
A.

The Sale of Property

An owner of a property interest may transfer all of that property
interest to another person.59 Under non-bankruptcy law, such a transfer
is recognized as a sale of the property interest.60 Bankruptcy law does
not directly recognize a “true sale” as such. Instead, bankruptcy law
recognizes the nature of a transfer of a property interest through the
definition of property of the estate. Section 541(a)(1) provides that the
commencement of a case creates an estate, and the estate consists of “all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.”61 For this reason, the common reference
59 Normally, the owner may not transfer a greater interest that she has, but there are
exceptions. For example, if O has transferred a property interest, P, to Buyer-1, but that transfer
is not perfected, as between O and Buyer-1, Buyer-1 would be considered the owner of P.
Nevertheless, in the case of real estate or the sale of accounts or chattel paper, O retains the power
to transfer P to Buyer-2, and Buyer-2’s ownership interest would eliminate Buyer-1’s ownership
interest. See, e.g., WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.9, at
871-72 (3d ed. 2000) (describing how the recording system may give priority to a later transferee
if the first transferee fails to record the instrument of transfer); U.C.C. § 9-318(b) (2001)
(providing that, as against creditors and purchasers for value, while the interest of a buyer of an
account or chattel paper is unperfected, “the debtor [seller] is deemed to have rights and title to
the account or chattel paper identical to those the debtor sold”); id. § 9-322(a)(2) (providing that a
“perfected security interest [including an ownership interest in accounts and chattel paper] . . . has
priority over a conflicting unperfected security interest”). Similarly, if a thief steals a negotiable
instrument payable to bearer from A and sells it to B, B may acquire the instrument free of A’s
ownership even though the thief had no ownership interest in the instrument. See id. § 3-306
(providing that a holder in due course takes free of claims to the instrument). Finally, if an owner
of goods entrusts a merchant with the goods, the merchant can transfer to a buyer all of the
owner’s interests in the goods, even though the merchant does not have that interest. See id. § 2403(2) (providing that the entrusting of goods to a merchant-dealer gives the merchant the power
to transfer all the rights that the entrustor has).
60 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (stating that a “‘sale’ consists in the passing of title from the
seller to the buyer for a price”); id. § 2-401(1)(2) (providing that title to goods cannot pass until
they are identified to the contract for sale but that title may pass in any manner agreed and that
absent agreement otherwise title passes when the seller completes its obligation to delivering the
goods to the buyer); see also infra note 76 and accompanying text (discussing the elements of a
sale of receivables).
61 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000) provides:
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates an
estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by
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in securitization to “true sale opinions”62 is somewhat inaccurate. The
opinions typically do not opine that there has been a true sale; they
typically opine that receivables transferred would not be included in the
bankruptcy estate of the transferor.63 In any event, whatever is
absolutely transferred by an originator can no longer be part of the
property of the estate.64
Of course, the owner need not transfer all of the property interest
that she has. If she owns a property item, for example, she can transfer
a leasehold interest to a lessee and retain a reversion.65 If the lessor
becomes a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code, her reversion would
become property of the estate. Similarly, an owner of a property item
can grant a security interest to a secured creditor. She retains legal title,
the right to redeem the security interest, the right to any surplus value
upon sale of the property item, and typically, depending on the nature of
the property item, the right to possess and use the property item.66
whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.
Id. This is the principal definition for property of the estate, and the only one relevant for true
sale purposes. The other enumerated items refer to community property, id. § 541(a)(2), and to
property added to the estate after the commencement of the case, id. § 541(a)(3)-(7).
62 See supra note 48 and accompanying text (describing the requirement for true sale opinions
in securitizations).
63 The nomenclature of “true sale opinions” sometimes causes difficulties for sellers of
receivables. Financial Accounting Standard No. 140, which establishes the guidelines for when a
transfer of receivables can be considered a “sale” for accounting purposes sufficient to trigger the
recognition of gain or loss by the transferor, includes the requirement that the receivables be
legally isolated from the transferor if the transferor were in bankruptcy. Financial Accounting
Standards Board, Statement of Financial Accounting Standard no. 140 ¶¶ 9(a), 27-28 at 9, 21
(Sept. 2000) [hereinafter FAS 140]. The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
prepared an example of language in an opinion that would satisfy this requirement stating that
“the transfer of the Financial Assets from the Seller to the Purchaser would be considered to be a
sale (or a true sale) of the Financial Assets and the proceeds thereof transferred to the Purchaser
and not a loan.” American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Profession Standards
Auditing Interpretation Section 9336 ¶ 1.13 (2002) (emphasis in original). The difficulty with
this approach is that a bankruptcy court must decide whether the transferred receivables have
been excluded from the estate but is not required to rule on whether there has been a sale and may
not in fact make such a ruling. In addition, the suggested language contains a technical error in
stating that the transfer would not be “a loan.” A transfer of assets cannot be a loan; the language
should have used language to the effect that the transfer “would not be a transfer as security for a
loan.”
64 See Plank, Bankruptcy Estate, supra note 50, at 1204-07.
65 See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 59, § 3.3, at 83-85, § 6.1, at 243-45, § 6.12, at
256-57 (describing the specific interests of a lessee and lessor in real estate); see also U.C.C. §
2A-103(1)(j)-(m), (p)-(q) (1995) (defining the specific interests of a lessee and lessor in goods).
66 See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 4.1-29, at
129-206 (4th ed. 2001) (describing the mortgagor’s equity interest in real estate); see also U.C.C.
§§ 9-608(a)(4), 9-611, 9-615(d) (2001) (in the case of personal property, requiring the secured
party to account to and pay to a debtor any surplus from collections on receivables or proceeds
from a foreclosure sale and to give the debtor notice of the foreclosure sale). Although Article 9
defines a security interest to include a buyer’s interest in receivables, the provisions giving the
debtor the right to surplus or notice before a sale do not apply to a buyer and seller of receivables.
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These retained interests would also become part of property of the
transferor’s estate. If the transferor of these lesser interests—a
leasehold interest or a security interest—becomes a debtor in
bankruptcy, the inclusion of the transferor’s interest in the property of
the estate may have an adverse effect on the transferee. As discussed
above, this adverse effect creates additional costs for a secured
creditor.67
Since time immemorial, parties to transactions have attempted to
disguise the true nature of the transaction when one or both of the
parties want to avoid limitations imposed by law on that type of
transaction. In exchange for a loan, for example, an owner of real estate
may deliver an absolute deed to the creditor as security for the loan,
retaining an option to “repurchase” the real estate at a fixed price on
some future date. By taking such a deed, the creditor hopes to avoid
limitations on its ability to liquidate the collateral pledged to secure a
loan.68 A borrower and a lender may characterize a pledge of
receivables to the lender as a “sale” to avoid limits on the amount of
interest that can be charged on a loan69 or to enable the lender to avoid
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.70 The lender in such a
disguised pledge transaction may simply want to avoid the obligations
of a true secured party to comply with foreclosure requirements of
Article 9 of the UCC71 or to remit to the “seller” the surplus collections
from receivables over the amounts advanced to the seller.72 These
See id. § 9-601(g) & cmt. 9, § 9-608(b), 9-615(e).
67 See supra notes 50-56 and accompanying text.
68 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 66, §§ 3.4-11, at 46-60.
69 See West Pico Furniture Co. v. Pac. Fin. Loans, 469 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1970); Milana v. Credit
Discount Co., 163 P.2d 869 (Cal. 1945); People v. Serv. Inst., 421 N.Y.S.2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1979);
Annotation, Usury As Predicable Upon Transaction in Form a Sale or Exchange of Commercial
Paper or Other Choses in Action, 165 A.L.R. 626 (1946).
70 See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. v. Grover (In re The Woodson Co.), 813 F.2d 266, 269
(9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the purported sale of participation interests in underlying loans was a
disguised grant of a security interest because the sellers retained all of the risk of loss on the
underlying loans); In re Carolina Util. Supply Co., 118 B.R. 412 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1990); Malone v.
Celeron Oil & Gas Co. (In re Currie), 57 B.R. 224 (Bankr. M.D. La. 1986) (assignment by a
mortgagor to a mortgagee payments from a mineral lease as additional security for a mortgage
loan); Rechnitzer v. Boyd (In re Exec. Growth Inv., Inc.), 40 B.R. 417 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1984);
Sarf v. Leff (In re Candy Lane Corp.), 38 B.R. 571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (assignment of a
portion of an expected condemnation award as part of a loan transaction); Castle Rock Enter. v.
S.O.A.W. Indus. Bank (In re S.O.A.W. Indust. Bank), 32 B.R. 279 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1983); In
re Evergreen Valley Resort, 23 B.R. 659 (Bankr. D. Me. 1982); Robert D. Aicher & William J.
Fellerhoff, Characterization of a Transfer of Receivables as a Sale or a Secured Loan Upon
Bankruptcy of the Transferor, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 181 (1991).
71 See U.C.C. § 9-607(c) (requiring a secured party to proceed in a commercially reasonable
manner to collect receivables); id. § 610(b) (requiring every disposition of collateral repossessed
by a secured party to be commercially reasonable); id. §§ 9-611 to -613 (requiring notification to
debtor before disposition of collateral).
72 See id. § 9-608 (requiring a secured party to account to and pay to the debtor any surplus
from collections); id. § 9-615(b) (requiring a secured party to account to and pay to the debtor any
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obligations generally do not apply to a true buyer of receivables.73
Similarly, an owner of a personal property item may disguise an
installment sale of the item to the purchaser as a “lease” in which the
seller retains only a nominal residual interest and title to secure the
payment of the purchase price in the form of rent, again, to obtain these
impermissible benefits.74 Courts will look through these disguised
transactions and apply the legal rules appropriate for the true nature of
the transaction.
Securitizations, like other transactions involving the sale of
property, are not immune from these limitations. Securitization requires
that the transfer of receivables by an owner to a pass-through trustee or
an SPE be a true sale of the receivables. The elements of a true sale are
relatively straightforward. First, the terms of the transaction should
describe it as a sale and not a transfer for security. In other words, the
form of the transfer must be a sale.75 Form alone, however, is not
enough. The substance of the transaction also must constitute a sale.
Hence, the transferor should transfer most of the benefits and burdens of
ownership.76 In the case of the transfer of receivables, this requires that
the buyer receive most of the risk of loss from default by the obligors
and most of the opportunity for gain or loss in the market value of the
receivables.77 Finally, the seller must receive fair market value for the
transfer of benefits and burdens of ownership and for retention of any of
those risks.78
In practice, the sale of receivables in a securitization is stronger
surplus from the disposition of collateral repossessed by a secured party).
73 Except in the case of U.C.C. § 9-607(c), which requires a secured party to proceed in a
commercially reasonable manner to collect receivables if it is entitled to recourse against the
seller, none of the duties imposed on secured parties by Part VI of the U.C.C., discussed supra in
notes 71 and 72, apply to a buyer of receivables. See id. § 9-601(g).
74 See generally JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §
21-3, at 718-33 (4th ed. 1995).
75 See S&P 2002 LEGAL CRITERIA, supra note 21, at 93 (app. I) (noting the importance of the
language of the parties to express the intent of the parties); Thomas E. Plank, The True Sale of
Loans and the Role of Recourse, 14 GEO. MASON L. REV. 287, 333-34 (1991) [hereinafter Plank,
True Sale]; Comm. on Bankruptcy, Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 1, at 547
76 S&P 2002 LEGAL CRITERIA, supra note 21, at 93-94 (app. I) (describing various elements
of the burden and benefits of receivables that should be transferred); Plank, True Sale, supra note
75, at 328-29, 334-39; Comm. on Bankruptcy, Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 1, at
542-47.
77 The market value of receivables will change, even without taking into consideration
obligor default, as a result of changes in interest rates for comparable receivables and other
market factors that affect value, such as factors that affect prepayment of the receivables. These
could also include changes in the law that make the receivables more or less desirable for the
owner. See, e.g., S&P 2002 LEGAL CRITERIA, supra note 21, at 94 (app. I) (noting that
“[r]ecourse to the seller for risks of changes in law or regulations are viewed as inconsistent with
a sale treatment”).
78 See, e.g., id. at 93-94 (noting that the seller should not receive substantially less than fair
market value and that the consideration should not depend on the future performance of the
receivables); Plank, True Sale, supra note75, at 328-29, 334-39.
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than most sales of property. Because the stakes are high—the issuance
of securities carrying an investment grade rating—the investors must
receive a true sale opinion.79 Therefore, the law firm rendering the
opinion would require that the sale be structured so that there is an
extremely high degree of certainty that any court would80 conclude that
the receivables sold were not part of the seller’s bankruptcy estate.
Opinions that say that “it is more likely than not” or that a court
“should” uphold the sale are not acceptable. For most other sales of
property items, neither true sale opinions nor questions about whether a
bankruptcy court would disregard a sale arise, even in those cases where
the seller retains some of the future risk relating to the property item,
such as liability associated with the future performance of the property
item.81
Indeed, courts have upheld the sale of property items when the
seller retains some of the risk or the some of the benefits of ownership.
For example, many courts have upheld a sale of receivables even
though the seller retains 100 percent recourse, that is, liability if the
underlying obligor does not pay.82 I have argued that there could be a
true sale under such circumstances, if properly structured.83 Yet, in
securitizations, the seller generally may not retain recourse greater than
historical loss84 or, in the case of long-term mortgage loans, 10 percent
79
80
81

See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
See S&P 2002 LEGAL CRITERIA, supra note 21, at 95.
Sellers of goods often make promises concerning future performance. See U.C.C. § 2313(a)(1) (defining an express warranty as any “affirmation of fact or promise” made by seller
that relates to the goods and that is the basis of the bargain). Holders who negotiate negotiable
instruments to subsequent holders by indorsement retain liability if the maker or drawer does not
pay the instrument unless they expressly disclaim liability. See id. § 3-415(a), (b). Practically
every person who has cashed a check drawn by another at a bank or other establishment, which
normally requires the person’s indorsement, retains liability if the check is not paid.
Nevertheless, one does not see claims that there had not been a true sale of the check to the bank.
82 See, e.g., Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 103 (1833); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp.
v. Mid-West Chevrolet, 66 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1933); Goldstein v. Madison Nat’l Bank, 89 B.R.
274 (D.D.C. 1988); Inv. Thrift v. AMA Corp., 63 Cal. Rptr. 157 (Ct. App. 1967); Indian Lake
Estates, Inc. v. Special Inv., Inc., 154 So.2d 883 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Starker v. Heckart,
267 P.2d 219 (Or. 1954); Coast Fin. Corp. v. Ira F. Powers Furniture Co., 209 P. 614 (Or. 1922);
Lake Hiawassee Dev. Co. v. Pioneer Bank, 535 S.W.2d 323 (Tenn. 1976); A.B. Lewis Co. v.
Nat’l Inv. Corp., 421 S.W.2d 723 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967); Val Zimmermann Corp. v. Leffingwell,
318 N.W.2d 781 (Wis. 1982); cf. Refinance Corp. v. N. Lumber Sales, Inc., 329 P.2d 109 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (involving twenty percent recourse in the form of a reserve fund financed
from sale proceeds plus one hundred percent recourse for loans without the buyer’s prior
approval).
83 See generally Plank, True Sale, supra note 75. The securitization industry has not,
understandably, adopted my argument that there could be a true sale even if the seller retained
one hundred percent recourse for credit default. See S&P 2002 LEGAL CRITERIA, supra note 21,
at 28 (noting that S&P will not rely on a true sale opinion for a transaction if the seller retains a
significant subordinate interest in the receivables or guarantees losses higher than historic loss
because “Standard & Poor’s believes that, although these transactions may actually be true sales,
they have a higher likelihood of being recharacterized as secured loan transactions”).
84 See S&P 2002 LEGAL CRITERIA, supra note 21, at 93-94; see also supra note 83.
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of the principal balance sold.85 In addition, numerous courts have held
that a sale of assets constitutes a true sale notwithstanding a seller’s
option to repurchase such assets, when there were no other significant
facts, such as inadequate consideration, suggesting that the parties
intended the transfer to be for security rather than to be an absolute
transfer.86 In securitizations, however, options by sellers to repurchase
are generally limited.87
85 This limit, even if larger than historical loss, appeared in the 1980s in mortgage loan
securitizations by savings associations when they were regulated by the former Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, which had a regulation defining a sale “without recourse” as a sale with
recourse for losses of less than ten percent, a rule that is still in effect for purposes other than
capital requirements under its successor, the Office of Thrift Supervision. See 12 C.F.R. §
561.55(b) (2003) (defining “recourse,” for general regulatory purposes, as credit liability for
saving associations exceeding ten percent). Although S&P’s published criteria has consistently
limited permitted credit recourse to historical loss, see supra note 84 and accompanying text,
S&P has long accepted true sale opinions in mortgage securitizations with recourse in excess of
historical loss but less than ten percent. I believe there is a good reason for allowing recourse of
up to ten percent in a mortgage sale. Even with a guarantee of the buyer’s principal against loss
from default by the mortgagor of up to ten percent, the buyer is still taking a risk of greater than
ten percent in loss of value in the case of a change in market rates for comparable mortgages. An
increase of two percentage points in mortgage interest rates will cause the market value of a long
term mortgage loan to decline by more than ten percent. See Plank, True Sale, supra note 75 at
298-301 (proving examples of the effect on the market value of a mortgage with a twenty-eight
year maturity of a change in comparable market interest rates of two percentage points).
86 See, e.g., Robert Mickam Trust v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Mich. 1994)
(holding that a vendor of real property retained no interest in property to which a federal lien
could attach after sale of property, though the deed was delivered into escrow under an agreement
allowing repurchase by vendor upon satisfaction of conditions contained in agreement); In re San
Francisco Indust. Park, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 271 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (holding that transactions styled
in terms of sale and leaseback and carried as the same by the parties on their books was in fact, as
well as in form, a sale and leaseback, and not a mortgage); Costello v. F & M Enter. (In re F & M
Enter.), 34 B.R. 211 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983) (holding that a deed with repurchase option was an
absolute conveyance and not security for a loan); Henslee v. Ratliff, 989 S.W.2d 161 (Ct. App.
Ark 1999) (upholding a trial court finding that, for purposes of determining right to proceeds of
tort recovery action, a deed conveying 200 acres of timber land subject to separate repurchase
option transferred ownership to transferees); Dillree v. Devoe, 724 P.2d 171 (Mont. 1986)
(upholding a finding of fact that a transfer of goods was a sale and not a secured transaction
notwithstanding seller’s option to repurchase); Cizek v. Cizek, 266 N.W.2d 68 (Neb. 1978)
(holding that a seller was not entitled to have a deed conveying farm with option to repurchase
declared a mortgage); Redman Indus. v. Couch, 613 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981)
(affirming a summary judgment that a transfer was a sale and not a secured loan where seller held
an option to repurchase the asset); see also Resthaven Mem. Cemetery, Inc. v. Comm’r, 43
B.T.A. 683 (U.S. Bd. of Tax App. 1941) (holding that transfer of assets constituted a sale
notwithstanding seller’s option to repurchase assets).
87 Options to repurchase at the then fair market value are not problematic, because this kind
of an option does not enable the seller to retain the benefit of an increase in the market value of
the receivable. These usually only appear when there are some special circumstances that require
the seller to retain the option. However, options to repurchase receivables at par, that is, at the
then face amount—which may or may not be fair market value at the time of the exercise of the
option—are allowed in only limited circumstances. One example is the “clean up call.” If the
seller is the servicer, the seller—but only in its role as servicer—may repurchase the receivables
when the then principal balance of the pool of receivables that has been securitized has been
reduced to ten percent of the original balance. The justification for this clean up call is that, when
the balance of the receivables becomes so small, the aggregate servicing fee (which is a
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Whatever the standards for a true sale, so long as there is a true
sale of receivables to a separate legal person, the receivables should not
be included in a bankruptcy estate of the seller. There is no principled
basis for treating a true sale of receivables in a securitization in a
manner different from a true sale of receivables or other property items
in any other context. To be sure, the analysis of whether there is a true
sale may differ in its particulars because different types of property
items manifest different benefits and burdens of ownership.88
Nevertheless, if there is a true sale of receivables in a securitization, the
sale should be respected. Further, it should not matter that the sale is to
an affiliate of the seller.89
B.

Separateness of the Special Purpose Entity

The innovation in securitization is the use of a bankruptcy remote
SPE to separate the risk associated with a particular pool of receivables
from all the other risks associated with an owner of the receivables that
is an operating company. When the risks associated with the pool of
receivables are lower than the risks associated with the operating
company, the overall costs of issuing debt securities by an SPE are
lower than the cost of issuing debt securities by the operating

percentage of the declining principal balance of the receivables, usually between one-quarter of
one percent and three percent per annum, depending on the type of receivable) earned by the
servicer becomes overwhelmed by fixed costs of satisfying the requirements for servicing for a
pool of rated securities. FAS, 140, supra note 63, ¶¶ 9(c), at 5, 30-31, 50-54 & 153 (defining a
clean up call). Another example is the option of the servicer to repurchase a defaulted receivable
at par. Typically, a servicer would exercise this option if it thought that it could obtain greater
proceeds if the receivable were not subject to the limitations that the securitization documents put
on the servicer.
88 For example, if I buy a tire, and the seller promises for an extra fee to repair or replace the
tire for any reason, no one would challenge the true sale of the tire because I have possession,
control, and use of the tire. Yet, the seller retains all of the risks associated with the tire except
the risk of theft. This risk, in the case of the sale of receivables, would be comparable to retaining
both one hundred percent credit recourse and one hundred percent responsibility for yield
maintenance for a receivable. In this regard, courts treat transfers of receivables more
unfavorably, and I believe they do so because they are less familiar with receivables as property.
See Plank, True Sale, supra note 75, at 298.
89 See, e.g., In re W.T. Mayfield Sons Trucking Co., 225 B.R. 818, 827 (N.D. Ga. 1998) ; In
re Guyana Dev. Corp. 168 B.R. 892, 905 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (same); see also Rimco Acquisition
Co. v. Johnson, 68 F. Supp. 2d 793, 797 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (holding that the automatic stay does
not stay actions against a non-debtor subsidiary when its parent is in bankruptcy); In re
Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 59 B.R. 129, 134 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.1986) (holding that the mine
that debtor had transferred to wholly owned corporation before filing chapter 11 petition, did not
become property of debtor’s estate at commencement of bankruptcy case and therefore debtor had
no responsibility for maintenance expenses of mine); Texaco-Ohio Gas, Inc. v. Mecom, 28
S.W.3d 129, 144 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that the automatic stay does not extend to
separate legal entities).
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company.90 Establishing separate legal entities to allocate risk,
however, is not new.
Corporations have long been treated as separate legal persons. By
statute, a corporation generally has perpetual existence, and it can sue
and can be sued, can deal with property, make contracts, incur
obligations, conduct business, carry on operations, own equity interests
in other legal entities, lend money, purchase insurance, and do other
acts that a natural person can do.91 More recently, state statutes have
given limited partnerships, limited liability companies, and statutory
trusts broad powers as separate legal entities92 and declared them to be
90 See supra note 4 (discussing a transaction in which GMAC saved money by securitizing
four billion dollars of automobile loans). In this case, when GMAC securitized these loans, its
traditional debt securities had an AA rating. The securities backed solely by the loans received a
AAA rating. The cost saving for GMAC, however, resulted not from the difference in interest
rates. The difference in the interest rates from a AAA security and a AA security were small, and
after factoring in the increased costs of the asset-backed securities, amount only to two-hundreths
of one percent, or two “basis points,” annually. Instead, the primary form of savings derived
from avoiding the cost to GMAC of maintaining the amount of equity required for GMAC to
achieve a AA rating on its own debt securities. See Rosenthal & Ocampo, supra note 4, at 32.
91 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122 (2003):
Every corporation created under this chapter shall have power to:
(1) Have perpetual succession by its corporate name . . . ;
(2) Sue and be sued in all courts and participate, as a party or otherwise, in any judicial,
administrative, arbitrative or other proceeding, in its corporate name;
...
(4) Purchase, receive, take by grant, gift, devise, bequest or otherwise, lease, or
otherwise acquire, own, hold, improve, employ, use and otherwise deal in and with real
or personal property, or any interest therein, wherever situated, and to sell, convey,
lease, exchange, transfer or otherwise dispose of, or mortgage or pledge, all or any of
its property and assets, or any interest therein, wherever situated;
...
(8) Conduct its business, carry on its operations and have offices and exercise its
powers within or without this State;
...
(10) Be an incorporator, promoter or manager of other corporations of any type or
kind;
(11) Participate with others in any corporation, partnership, limited partnership, joint
venture or other association of any kind . . . ;
...
(13) Make contracts, including contracts of guaranty and suretyship, incur liabilities,
borrow money at such rates of interest as the corporation may determine, issue its
notes, bonds and other obligations, and secure any of its obligations by mortgage,
pledge or other encumbrance of all or any of its property . . .;
(14) Lend money for its corporate purposes, invest and reinvest its funds, and take,
hold and deal with real and personal property as security for the payment of funds so
loaned or invested.
Id.
92 UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §§ 112 (1996), 6A U.L.A. 560, 576-77 (2003) (stating that a
“limited liability company may be organized under this [Act] for any lawful purpose,” and that
unless “its articles of organization provide otherwise, a limited liability company has the same
powers as an individual to do all things necessary or convenient to carry on its business or
affairs,” including the power to: “(1) sue and be sued, and defend in its name; (2) . . . acquire,
own, hold, improve, use, and otherwise deal with real or personal property, or any legal or
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separate legal entities.93
During the last part of the twentieth century, a substantial body of
scholarship eschewed the “entity” model of corporations in favor of a
“contractarian model” and has argued that corporations represent a
nexus of contracts among their many constituents, such as shareholders,
directors, officers, employees, and others.94 This model may be helpful
in analyzing the interaction among and the role of these different
constituents. Nevertheless, this view of the firm does not eliminate the
fact that, for purposes of transactions with others, the corporation and
other artificial legal entities are separate legal entities.95 To put it
another way, to analyze the sale of a property interest from a seller to a
corporation, even if only a “nexus of contracts,” still requires the simple
property analysis of whether the seller has transferred a substantial part
of the benefits and burdens of ownership to the corporation.96
Whatever the scholarly view of the nature of the corporation,
legislatures and courts have for over a century recognized the
separateness of the corporation from its shareholders, affiliates, and
other constituent bodies. Such separateness allows for the allocation
and diversification of risks and the development of specialization.
Hence, General Motors Corporation can establish a separate subsidiary
corporation, General Motors Acceptance Corporation (“GMAC”), to
specialize in the business of financing automobile dealers and
purchasers of their product.97 Lenders to and investors in GMAC
equitable interest in property, wherever located; (3) sell . . . and otherwise encumber . . . its
property; (4) . . . acquire, own, hold, vote, use, sell, grant a security interest in, or otherwise
dispose of and deal in and with, shares or other interests in or obligations of any other entity; (5)
make contracts and guarantees, incur liabilities, borrow money . . . and . . . secure any of its
obligations . . .; lend money and invest . . .”); 104(c) (2001), 6A U.L.A. 9, 18 (stating that a
“limited partnership has a perpetual duration”); 105 (providing that a limited partnership “has the
powers to do all things necessary or convenient to carry on its activities, including the power to
sue, be sued, and defend in its own name”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3805(c) (2003) (providing
that a beneficial owner’s beneficial interest in the statutory trust is personal property and that,
except as otherwise provided in the governing instrument, “a beneficial owner has no interest in
specific statutory trust property”).
93 See, e.g., UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 201 (1996), 6A U.L.A. 560, 578 (2003) (stating that
a “limited liability company is a legal entity distinct from its members”); UNIF. LTD. P’SHIP ACT
§ 104(c) (2001), 6A U.L.A. 9, 18 (2003) (stating that a “limited partnership is an entity distinct
from its partners”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3801(a) (Supp. 2003) (declaring a Delaware
statutory trust to be “a separate legal entity”).
94 See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS § 1.5, at
26-38 (2002).
95 See id. § 1.2, at 7 (stating that, as “a legal matter, the corporation is an entity wholly
separate from the people who own it and work for it” and that for most purposes it has “an
identity wholly apart from its constituents”).
96 See, e.g., id. § 1.5, at 28 (noting that, under the contractarian model of the firm, owning a
few shares of stock in a corporation does not entitle the stockholder “to trespass on [the
corporation’s] property—[the stockholder does] not own the land or even have any ownershiplike right to enter its land”)
97 See General Motors Acceptance Corporation, Annual Report, Form 10-K, at 1 (2002)
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therefore do not assume the risks associated with the manufacture of
automobiles.98
Some might argue that SPEs should be treated differently on the
grounds that the use of an SPE in a securitization allows secured
creditors to avoid the jurisdiction of bankruptcy law. This is not
correct. The SPE, as a separate legal entity, retains the risks associated
with the receivables. The SPE is not bankruptcy proof; it is merely
bankruptcy remote. An SPE is structured to eliminate the risk of
bankruptcy for reasons not related to the receivables. An SPE retains
the risk of bankruptcy if the receivables perform poorly and the SPE
defaults on its debt. If the receivables do not perform as expected, and
the creditors seek to enforce their security interest against the SPE, the
SPE has a reason to file for bankruptcy. At least one insolvent SPE has
filed for bankruptcy for this reason.99
For this reason, Kingston Square Associates100 is no threat to
securitization. In this case, eleven SPEs that owned real estate
properties and that had defaulted on their loans faced foreclosure by the
secured lenders. To stall the foreclosures, the individual who was the
controlling principal of the SPEs solicited creditors to file an
involuntary bankruptcy petition against the SPEs.101 The lenders
challenged the involuntary petitions as a bad faith avoidance of the
requirement that the SPEs obtain the consent of the independent director
of the SPEs for a voluntary or involuntary filing.102 The controlling
principal of the SPEs had not sought the consent of the independent
director because he viewed the independent director as an agent of the
lenders and did not expect that such consent would be given.103
Although finding that the principal had orchestrated the filings, the
court rejected the lenders’ claim that soliciting the involuntary petition
evidenced bad faith. For this reason, and because of the failure of the
principal to seek the approval of the independent director, the court
declined to rule on the motion of the debtors and the petitioning
creditors to invalidate the requirement for the approval of the
independent director for a bankruptcy petition. Some commentators
(noting that GMAC has been a wholly owned subsidiary of General Motors Corporation
(“GMC”) since 1919).
98 See id. at 29 (disclosing approximately $180 billion in debt).
99 See Comm. on Bankruptcy, Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 1, at 565-67;
Harold L. Kaplan & Stephanie Wickouski, Column, Intensive Care, Health Care Financing And
Securitization After National Century, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2003, at 28.
100 214 B.R 713 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997)
101 Some of the SPEs were corporations, in which an independent director was a member of
the board of directors. Others were limited partnerships in which the general partner was an SPE
corporation, again with an independent director was a member of the board of directors. See id.
at 716-17.
102 See id. at 715, 723 .
103 See id. at 720 n.11, 736.
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have interpreted the court’s decision as raising “questions concerning
the viability of corporate governance mechanisms in bankruptcy remote
vehicles.”104 I do not believe that either the case or the court’s language
has any such effect. True, the court seemed not to understand the nature
of the provisions requiring the consent of the independent director for a
bankruptcy filing. The court repeatedly called them “bankruptcy proof”
provisions in all but one instance.105 These are not “bankruptcy proof”
provisions, just bankruptcy remote provisions. Indeed, the independent
director in the case testified that these provisions were designed to
prevent the principal of the debtors from bringing the SPEs into the
principal’s personal bankruptcy.106 More importantly, as discussed
above, when an SPE is insolvent and the secured creditor commences
foreclosure proceedings against the SPE’s assets, one would expect that
an independent director would vote in favor of a bankruptcy petition.107
At a broader level, the legal device of a separate corporation or
other artificial legal person, like all legal devices, can be abused. The
law, however, recognizes a remedy. State law allows creditors of a
corporation to “pierce the corporate veil” and impose liability for the
creditors’ claims on the shareholders of the corporation under certain
circumstances. Courts will do so if the shareholder has failed to respect
the separateness of the corporation, that is, has failed to comply with
corporate formalities and to keep the operations, assets, and records of
the corporation separate, and at the same has engaged in inequitable
conduct, such as using the corporation to perpetuate fraud on
creditors.108
A bankruptcy court will also substantively consolidate two
affiliated entities under similar circumstances. For example, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Augie/Restivo Baking Co.109
104 See Committee on Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization of The Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, New Developments in Structured Finance, 56 BUS. LAW. 95, 162
(2000).
105 See Kingston Square, 214 B.R. at 716 (stating that the requirement for independent director
consent to a bankruptcy filing is “commonly referred to as a ‘bankruptcy remote’ or ‘bankruptcy
proof’ provision”); id. at 721, 722, 729, 737 (using only the term “bankruptcy proof”); id. at 724
(noting that the involuntary petitions were filed “to circumvent what effectively were prohibitions
on the filing of voluntary petitions”); id. at 736 (stating that the “Movants [lenders] may feel
bruised because the Respondents outmaneuvered what the Movants thought was an iron-clad
provision in the corporate by-laws preventing a bankruptcy filing, but this does not mean that,
without more, the petitions must be dismissed”). It may be that either of the parties used this term
“bankruptcy proof” and the court simply accepted this use.
106 See id. at 722.
107 Another distinguishing feature of this case is the failure of the board of directors to hold
regular meetings and comply with corporate formalities, including the inattention of the
independent director to the affairs of the debtors, and the close ties of the independent director to
the lenders. See id. at 730, 735-36.
108 FRANKLIN A. GEVURTZ, CORPORATION LAW §1.5, at 69-108 (2000) (analyzing and
criticizing the law on piercing the corporate veil).
109 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988).
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identified two critical factors for consolidation: “(i) whether creditors
dealt with the entities as a single economic unit and did not rely on their
separate identity in extending credit . . . [or] (ii) whether the affairs of
the debtors are so entangled that consolidation will benefit all
creditors.”110 Some courts have used a more liberal approach and have
substantively consolidated affiliates if there has been a failure to respect
the separateness of the affiliates, and the creditor or party opposing the
consolidation has failed to demonstrate that it did not rely solely on the
separate credit of one affiliate.111 As discussed above, securitizations
contain features to reduce or eliminate the risk of substantive
consolidation or veil piercing. Unless the SPE meets the tests
applicable to corporations or other legal entities for disregarding their
separateness, the separate legal existence of the SPE should continue to
be respected by federal courts.
III. ASSAULTS ON SECURITIZATION
A.

The Undifferentiated “Form over Substance” Argument

As noted above, courts have long disregarded the express form of a
single transaction when the substance of the transaction did not match
the form. In these cases, they have given effect to the substance of the
transaction. Calling a transaction a sale does not make it a sale if the
transfer in substance is a grant of a security interest to secure repayment
of a debt. Thus, a “seller” may transfer a property interest to a “buyer”
110
111

See id. at 518.
See, e.g., Eastgroup Prop. v. S. Motel Assoc., Ltd., 935 F.2d 245, 249 (11th Cir. 1991); In
re Vecco Constr. Indus., 4 B.R. 407, 408-09 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980). In Eastgroup, the court
upheld a bankruptcy court’s order consolidating a debtor corporation that operated a motel and
that had many debts and few assets with an affiliated debtor partnership that owned the motel
property and had greater assets and fewer debts. The court held that a proponent of substantive
consolidation must show that (1) there is a substantial identity between the entities to be
consolidated and (2) consolidation is necessary to avoid some harm or realize some benefit.
Upon a proponent making a prima facie case for consolidation, the burden shifts to the objecting
creditor to show that (i) it has relied on the separate credit of one of the entities to be consolidated
and (ii) it will be prejudiced by substantive consolidation. See Eastgroup, 935 F.2d at 249. The
court cited the following facts: (1) ownership was common; (2) both entities used the same
employees and the same physical facilities and employees were paid by only one entity, although
they performed services for both; (3) funds were transferred from one entity to the other; (4) one
entity paid unsecured debts of the other; (5) substantial defaults in performance of inter-company
agreements had no effect on the continuing relationships; (6) confusion existed regarding the
question of which entity owns which assets [based on testimony of one witness]; and (7) absent
consolidation, majority of creditors [mostly of the operating partnership] will receive only a small
portion of their claims, while the equity interest holders [of the partnership] may receive
substantial distribution. See id. at 250. Finally, the court held that, even though creditors of the
less insolvent partnership would be prejudiced by consolidation, those creditors had failed to
show that they had relied solely on the separate credit of the partnership. See id. at 251-52.
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in exchange for the “purchase price” but retain all of the benefits and
burdens of ownership. For example, the seller may guarantee the buyer
against future losses and retain all of the residual proceeds in excess of
the purchase price. In this case, the courts will recharacterize this “sale”
as a pledge, and properly so.
Relying on this analogy, some bankruptcy scholars have suggested
to me that securitizations should be disregarded because, in their view, a
securitization is only a disguised security interest.112 They argue that
the two separate transactions in a securitization—sale of receivables to
an SPE and a grant of a security interest in the receivables by the SPE as
security for the debt securities—is in substance a grant of a security
interest in the receivables by the seller in favor of the securities
holders.113 They note that the seller can retain the economic benefits
from the receivables by selling them to a wholly owned SPE subsidiary.
For example, assume that originator O sells to a SPE receivables worth
$100, and the SPE issues debt securities in the amount of $80. The SPE
retains an equity interest in the receivables, and O retains stock in the
SPE worth, roughly, $20.114 Hence, the argument is that the two steps
in the securitization—sale by O to SPE and pledge by SPE to
investors—should be recharacterized as a simple grant of a security
interest by O to the investors.
This simple argument, however, is flawed. First, it only applies for
those originators who establish their own wholly owned SPEs.
Although this structure is used in many securitizations, many other
securitizations involve a sale by an originator to an unaffiliated SPE.
The “form over substance” argument does not apply to these
securitizations. Hence, successful deployment of the argument would
not stop securitizations. It would merely eliminate some of them, and
reduce the choices available to originators to obtain money to conduct
their businesses.
Also, other securitizations involve a sale to an SPE that is an
affiliate of the seller, such as a sister corporation, that is not a direct or
indirect subsidiary. In these cases, an affiliate of the SPE—say, the
parent of both the originator and the SPE—retains the indirect residual
benefit. The “form over substance” argument does not directly apply to
112 See also Lupica, supra note 6, at 641 (suggesting that bankruptcy judges could use their
discretion to find that “securitization transactions are nothing more than extravagant and
embellished security interests designed to circumvent the bankruptcy process”).
113 See Letter from Kenneth J. Kettering, Associate Professor, New York Law School, et al. to
Senator Patrick Leahy and Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner (February 5, 2002) [hereinafter
Kettering Letter], available at http://www.abiworld.org/resources/research/nylawschoolletter.
html.
114 In reality, because the financing costs for the SPE are lower as a result of the lower interest
rate on the debt securities—taking into account the lack of a bankruptcy premium that O would
have to pay—the receivables owned by the SPE, even after taking into account the additional
costs of the SPE, will be worth more than they were when owned by O.

PLANK.GALLEY

2004]

5/25/2004 4:02 PM

THE SECURITY OF SECURITIZATION

1685

these securitizations. To make the argument fit to these securitizations,
one would have to collapse two affiliated legal entities into one.
Second, the “form over substance” argument fails to take into
account the real economic difference between a direct security interest
and the two-step sale and pledge in securitizations. In a direct pledge
by an owner of receivables to secure debt obligations of the originator,
the creditors of the owner have a claim on all of the owner’s assets.115
If the receivables themselves underperform, and prove to be insufficient
to repay the creditors, the creditors will be able to share at least as
unsecured creditors in the owner’s assets if the owner files for
bankruptcy. In the case of a securitization, however, the investors only
have a claim on the assets of the SPE, and not the assets of the seller. If
the seller becomes a debtor in bankruptcy, the investors will not have
claims against the seller.
Third, securitizations are not “disguised” transactions. In the
traditional case in which a court will disregard the form of a transaction
to give effect to its substance, the parties attempted to disguise the true
nature of their transaction to avoid legal rules that they deemed
undesirable. Securitizations, however, are transparent. There must be
an open, clear true sale in both form and the substance to an SPE.116
The SPE must be, in both form and substance, a separate legal
person.117 Securitizations are openly and specifically designed to avoid
the risks of the bankruptcy of the seller of the receivables and the
bankruptcy premium paid on direct secured debt.
Although some may decry this risk avoidance, there is nothing
insidious about using existing legal technologies to reduce risk—
including bankruptcy risk—in an open manner. There is no basis in the
law for disregarding two open and legitimate legal transactions—a true
sale of property, and the establishment of a separate legal entity—
simply because the combined result might, in some respects, resemble a
single step transaction that has different legal consequences. In this
regard, a securitization is no different that an individual conducting
115 The creditors would not have a claim against all of the assets of the owner if the debt were
“non-recourse.” Non-recourse lending is common in loans secured by real estate. See, e.g., Alan
Wayte, Selected Issues in the Negotiation of Real Estate Financing Documents, REAL ESTATE
FINANCING DOCUMENTATION: COPING WITH NEW REALITIES 57, 59, 73-76 (2003). To my
knowledge, it is not used in receivables financing.
116 The sale must be perfected, and for sales of accounts and chattel paper, perfection requires
notice through the filing of a financing statement. See U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (2001). Sales of
payment intangibles and instruments are perfected upon attachment, and therefore no public
notice is given. See id. § 9-309(3) & (4). Nevertheless, for all securitizations, to ensure a true
sale, the seller must mark its books and records to reflect the sale, the documentation for the sale
must use unequivocal language of sale, and the seller must give up control of the receivables
except to the extent it retains the rights to service them.
117 To ensure the separateness of the SPE, the SPE must comply with separateness covenants
that ensure that the SPE operates separately from its parent and that it is identified as being a
separate legal person. See supra note 38 (describing the separateness covenants).

PLANK.GALLEY

1686

5/25/2004 4:02 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:5

business through a corporation instead of operating as a sole proprietor,
or having General Motors Corporation operate an automobile financing
business through a separate corporation.
B.

The LTV Bankruptcy

The bankruptcy of LTV Corporation (“LTV”) presented a direct
assault on securitization that caused some initial discomfort to the
securitization industry but that ultimately proved unsuccessful. In my
opinion, the LTV case presents no threat to the firm legal foundations of
securitization.
On December 29, 2000, LTV and 48 of its operating subsidiaries,
which produced and sold steel products, filed chapter 11 petitions under
the Bankruptcy Code.118 On the same day, LTV sought to repudiate a
trade receivables securitization and another transaction that was called
an “inventory securitization” that LTV had established in 1994 and
1998. The proffered grounds for repudiating both securitizations were
that these transactions were merely disguised secured transactions by
the debtors.119
Shortly after emerging from a prior bankruptcy in 1993, LTV and
several of its subsidiaries securitized the trade receivables generated
from the sale of their steel products.120 LTV created an SPE, LTV Sales
Finance Company (the “Receivables SPE”), to purchase the receivables,
and LTV and several affiliates entered into a revolving sale agreement
providing for the continuous sale of their receivables to the Receivables
SPE.121 The Receivables SPE simultaneously entered into a revolving
credit agreement providing for the issuance to investors of notes secured

118 See In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278, 280 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2001); Voluntary Petition,
In re LTV Steel Co., 00-43866 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio) (doc. no. 1 filed Dec. 29, 2000); Motion of
Debtors and Debtors in Possession for an Order Directing Joint Administration of Related
Chapter 11 Cases, at 12-14, In re LTV Steel Co., (doc. no. 2 filed Dec. 29, 2000). The docket for
the LTV case and the pleadings is accessable through the LTV Corporation web site at
http://www.ltvsteel.com (last visited Dec. 27, 2003), which has a link to the “Bankruptcy
Docket.”
119 See In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. at 280; Emergency Motion for (1) Order Granting
Interim Authority to Use Cash Collateral and (2) Scheduling and Establishing Deadlines Relating
to a Final Hearing; Memorandum and Points and Authorities at 1-4, In re LTV Steel Co. (doc. no.
28 filed Dec. 29, 2000) [hereinafter LTV Emergency Motion].
120 See In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. at 280.
121 See Receivables Purchase and Sale Agreement, dated as of October 12, 1994, among the
LTV Corporation, the Sellers Named Herein, LTV Steel Company, Inc., as the Servicer and LTV
Sales Finance Company, as the Purchaser, attached as Exhibits H and I to LTV’s Emergency
Motion, supra note 119, at 387-485 [hereinafter LTV Receivables Purchase Agreement].
References to pages for any exhibit to the LTV Debtors Emergency Motion reflects continuous
pagination for all of the exhibits to the Emergency Motion.
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by the receivables122 that obtained a rating of AAA from Standard and
Poor’s,123 the highest rating for debt securities.124
Four years later, two of LTV’s subsidiaries established what they
called an “inventory securitization.” These subsidiaries sold their
unfinished inventory to a newly created SPE, LTV Steel Products, LLC
(the “Inventory SPE”).125 The Inventory SPE issued debt securities and
granted a security interest in the inventory to secure repayment of the
debt securities.126 The Inventory SPE entered into a Servicing
Agreement with LTV Steel Company by which LTV Steel Company
processed and sold the inventory on behalf of the Inventory SPE.127
As discussed below, the inventory securitization played a
significant role in the litigation. The inventory securitization was not a
typical securitization, although it appears to have been a properly
structured consignment.128 Unlike a securitization of receivables, in
which the receivables generate the cash used to repay the securities,129
this inventory securitization was an attempt to “securitize” operations.
Standard and Poor’s calls these transactions “hybrid transactions”
because they use the securitization structure but the cash flow from the
transactions depend heavily upon the activities of an operating
company. Accordingly, the rating on the securities depends not on the

122 See Revolving Credit Agreement Dated as of October 12, 1994, among LTV Sales Finance
Company the Financial Institutions Parties Hereto as Banks, the Issuing Banks, and the Facility
Agent and Collateral Agent, attached as Exhibit G to LTV’s Emergency Motion, supra note 119.
123 See In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. at 286.
124 See supra note 16 (describing the rating agencies and the ratings).
125 See Contribution and Sale Agreement of February 26, 1998, among the LTV Steel
Products, LLC, as Purchaser, LTV Steel Company, Inc., as Servicer, LTV Steel Company, Inc.,
and Georgia Tubing Co., as Initial Sellers, attached as Exhibit A to LTV’s Emergency Motion,
supra note 119.
126 See Trust Agreement of February 26, 1998, between LTV Steel Products, LLC and Chase
Manhattan Bank, as Collateral Agent, attached as Exhibit C to LTV’s Emergency Motion, supra
note 119. Note Purchase and Letter of Credit Agreement dated as of Feb. 26, 1998 among LTV
Steel Products, LLC, certain Note Purchasers, Chase Securities Inc., as Placement Agent, and
Chase Manhattan Bank, as Administrative Agent and Collateral Agent, attached as Exhibit D to
LTV’s Emergency Motion, supra note 119 [hereinafter LTV Inventory Note Purchase
Agreement].
127 See Inventory Processing and Servicing Agreement, dated as of February 26, 1998, among
LTV Steel Products, LLC, LTV Steel Company, Inc., as Processor and Servicer, and Chase
Manhattan Bank, as Collateral Agent, attached as Exhibit B to LTV’s Emergency Motion, supra
note 119.
128 There was a sale of inventory to the Inventory SPE and a delivery of possession of the
inventory to a servicer for processing and sale and retention of title to the inventory by the
Inventory SPE. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(4) & cmt. 6 (2001); U.C.C. § 2-326 (1972) (both
discussing consignments).
129 The ownership of receivables requires the servicing of the receivables, that is, the
collecting, processing, and accounting for payments by obligors, and pursuing defaulting
obligors, and the quality of the servicing will affect the value of the receivables. Nevertheless,
the primary value in the receivables is the obligation of the multitude of obligors on the
receivables, most of whom voluntarily repay their obligations.
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quality of the assets but on the quality of the processor.130 For this
reason, the securities issued by the Inventory SPE obtained a rating of
BBB from Fitch Rating Services, Inc.,131 the lowest of the investment
grade ratings132 and substantially lower than the AAA rating on the
securities backed by the trade receivables purchased from LTV.
In 2000, LTV sought relief under the Bankruptcy Code.133 Unable
to obtain a commitment for debtor in possession financing before
filing,134 LTV immediately sought to repudiate the trade receivables
securitization and the inventory securitization, recapture the receivables
and inventory, and use the cash proceeds of the receivables and the
inventory to fund its reorganization efforts.135 The bases for this
emergency motion were the assertions that the securitizations were only
“disguised financing transactions” and that the court’s failure to allow
the use of the cash collateral from the trade receivables and the
inventory would “elevate form over substance at a tremendous and
tragic cost, including the loss of more than 17,500 jobs and severe
economic consequences for the unsecured creditors, shareholders and
other parties in interest.”136
On that very same day, the court entered an interim order
permitting the temporary use of the receivables and inventory and
setting a hearing on the allegations raised by LTV.137 The interim order
noted the dispute between LTV and the secured lenders to the
Receivables SPE and the Inventory SPE (the “SPE Lenders”) about
whether the transactions between the LTV debtors and the SPEs were
true sales or disguised financings.138 It permitted LTV to use, and it
130 See S&P 2002 LEGAL CRITERIA, supra note 21, at 57 (describing these transactions as
“hybrid transactions” because they combine techniques of securitization and traditional corporate
finance and noting that, in these transactions, “securitization techniques generally cannot effect
complete isolation of the credit risk of the operating assets”).
131 See LTV Inventory Note Purchase Agreement, supra note 126, at 24, 145.
132 See supra note 16 (describing the rating agencies and the ratings).
133 LTV’s summary of the events that lead to the filing appears in the Disclosure Statement,
Pursuant to section 1125 of the Bankruptcy Code with Respect to the First Amended Joint Plan of
Liquidation for VP Holdings et al., at 15-1. In re LTV Steel Co. (doc. no. 6828 filed Nov. 6,
2003) [hereinafter VP Disclosure Statement] (copy on file with the Law Review and the author).
134 A debtor usually does not have a realistic chance of reorganization if it does not obtain a
commitment for debtor in possession financing before filing. See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K.
Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751, 784-85 (2002); Marcia L. Goldstein
et al., Current Issues in Debtor in Possession Financing, at 147, 149 (PLI Comm. L. & Practice
Course, Handook Series No. 853 (2003)); David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors' Ball: the “New” New
Corporate Governance in Chapter 11, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 917, 919, 925 (2003).
135 LTV’s Emergency Motion, supra note 119; see also VP Holdings Disclosure Statement,
supra note 133, at 19, 21.
136 LTV’s Emergency Motion, supra note 119, at 4.
137 See In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. at 281; Interim Order (1) Authorizing Debtors to Obtain
Post-Petition Financing or Use Cash Collateral Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 361, 363, 364(c)(1),
364(c)(2), 364(c)(3), and 507(b) and (2) Granting Adequate Protection to Pre-Petition Parties, In
re LTV Steel Co., at 1-5 (doc. no. 41 filed Dec. 29, 2000) [hereinafter Interim Order].
138 See In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. at 281; Interim Order, supra note 137, at 2-5.
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ordered the SPE Lenders to turn over to LTV, the cash proceeds of the
inventory and receivables as working capital for LTV.139 Nevertheless,
the interim order recognized that the bankruptcy court might determine
these transactions to be true sales and therefore granted the SPE Lenders
administrative expense priority and adequate protection in the form of
senior liens on the inventory and receivables and weekly interest
payments to the SPE Lenders at pre-petition non-default rates.140
The investor in the trade receivables securitization moved for
modification of the interim order on several grounds.141 The receivables
investor argued that (1) it did not receive adequate notice of the
December 29, 2000 hearing and was thus denied due process of law; (2)
there was no basis for the court to determine that the receivables sold by
the LTV debtors were property of the debtors’ estate; and (3) that the
receivables investor’s interests were not adequately protected.142 The
debtors countered that the receivables investor received notice of the
December 29 hearing, had failed to state adequate grounds to modify
the interim order, and had received adequate protection of its interests in
the receivables.143 On February 5, 2001, the court agreed with the
debtors and rejected the motion of the receivables investor.144
The parties then prepared for a full hearing on the debtors’
allegations. This preparation included deposition of officers and
representatives of the debtors, the production of documents by the
debtors, the filing of briefs by the receivables investor, the filing of an
expert report prepared by me concluding that the trade receivables
securitization had been properly structured in accordance with industry
standards,145 the filing of amici briefs on behalf of the securitization

139
140
141

See In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. at 281; Interim Order, supra note 137, ¶ 3, at 5.
See In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. at 281; Interim Order, supra note 137, ¶¶ 5-10, at 5-7.
See Emergency Motion by Abbey National Treasury Services PLC for Modification of
Interim Order Entered on Dec. 29, 2000 and Objection to such Order, In re LTV Steel Co. (doc.
no. 98 filed Jan. 9, 2001); see also Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of (1)
Emergency Motion by Abbey National Treasury Services PLC for Modification of Interim Order
Entered on December 29, 2000 and (2) the Objection to such Order, In re LTV Steel Co. (doc. no.
180 filed Jan. 9, 2001) [hereinafter Abbey Modification Memorandum]; Memorandum of Points
and Authorities (A) in Further Support of Objection by Abbey Nat’l Treasury Serv. PLC to the
Interim Order Entered on December 29, 2000, (B) in Opposition to Debtor’s Emergency Motion
for (1) Order Granting Interim Authority to Use Cash Collateral . . ., In re LTV Steel Co. (doc.
no. 180 filed Jan. 17, 2001) [hereinafter Abbey Supplemental Memorandum].
142 See In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. at 282; see also Abbey Modification Memorandum,
supra note 141, passim; Abbey Supplemental Memorandum, supra note 141, passim.
143 See In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. at 282.
144 See id. at 287.
145 See Notice of Abbey National Treasury Services PLC of Filing Its Supplemental
Memorandum in Opposition to Debtors’ Emergency Motion for Final Order Granting Authority
to Use Cash Collateral Under Seal, In re: LTV Steel Co., (doc. no. 524 filed Feb. 20, 2001);
Expert Witness Report of Thomas E. Plank Filed Under Seal, In re: LTV Steel Co. (doc. no. 584
filed Mar. 2, 2001).
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industry, and other filings on behalf of the inventory investor.146 As the
date for the hearing on the debtors’ allegations neared, the debtors, the
receivables investor, and the inventory investor entered into a settlement
agreement. Under the settlement, the SPE Lenders, among others,
agreed to provide debtor in possession financing, the debtor/sellers
repurchased the receivables and inventory sold to the two SPEs, and the
debtors conceded that the sale of the receivables and inventory had been
true sales.147 On March 20, 2001, the court entered an order approving
the terms of the settlement. The court specifically found that the sale of
the receivables and the inventory to the two SPEs had been true sales.148
The LTV case illustrates the solid legal foundations of
securitization. Initially, some viewed the case as a potential problem for
securitization, referring specifically to language in the court’s published
opinion in In re LTV Steel Company149 denying the receivables
investor’s motion for modification of the interim order. In rejecting the
argument that the court lacked jurisdiction over the receivables sold by
the debtors to an SPE that was not a debtor, the court remarked:
Furthermore, there seems to be an element of sophistry to suggest
that Debtor does not retain at least an equitable interest in the
property that is subject to the interim order. Debtor’s business
requires it to purchase, melt, mold and cast various metal products.
To suggest that Debtor lacks some ownership interest in products
that it creates with its own labor, as well as the proceeds to be
derived from that labor, is difficult to accept. Accordingly, the Court
concludes that Debtor has at least some equitable interest in the
inventory and receivables, and that this interest is property of the
Debtor’s estate. This equitable interest is sufficient to support the
entry of the interim cash collateral order.150

This bare statement that the debtor has some equitable interest in
property that purportedly had been sold caused a minor stir in the
146 Motion for Leave to File a Memorandum on Behalf of Amici Curiae in Opposition to the
Debtors’ Emergency Motion for an Order Granting Interim and Final Authority to Use Cash
Collateral, In re: LTV Steel Co., (doc. no. 500 filed Feb. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Motion of
Securitization Amici]; Memorandum of Securitization Amici Curiae In Opposition to Debtors’
Emergency Motion for (1) Order Granting Interim and Final Authority to Use Cash Collateral, In
re LTV Steel Co. (doc. no. 502 filed Feb. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Memorandum of Securitization
Amici]; Brief of The New York Clearing House Association L.L.C. as Amicus Curiae In
Opposition to Debtors’ Emergency Motion for (1) Order Granting Interim Authority to Use Cash
Collateral, In re LTV Steel Co. (doc. no. 507 filed Feb. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Brief of New York
Clearing House Association].
147 Final Order Authorizing Debtors Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 361, 362, 363, 364(c)(1),
364(c)(2), and 364(c)(3) to (A) Obtain Post-Petition Financing and (B) Repurchase Certain
Inventory, Accounts Receivable and Adequate Protection Claims, ¶¶ 5 at 7-8, 11, at 11, In re
LTV Steel Co. (doc. no. 734 filed on Mar. 20, 2001), available at 2001 WL 1822360 at *4, *6
(Mar. 20, 2001).
148 Id.
149 274 B.R. at 280.
150 Id. at 285 (emphasis added).
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market151 and has also given hope to those who criticize securitizations.
Nevertheless, this statement does not support an argument that a sale by
an originator to an SPE and a secured borrowing by the SPE in a
securitization should be recharacterized as a direct secured transaction
by an originator.
First, the procedural posture of the court’s decision renders this
statement irrelevant to a true sale analysis. On the first day of the case,
the court had entered the interim order exerting control over the
receivables and inventory that the debtor/sellers claimed they still
owned. The agent for the receivables investor was present at the
hearing. This agent had reached agreement with the debtors regarding
the interim order, had negotiated some of the terms of the interim order,
and, although not consenting to the order because of the lack of the
consent of the receivables investor, did not object to the entry of the
order.152 The receivables investor then sought modification of this
interim order. Hence the court did not decide that the seller had an
interest in the receivables and inventory sold. It merely decided that
there were insufficient grounds to modify the interim order.
Second, the court’s statement is a conclusory declaration devoid of
analysis. The court did not identify or describe what the debtor’s
equitable interest consisted of. To be sure, LTV Steel Products, one of
the debtors, did have possession of the steel inventory because it was
the “servicer” processing the inventory on behalf of the Inventory SPE.
This possessory interest is an interest in property, and such a possessory
interest has long been a sufficient basis for the bankruptcy court’s
jurisdiction. In the case of the receivables, LTV Steel Products also was
the servicer that collected the payments of the trade receivables. In this
regard, it had some control over the receivables, but, as discussed
below,153 this control does not amount to an “equitable interest” in the
receivables. Accordingly, it would be difficult to build a strong legal
assault on securitization on the basis of the court’s conclusory
statement.
There is a more plausible explanation of the court’s statement. The
debtor had made an allegation that the debtor/sellers had not sold the
receivables. This allegation, no matter how unsubstantiated, was
151 See, e.g., ABS Finds It’s By No Means Immune to Market Rumble, INV. DEALERS’ DIG.,
Mar. 26, 2001; LTV Decision Shakes Securitization Industry, BANKR. CT. DEC., Mar. 27, 2001, at
1; Section 912: “Good Law,” 37 BANKR. CT. DEC. 1 (Mar. 27, 2001); Section 912: “Potentially
Evil,” 37 BANKR. CT. DEC. 4 (Mar. 27, 2001); Barbara M. Goodstein, How Secure Are Your
Securitizations? LTV Case Raises Important Issues for Creditors, BANKR. STRATEGIST, April
2001, at 1; Alexandra Dill & Letitia Hanson, True Sale Assailed: Implications of In re LTV Steel
for Structured Finance (Special Report, Moody’s Investors Service 2001).
152 See In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. at 281.
153 See infra Part III.C.2.b (explaining why a servicer who collects receivables has no property
interest in the receivables and only a possessory interest in collections in its possession in trust for
the benefit of the owner of the receivables).
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sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the bankruptcy court to adjudicate
the allegation.154 The most that can be made out of the court’s decision
is that an allegation of a property interest confers on the court sufficient
jurisdiction to enter an interim order regarding the property interest until
final resolution after a full trial.
The third factor that neutralizes any threat from the LTV case to
securization is the presence of the “inventory securitization.” The
“inventory securitization,” which is not a true securitization,155 provided
the fuel for the initial allegation by the LTV debtors that the
securitization of trade receivables was a disguised secured transaction.
Specifically, the debtors’ initial cash collateral emergency motion used
the features of the “inventory securitization” to paint the sale of both the
inventory and the receivables to the SPEs and the granting of security
interests in the SPEs to the inventory and receivables investors as sham
transactions.
For example, the debtor alleged that the purchase price of the
inventory was not fair market value because it was based on a formula
that it did not equal the fair market value when sold to third parties.156
In light of the depression in steel prices as the result of substantial
increases in supply from foreign sellers, this allegation is plausible on
its face.
The debtors then appended to this allegation the following
statement: “The pricing of accounts [sold] . . . are similarly arbitrary and
unrelated to the fair market value of the Receivables.”157 This statement
is false. Although the formula for the pricing of the receivables appears
to be daunting for those not familiar with the pricing of trade
receivables, the basic concept is relatively simple. Buyers and sellers of
trade receivables, which do not bear interest, determine the fair market
value of trade receivables by subtracting two components from the
amount due on the receivable: (1) a discount to reflect the time value of
money, and (2) a discount to reflect the risk of non-payment by the
obligor.
154 See infra note 222 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2000) (specifying the bankruptcy court’s
jurisdiction over property of the estate)); see also Cambridge Co. v. Cotton (In re Trafficwatch),
138 B.R. 841, 842 (1992) (finding that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to determine its own
jurisdiction) (citing United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 291-92 (1947));
Inv. Materials Corp. v. First Interstate Bank of Nev., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 16297, at *4-*5 (9th
Cir., July 15, 1999) (finding that the bankruptcy court’s core jurisdiction was invoked because it
had to determine to whom the disputed assets belonged, the debtor or the non-debtor). Of course,
if the debtor had no interest in the receivables transferred by the debtor, the receivables would not
be part of the bankruptcy estate and the court would not have jurisdiction over those receivables,
but the court would not know if it had jurisdiction until it decided the legal question being
presented. This is not a new problem.
155 See supra note 130 and accompanying text (explaining the difference between a hybrid
transaction and a true securitization).
156 See LTV’s Emergency Motion, supra note 119, at 7.
157 See id.
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Because trade receivables, like the receivables in LTV, do not bear
interest, the discount to reflect the time value of money will reflect both
the amount of time during which the receivables are expected to remain
outstanding and the interest rate—the yield—that the buyer expects to
earn. For example, assume that a buyer is thinking of buying a
receivable in the amount of $100 nominally payable in 60 days. If the
buyer wants a yield of 12 percent per annum on its investment and
expects (based on historical experience) that the obligor will pay in two
months, the buyer will determine that the present value of the receivable
on the date of purchase equals $100 less approximately $2 if there is no
default.158 If the obligor pays faster, say in 30 days, the buyer will be
better off, since it will have received a higher annual yield of
approximately 24 percent.159 If the obligor pays more slowly, say in 90
days, then the buyer will have received a lower yield on its investment
than it expected, approximately eight percent.160 Accordingly, the
purchase price and the fair market value of a trade receivable will
incorporate an estimate of the uncertain maturity date and the current
interest rate environment.
In addition, in any receivable there is a risk that the obligor will not
pay. The buyer will estimate this risk and subtract the present value of
this risk from the amount it is willing to pay for the receivable. For
example, if the buyer expects that there is a one percent chance that the
obligor will not pay, the buyer would also subtract approximately $1
from the face amount. Based on these determinations, this buyer would
pay approximately $97 for the receivable.
In the case of the sale of receivables to the Receivables SPE in
LTV, as in the case of the continuous sale of other trade receivables,161
158 The discount is not exactly two dollars because it is a discount from the future value. The
discount is the amount of interest at a specified rate that would be earned on the present value of
the receivable at the discount rate to produce the future value. The formula for the future value is
FV = (1+i)n * PV, and the formula for the present value is PV = FV/(1+i)n, where, in each case,
PV is the present value, i is the periodic rate of interest, n is the number of periods, and FV is the
future value. See C. STEVEN BRADFORD & GARY ADNA AMES, BASIC ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES
FOR LAWYERS 113 (1997). Hence, if the periodic interest rate is one percent per month, and the
total periods are two months, the present value of the sum of $100 payable in two months at an
annual discount rate of twelve percent equals $100/(1.01)2, which equals $100/1.0201, or $98.03.
159 The yield is determined by the following formula: i = (FV/PV)1/n – 1. Hence, the monthly
yield is (100/98.03) – 1, which equals 1.0201 – 1, which equals 0.0201, or 2.01% a month, which
is an annual yield of 24.12%, more than twice the yield that the buyer expected.
160 Again, using the formula: i = (FV/PV)1/n – 1, the monthly yield is (100/98.03)1/3 – 1, which
equals 1.006654 – 1, which equals 0.006654, or 0.6654% a month, which is an annual yield of
7.99%, about one third less yield than the buyer expected.
161 For example, in the Jefferson Smurfit Finance Company receivables securitization in Mar.
1995, described in Standard and Poor’s Structured Finance Ratings, Asset Backed Securities,
Trade Receivables Criteria 61-62 (undated), the transfers of the eligible receivables were
“structured to be true sales in which the purchase price is discounted by a loss and carrying cost
component. The discount applied is designed to reflect a current expected loss number and a real
interest and carrying cost for the financing to ensure that each sale is a true sale.” Id. at 66.
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the formula set the price for the purchase of each batch of receivables
based on historical factors. This formula was not arbitrary because it
was based on the factors that the financial industry uses to price
financial assets of this type. For each batch of receivables purchased
during a monthly period, the purchase price reflected the expected
discount rate and losses, as well as the other costs of and a profit for the
Receivables SPE, determined by using the historical data for receivables
previously purchased.162 This formula produced a purchase price that
reflected the fair market value of the receivables. Although the LTV
debtors may have been able to argue that the formula was complicated,
they could not, like they did in the case of the sale of inventory, point to
elements in the formula that appeared on its face to be arbitrary and
unrelated to fair market value. The LTV debtors simply used the
pricing formula for the inventory to mislead the court about the nature
of the pricing formula for the receivables.
The debtors made other allegations to challenge the true sale by the
debtor/sellers of the inventory. These included allegations that:
(1) The debtor/sellers of the inventory did not receive the purchase
price in cash.163
(2) LTV Steel Company’s servicing fees were paid not in cash but in
the form of subordinated notes of the Inventory SPE that were not
payable until after the inventory investors had received repayment of
moneys lent to the Inventory SPE.164
162 The LTV Receivables Purchase Agreement provided that the Purchase Price for the
Receivables equals the Original Balance of the Receivables times the Purchase Price Percentage.
See LTV Receivables Purchase Agreement, supra note 121, at 476. The Purchase Price
Percentage, which applies to purchases that occur on or after each Settlement Date—the twentieth
day of each calendar month (or the next following business day, if the twentieth is not a business
day), see id. at 480, is one hundred percent minus the sum of (i) the Loss Discount Ratio and (ii)
the Purchase Discount Rate Reserve Ratio. See id. at 476. The first deduction, the Loss Discount
Ratio, represents the ratio of (a) losses on the Receivables realized during the three calendar
months preceding the Settlement Date to (b) the total collections received during the same
preceding three months. See id. at 469- 470.
The second deduction is the Purchase Discount Rate Reserve Ratio. This ratio reflects the
expected term of the Receivables, the cost of funds, the cost of operations (all based on
information that precedes the calculation of the Purchase Price Percentage), and a profit amount.
See id. at 475-76 (defining the “Purchase Discount Rate Reserve Ratio”). The expected term of
the Receivables is determined by calculating the “Turnover Days,” that is, the average number of
days from the creation of the Receivable to the payment of the Receivable, for Receivables
previously sold. See id. at 482. The expected cost of funds and cost of operations are those costs
of the Purchaser for the calendar month preceding the Settlement Date. See id. at 454 (defining
the “Discount Rate”); id. at 452 (defining “Cost of Funds Rate”); id. at 449 (defining “Carrying
Cost Percentage”). The profit discount provides a cushion to protect the Purchaser from the risks
that the historical losses on the Receivables, historical turnover, historical interest rates, and
historical cost of operations used in calculating the Purchase Price will increase. On the other
hand, to the extent that these historical losses, turnover, interest rates, and costs of operations
used in calculating the Purchase Price decrease, the Purchaser will make a greater profit.
163 See LTV’s Emergency Motion, supra note 119, at 7.
164 See id. at 7, 14-15.
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(3) To satisfy the requirement that the Inventory SPE maintain at
least $10 million in equity, $300 million in subordinated debt held by
its parent, LTV Steel Company, was converted to capital
contributions (perhaps necessitated by the inability of the Inventory
SPE to sell steel products for an amount equal to or greater than the
price at which it purchased the inventory plus the servicing fees of
the inventory processor).165

Based on these allegations, the performance and warranty
obligations of the related debtor/sellers of both the inventory and
receivables,166 and the use of subordinated notes by the Inventory SPE,
the debtors misleadingly stated: “The net effect is that the economic risk
associated with the sale of inventory and collection of accounts remains
with the Debtors, notwithstanding their purported ‘sale’ of the inventory
and accounts.”167 Whatever force these allegations may have had to
challenge the true sale of the inventory, this characterization of the
transfer of the receivables was absolutely false.
The debtor/sellers continued in this vein by stating that the
debtor/sellers maintained dominion and control over the inventory and
accounts.168 To support this statement, the debtor/sellers alleged that
LTV Steel Company, one of the debtor/sellers and the inventory
servicer, performed all of the business functions of the inventory
debtor/sellers. These included “inventory processing (i.e., manufacture)
of raw materials into saleable products; storage and safekeeping of the
inventory; transportation; and marketing and sale of the products.”169
The debtors, however, did not claim that the servicer of the receivables
retained control over the receivables in a manner inconsistent with a
sale of the receivables.
The alleged use of subordinated notes by the Inventory SPE, the
alleged conversion of $300 million of subordinated notes into capital
contributions to the Inventory SPE, and the possession, control, and
processing of the inventory by one of the debtor/sellers, as a matter of
appearances, creates questions about the nature of the transfer of the
inventory. Whether these allegations, if true, would be sufficient to
establish that there was no true sale of the inventory requires a detailed
analysis of the substance of the transaction. This analysis would have to
take into account all the other factors used in determining whether there
had been a true sale, such as whether, on balance, the risks and rewards
of ownership had been transferred to the Inventory SPE or had been
165
166

See id. at 8, 15.
See id. at 8-9, 14, 16. The warranty and performance obligations of the debtor/sellers of
receivables to the Receivables SPE are completely consistent with a true sale of the receivables
and provide no basis for challenging the receivables securitization. See infra note 160.
167 See LTV’s Emergency Motion, supra note 119, at 9 (emphasis added).
168 See id.
169 See id. at 9-10.
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retained by the sellers. None of these allegations, however, were
relevant to the transfer of the receivables.170 The debtor/sellers
misleadingly attempted to tar the sale of the receivables with those
aspects of the transfer of the inventory that appeared to be inconsistent
with the sale of the inventory.171
For the most part, the debtor/sellers’ argument seemed to be
limited to a simple argument that the initial transfer to the SPEs—the
first step—was not a true sale but a disguised grant of a security interest
to secure repayment of a debt.172 The debtor/sellers, however,
broadened their attack in a way that suggests that the entire
170 The LTV debtors alleged that the debtor/sellers’ obligations to indemnify the Inventory
SPE and the Receivables SPE for the debtor/sellers’ failure to perform their obligations or for
breach of warranties regarding the inventory or receivables sold indicated that the transfers were
not true sales of the inventory or the receivables. See LTV’s Emergency Motion, supra note 119,
at 8, 9, 14, 16. These allegations are completely without foundation in the case of the sale of the
receivables. Because the receivables sold to an SPE are the source of payment for the securities
issued by an SPE, investors and rating agencies generally require the seller of the receivables to
make detailed warranties about the receivables. If such warranties are incorrect, the seller
generally agrees to repurchase any receivables that do not conform to the warranties or otherwise
to indemnify the SPE/purchaser for losses arising from a breach of warranties. The seller also
often agrees to indemnify the SPE/purchaser for any actions or failures to act for which the seller
is responsible that cause damages to the SPE/purchaser. In the case of trade receivables,
indemnification obligations normally cover pricing disputes with customers/obligors, the sale of
defective goods to customers/obligors, the return by customers/obligors of products sold, any
discounts or adjustments from the stated balance of the receivable that the seller might grant to
the customers/obligors, other acts that give rise to a defense or claim in recoupment by the
obligor of the receivable that the obligor could set off against the amount due on the receivable,
and other activities of the seller that might cause liability to the SPE/purchaser. These actions
might cause a reduction in the principal balance of the receivable—generally known as dilution—
for reasons other than the inability or failure of the obligor to pay the receivable. It is appropriate
for sellers to retain this dilution risk because the risk arises out of actions by the seller. In the
LTV case, each seller made these normal warranties about itself and the receivables. See LTV
Receivables Purchase Agreement, supra note 121, § 3.01, at 401-05; id. at 456-57, 497 (defining
“Eligible Receivable” and “Noncomplying Receivable”). The representations and warranties do
not include any representations or obligations guaranteeing the ability of the obligors to pay the
receivables or the yield to the purchaser. Because they relate to the nature of the receivables at
the time of the sale or to the actions that the sellers took with respect to the receivables, they are
not inconsistent with a true sale of the receivables. See S&P 2002 LEGAL CRITERIA, supra note
21, at 93-94; Plank, True Sale, supra note 75, at 306.
171 See LTV Emergency Motion, supra note 119, at 10.
172 In this regard, the debtor/sellers also made additional allegations that LTV Steel, as the
owner of the two SPEs, failed to treat the SPEs as separate entities. See id. at 11. The
debtor/sellers, however, did not provide any evidence to support these allegations, and the
evidence produced during discovery showed that the SPEs were indeed operated as separate
entities. The debtor/sellers also argued that the filing of a financing statement by the
debtor/sellers in favor of the Inventory. SPE indicated an intent to treat the transfer of the
inventory as a grant of a security interest for security and not as a true sale. See id. at 12. This
argument is silly. The filing was no doubt a precautionary filing to protect the Inventory SPE
against a court’s re-characterization of the transfer as a grant of a security interest and not as the
intended sale. Further, to the extent that the inventory servicer’s retention of possession could be
considered a consignment by the Inventory SPE, such a filing would be necessary to protect the
Inventory SPE’s ownership interest from claims of creditors. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(4) &
cmt. 6 (2001); id. § 2-326 (1972) (both discussing consignments).
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securitization structure should be collapsed. They specifically pointed
to the fact that LTV Steel was the 100 percent owner of the Inventory
SPE and the Receivable SPE.173 They argued that all of the excess
economic benefit generated from the accounts and inventory flowed to
the debtor/sellers, and that the debtor/sellers, not the two SPEs, were
“ultimately entitled to any surplus” from the sale of inventory and
collection of accounts.174 They accordingly argued that the
securitizations should be treated as a loan, and not a sale of the
inventory and accounts.
For this reason, it is unclear whether LTV’s attack was based on
the argument that the sales to the SPEs were simply disguised pledges
or the broader argument that the court should disregard the
securitizations on the grounds of economic substance over form. In any
event, the peculiar facts surrounding the inventory securitization
enabled the LTV debtor/sellers to throw sufficient dust in the eyes of
the bankruptcy judge to impede a clear understanding of the trade
receivables securitization. The bankruptcy court faced a very real
prospect that LTV’s liquidity crisis might well cause the imminent loss
of jobs by 17,500 workers. Given these peculiar facts, and the
acquiescence of the agent for both the receivables investor and the
inventory investor, it is not surprising that the court entered the initial
interim order. Nor is it surprising that the court rejected the receivables
investor’s attempt to modify the interim order pending a full hearing on
the question of whether there had been a true sale of the inventory or the
receivables.
Without the peculiar facts pertaining to the inventory
securitization, I believe that the debtors would have had a much more
difficult task—if not an impossible task—in convincing the court to
enter an interim order allowing the debtor/sellers to recapture the
proceeds of receivables that they had sold. Moreover, as the expert
witness for the receivables investor who analyzed the documents and
facts developed in discovery, I believe that the receivables securitization
was properly structured, that there was no legal or factual basis for
recharacterizing the sale of the receivables to the Receivable SPE as a
pledge to secure a loan, and that there were no grounds for substantively
consolidating the Receivable SPE with its parent, LTV Steel Company,
one of the sellers. In addition, as pointed out by the industry groups
who filed amici briefs, LTV’s attempt to repudiate a properly structured
securitization to save 17,500 jobs would have had the effect of
destroying an industry that provided trillions of dollars of lower cost
financing to many borrowers, including LTV and other steel

173
174

See LTV’s Emergency Motion, supra note 119, at 10.
See id. at 16.

PLANK.GALLEY

5/25/2004 4:02 PM

1698

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:5

companies.175 Therefore, it is my firm conviction that, had the matter
gone to a full hearing, the court would have, however reluctantly, ruled
that there had been a true sale of the receivables.176 In any event, the
unusual circumstances of this case, the ramifications of a final
repudiation of the receivables securitization, and the parties’ agreement
and the court’s final determination that the transfers of the inventory or
the receivables were true sales eliminate In re LTV Steel Co. as a legal
threat to securitization.
C.
1.

David Carlson’s Assault on Securitization

A Rhapsody on Whiting Pools and the Sale-Lien Distinction

In 1998, David Carlson wrote an article, blandly entitled The
Rotten Foundations of Securitization,177 arguing that, under the
language of the Bankruptcy Code and its policy favoring reorganization,
“securitization’s right to exist may be sharply questioned.”178 Professor
Carlson admits that his analysis may be perceived as “rarified.”179 His
analysis also can be seen as a rhapsody180 on the Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Whiting Pools.181 I of course disagree with
his conclusion and with the analysis that Professor Carlson presents in
Rotten Foundations. In particular, I think his reliance on Whiting Pools
dooms his argument.
I have made a mini-career criticizing Whiting Pools.182 The Court
175 Motion of Securitization Amici, supra note 146, at 1-2 (identifying as the “Securitization
Amici” several steel companies who sell asset-backed securities to fund their operations, issuers
of asset-backed securities, trade associations, investors, and underwriters); Memorandum of
Securitization Amici, supra note 146, at 17-18, 20 (stating that accepting “LTV’s extreme legal
arguments and disregarding the structure of the LTV transactions could cause a seismic
disruption in the capital markets” and LTV’s motion “is an attack on a major funding technique
that benefits manufacturers, consumers, investors, and creditors alike”); Brief of The New York
Clearing House Association, supra note 146, at 4 (noting that LTV’s motion would sacrifice the
form of financing that successfully aided its earlier rehabilitation and adversely affect thousands
of companies with millions of employees as well as millions of investors).
176 I did not perform a legal and factual analysis of the inventory securitization. Some of the
allegations of the debtors raise issues about the nature of the transfer of the inventory to the
Inventory SPE and its separateness. Nevertheless, given the debtors’ failure to produce any
evidence to support their allegations about the nature of the sale of the receivables, I am skeptical
that the debtors could ultimately convince the court to recharacterize the sale of the inventory.
177 See Carlson, Rotten Foundations, supra note 8.
178 See id. at 1065.
179 See id. at 1060.
180 See, e.g., THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1650 (2d ed.
1987) (defining “rhapsody” as “an ecstatic expression of feeling or enthusiasm”).
181 United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983).
182 See, e.g., Thomas E. Plank, The Creditor in Possession Under the Bankruptcy Code:
History, Text, and Policy, 59 MD. L. REV. 253, 255-58, 301-05, 310-11, 339-44 (2000)
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used poor legal reasoning and relied on extremely dubious legislative
history while ignoring direct legislative history that would have
demanded the opposite conclusion. Despite its weaknesses, and the
Court’s later repudiation of its analysis of the definition of property of
the estate in Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf,183 Whiting Pools is
still with us. Nevertheless, as poor an example of judicial craftsmanship
as it is, one can justify the result in Whiting Pools in a way that rescues
the Court from embarrassment. In any event, Whiting Pools offers no
threat to securitization.
Whiting Pools, Inc., had failed to pay approximately $92,000 in
federal taxes withheld from employees. To obtain payment, the Internal
Revenue Service seized all of Whiting Pools’ personal property
pursuant to the Federal Tax Lien Act184 to collect the unpaid taxes.185
Whiting Pools then filed a chapter 11 petition in bankruptcy and as
debtor in possession sought an order under § 542(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code directing the IRS to return the seized goods to the debtor in
possession to enable it to reorganize.186 The Supreme Court held that §
542(a) authorized a bankruptcy court to direct a creditor—here, the
IRS—in rightful possession of tangible property items pending a
foreclosure sale to return the seized items to the bankruptcy trustee, here
Whiting Pools as debtor in possession.187
Section 542(a) in essence requires that any person in possession or
control of property of the estate return that property of the estate to the
bankruptcy trustee.188 The purpose of § 542(a) was to codify the judgemade law of turnover under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.189 Property of
the estate means “all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in
[hereinafter Plank, Creditor in Possession] (criticizing the Court’s failure to follow the statutory
language of the Bankruptcy Code, its use of weak legislative history and its ignorance of direct,
contrary legislative history and its too general policy analysis); Plank, Bankruptcy Estate, supra
note 50, at 1196-97, 1234-63 (critiquing the Court’s analysis in Whiting Pools and its effect on
the interpretation of property of the estate under § 541(a)(1) and explaining why it should no
longer be considered good law).
183 516 U.S. 16 (1995).
184 26 U.S.C. §§ 6321-34 (1976).
185 See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 200-01.
186 See id.
187 Id. at 209.
188 See 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2000), which requires an entity “in possession, custody, or
control . . . of property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under [§] 363” to deliver that
property to the trustee. Pursuant to the relevant subsections of § 363, the trustee “may use, sell,
or lease property of the estate.” See supra note 52 (quoting § 363(b)(c)). Section 363(f) also
authorizes a trustee under certain circumstances to sell property items in which the estate and
another entity have an interest, see infra note 239 (quoting § 363(f)), but this subsection did not
apply in Whiting Pools because the debtor in possession did not want possession to sell the goods.
See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 203-04; see also Plank, Creditor in Possession, supra note 182, at
320-23 (describing how § 542(a) and § 363(f) authorizes a turnover order for certain items in
possession of a creditor for purpose of allowing the trustee to liquidating the items).
189 See Plank, Creditor in Possession, supra note 182, at 264-65, 302-03.

PLANK.GALLEY

1700

5/25/2004 4:02 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:5

property,”190 not the property item in which the debtor has an interest.
In Whiting Pools, the debtor’s interest in the goods seized by the IRS
consisted of its “equity interest”, that is, its legal title (subject to loss of
title upon foreclosure),191 its right to redeem the security interest by
paying the secured debt,192 its right to notice before any foreclosure
sale,193 and its right to any surplus from the foreclosure sale of the
goods.194 The IRS did not have possession, custody or control over
these rights. Whiting Pools’ interests, however, emphatically did not
include the right to possess or use the goods. Accordingly, under the
language of §§ 542(a), 363(b), (c), and 542(a)(1), the IRS was not
required to return the goods.
Nevertheless, the Court held that Congress intended § 542(a) to
require a creditor in rightful possession of repossessed goods to return
them to the trustee and to rely on its right to adequate protection. It
relied in part on the legislative history:195 the appearance of § 542(a) in
the major redraft of the bill that eventually became the Bankruptcy
Code after four witnesses testified that the prior draft of the bankruptcy
bill did not have a provision requiring the avoidance of what one
witness termed a “preferential possession.”196 Unfortunately, the Court
missed direct legislative history that, as enacted, § 542(a) required the
return of property acquired by the estate after the filing of the
bankruptcy petition that was in the possession or control of third person:
Section 542(a) of the House amendment modifies similar
provisions contained in the House bill and the Senate amendment
treating with turnover of property to the estate. The section makes
clear that any entity, other than a custodian, is required to deliver
property of the estate to the trustee or debtor in possession whenever
such property is acquired by the entity during the case, if the trustee
or debtor in possession may use, sell, or lease the property under
section 363 . . . .197
190
191

See supra note 61 (quoting § 541(a)).
See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 209-11; see also infra note 217 and accompanying text
(describing Whiting Pools’ analysis of the IRS’s interests and a creditor).
192 See I.R.C. § 6342(b) (1976) (authorizing an owner to redeem the IRS’s lien on the goods
by paying the amount of taxes due).
193 See id. § 6335(b).
194 See id. § 6342(b).
195 See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 207-08 & n. 16.
196 See Hearings on H.R. 31 & H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 439 (pt. 1) (1975-76) (prepared statement of
Patrick A. Murphy that in a reorganization case “the legislation should expressly deal with the
question of when and under what standards displacement of the secured creditor [in possession]
or its agent should be permitted” and suggesting the concept of “preferential possession” as a
further refinement, that is, distinguishing between a pledgee and a creditor repossessing after
default); id. at 489-92 (testimony of Patrick Murphy to the same effect; also stating that a creditor
need not return property in a liquidation).
197 See 124 CONG. REC. H11089 (Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Don Edwards, Upon
Introducing the House Amendment to the Senate Amendment to H.R. 8200), reprinted in 1978

PLANK.GALLEY

2004]

5/25/2004 4:02 PM

THE SECURITY OF SECURITIZATION

1701

In any event, the Court reasoned that Congress intended to
encourage reorganization of debtors, and that, to do so, Congress had
displaced creditors’ state law remedies of foreclosure with the
requirement of adequate protection of the secured creditor or lien
creditor.198
I believe that the Court’s analysis is wrong. It ignores the language
of the statute in favor of vague policy considerations, and its use of
legislative history is pitiful. There is, however, a basis for justifying the
Court’s conclusion: the simple exercise of the Court’s power to make
federal common law.199
The Supreme Court has stated in Butner v. United States200 and
Raleigh v. Illinois Department of Revenue201 that, in the absence of an
important federal interest, federal courts in bankruptcy should respect
the state law entitlements of creditors. Accordingly, the Court held in
Butner that a bankruptcy court should apply the relevant state law on
when a mortgagee obtained a property interest in rents from the
mortgaged property and not create a federal rule of equity.202 It more
recently held in Raleigh that a bankruptcy court should apply the state
law allocating burden of proof of a creditor’s claim and not apply a
federal rule reversing that burden of proof.203 Nevertheless, these
statements and holdings contain an important caveat: If necessary to
vindicate an important federal interest, bankruptcy courts may create a
federal rule that overrides the state law rights of creditors when the
Bankruptcy Code is silent. Indeed, courts have done so under the
Bankruptcy Code and the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.204
In Whiting Pools, the Court was faced with an issue for which
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6436, 6455 (emphasis added); see also 124 CONG. REC. S17406 (Oct. 6, 1978)
(statement of Dennis DeConcini, Upon Introducing the Senate Amendment to the House
Amendment to H.R. 8200), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6505, 6525 (same).
198 See Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 203-04, 207.
199 See also Charles J. Tabb, The Bankruptcy Reform Act in the Supreme Court, 49 U. PITT. L.
REV. 477, 507-14 (1988) (suggesting that the Court should have acknowledged that the statute
did not accomplish Congress’s intent to provide for the return of repossessed property items and
should have declared that the Bankruptcy Code provided for that turnover).
200 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
201 530 U.S. 15, 20 (2000).
202 Butner, 440 U.S. at 55.
203 Raleigh, 530 U.S. at 20.
204 For example, the power of the trustee to reject or assume executory contracts, see 11
U.S.C. § 365 (2000), first added to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 in 1938, see Act of June 22, 1938,
ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 840, 880-81 (amending Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(b), 30 Stat.
544, 565-66) (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1976)), originated with decisions of
federal bankruptcy courts. See Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy:
Understanding “Rejection,” 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845, 856-62 (1988). Similarly, the power of
the bankruptcy trustee to abandon burdensome or inconsequential property of the estate, see 11
U.S.C. § 554 (2000), first codified with the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code, originated in
judicial decisions under the Bankruptcy Act. See Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl.
Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 500-01 (1986) (describing the history of the abandonment power).
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there was no direct answer. As I have explained elsewhere, the
Bankruptcy Code does expressly provide for turnover by creditors in
possession of property items owned by the debtor in three
circumstances: redemption, sale under § 363(f), and turnover pursuant
to a confirmed reorganization plan.205 For a debtor who has no equity in
property items that are necessary for reorganization, the first two are not
practical for a reorganizing debtor in possession.206 Turnover pursuant
to a plan would entail a delay until confirmation. Such delay may not
be helpful for a debtor trying to stay in business while it prepares a plan,
solicits approval, and obtains confirmation. Meanwhile, the automatic
stay against acts to collect a debt—not the stay against acts to control
property of the estate—prevents the creditor in possession from
foreclosing.207 Faced with this standoff, the Court could have
legitimately determined to create a federal bankruptcy common law rule
requiring the creditor to return the property items before redemption,
sale, or confirmation of the plan when possession was necessary for
reorganization.
Accordingly, one can view Whiting Pools either as the creation of
a federal bankruptcy common law rule or as a poor interpretation of §§
542(a) and 541(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Under the latter
interpretation, Whiting Pools can be read as extending the definition of
property of the estate: when a debtor retains an equity of redemption in
a property item, the entire property item—or at least the creditor’s right
to possession—is part of property of the estate.
This latter
interpretation flies in the face of a statutory scheme that defines
property of the estate quite specifically as the debtor’s interest in
property208 and—with few exceptions—uses that definition consistently
throughout the Bankruptcy Code.209 Unfortunately, many courts have
followed this cartoon version of property of the estate.210 Even so, the
205
206

See Plank, Creditor in Possession, supra note 182, at 261, 319-26.
In the case of redemption, the debtor must pay the full amount of the debt, which by
definition exceeds the value of the collateral. In the case of turnover for liquidation, the collateral
must be sold for an amount that exceeds the creditor’s claim. See id. at 319-23.
207 See supra note 50 (quoting the provisions of the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) &
(6) (2000)); Plank, Bankruptcy Estate, supra note 50, at 1263-66 (describing why a foreclosure
action by a creditor is an act to collect a claim, is not a act to control property of the estate, but
may be an act to obtain possession of property from the estate).
208 See supra note 61 (quoting § 541(a)).
209 See generally Plank, Bankruptcy Estate, supra note 50, at 1216-34 (describing the drafting
history of the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code defining and using property of the estate and the
consistent use of the definition of property of the estate and of property in the Bankruptcy Code).
210 See, e.g., Knaus v. Concordia Lumber Co. (In re Knaus), 889 F.2d 773, 775 (8th Cir. 1989)
(citing Whiting Pools for the erroneous proposition that “property seized but not yet sold before
the filing of the bankruptcy petition is property of the estate”); Plank, Bankruptcy Estate, supra
note 50, at 1267-80 (analyzing cases citing Whiting Pools for the proposition that the property of
the estate consists of the property item in which a creditor has an interest instead of the analyzing
the debtor’s interest in the property item, as required by § 541(a)(1)).
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important feature of Whiting Pools under either interpretation is that the
case is limited to a property interest of a debtor in relation to a property
interest of a secured creditor of the debtor.
In his analysis of Whiting Pools, Professor Carlson does not rely
on the cartoon version of property. Instead, he relies on the fact that the
debtor’s equity was valueless: “Whiting Pool, then, grounds bankruptcy
jurisdiction on valueless, or mere hypothetical, property interests.”211
From this proposition, Professor Carlson makes a further leap: “If a
bankruptcy trustee can fathom any legal connection between the debtor
and a thing, the thing may be expropriated for the benefit of the
unsecured creditors.”212 The flaw in this statement is that Whiting Pools
cannot be read for such a broad proposition. At most, Whiting Pools
stands for this proposition: “If a bankruptcy trustee can fathom any
equity interest by a debtor in a thing in which a creditor has a security
interest, the thing may be expropriated from the creditor for the benefit
of the unsecured creditors.”213 Under any interpretation, Whiting Pools
only alters the nonbankruptcy law entitlements of creditors against a
debtor who retains well-recognized property interests in property
items—the debtor’s equity interest—even if they are valueless. This
limitation is consistent with the whole history of the law that has sought
to protect debtors even when their equity interest is “valueless.”214
Whiting Pools expressly limits its expansion of the bankruptcy
trustee’s power to the creditor’s interest: “We conclude that the
reorganization estate includes property of the debtor that has been
seized by a creditor prior to the filing of a petition for
reorganization.”215 The Court emphasizes this limitation in its analysis
of why its holding applied to the IRS: “We see no reason why a
different result should obtain when the IRS is the creditor.”216 The
Court continues: “Of course, if a tax levy or seizure transfers to the IRS
ownership of the property seized, § 542(a) may not apply.”217 One
might argue that the Court deliberately used the word “may” to leave
room for Professor’s Carlson’s extension of Whiting Pools beyond the

211
212
213
214

See Carlson, Rotten Foundations, supra note 8, at 1078.
See id.
See id. with my modifications italicized.
See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-620, 9-621, 9-620 & accompanying comments. (imposing significant
restrictions on when and how a secured creditor may use strict foreclosure, that is, may accept the
debtor’s interest in the collateral in satisfaction of the secured debt); NELSON & WHITMAN, supra
note 66, §§ 7.9-7.10, at 554-58 (noting that in most states, strict foreclosure of a mortgagor’s
interest is not permitted, and that it is only used in a few states or under limited circumstances).
215 Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 209. Note that the Court uses the phrase “property of the
debtor” to mean the colloquial meaning of “property,” that is, the property item, and not the
property interest.
216 Id.
217 Id.
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debtor-creditor relationship,218 but Whiting Pools itself does not extend
beyond the debtor-creditor relationship. After correctly analyzing why
the IRS was a creditor, the Court restated its holding: “Until [a
foreclosure] sale takes place, the property remains the debtor’s and thus
is subject to the turnover requirement of § 542(a).”219
Professor Carlson also asserts that, under the language of the
Bankruptcy Code, if a debtor retains any interest in a thing, then a
bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over that thing.220 To a certain extent,
this is correct. Any interest in a property item that the debtor has at the
commencement of a case becomes property of the estate under §
541(a)(1).221 The bankruptcy court has jurisdiction over property of the
estate and therefore has jurisdiction to decide matters involving the
property of the estate.222
This extensive jurisdiction, however, does not bring into the
bankruptcy estate property interests that have been sold to third parties.
There is nothing in the Bankruptcy Code that subjects these excluded
property interests to the automatic stay of acts to control property of the
estate,223 the trustee’s power to use224 or require turnover225 of property
218 In my view, the most plausible reason for the use of the term “may” is simply to avoid
appearing to decide any issues not before the Court.
219 Id. at 211.
220 See Carlson, Rotten Foundations, supra note 8, at 1060-61, 1065.
221 See supra note 61 (quoting § 541(a)).
222 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (2000) (“Bankruptcy judges may hear and determine all cases
under title 11 and all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11,
referred under subsection (a) of this section, and may enter appropriate orders and judgments,
subject to review under section 158 of this title.”)
See also id. § 157(b)(2):
Core proceedings include, but are not limited to—
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of . . . exemptions from property of the estate . . .;
...
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
...
(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
...
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
...
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of cash
collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting from
claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed claims against the
estate; and
(O) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the estate or the
adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security holder relationship, except
personal injury tort or wrongful death claims.
Id.
223 See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing the automatic stay).
224 See supra note 52 and accompanying text (discussing the trustee’s power to use property of
the estate).
225 See supra note 188 (quoting the turnover provision, § 542(a)).
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of the estate, or the other limitations of the Bankruptcy Code that affect
secured creditors.226 Although Professor Carlson argues that it is an
error to assume “that the sale-lien distinction is also the test for
bankruptcy jurisdiction,”227 the sale-lien distinction retains its vitality
under both the Bankruptcy Code and Whiting Pools. The sale-lien
distinction determines the different treatment of x, an originator that is
an operating company that must pay to its secured creditors a
bankruptcy premium to compensate them for the risk of its bankruptcy,
and y, a third party non-creditor that owns receivables, including but not
limited to an SPE, that will not have to pay to its secured creditors a
bankruptcy premium to compensate them for the risk of the bankruptcy
of the prior owner of the receivables.
2.

Insufficiency of a Seller’s Retained Powers

Further, even if the sale-lien dichotomy did not matter, the powers
retained by a seller in a securitization proffered by Professor Carlson are
not sufficient to undermine the legal foundations of securitization.
Professor Carlson posits three types of powers retained by a seller in a
securitization that would permit recapturing receivables sold by the
seller who later becomes a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code:
(1) The power of a seller of chattel paper who retains possession
of the chattel paper to resell the chattel paper to a third party who
takes possession for value.228 Under § 9-330(b), a subsequent
purchaser of chattel paper for value who obtains possession of the
chattel paper takes priority over a “secured party,” which includes a
buyer of the chattel paper,229 which perfects its interest by filing a
financing statement.230 This analysis now would extend to sellers of
promissory notes by virtue of the revision of Article 9 of the UCC.231

226 See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing the power of the trustee to obtain a
superpriority security interest); supra note 55 (discussing the inability of the undersecured
creditor to receive interest on the value of its collateral or to get prompt relief from the automatic
stay).
227 See Carlson, Rotten Foundations, supra note 8, at 1082.
228 See id. at 1061, 1088-91.
229 See U.C.C. § 1-201(35) (2001) (defining a “security interest” to include a buyer’s interest
in chattel paper).
230 See id. § 9-330(b). At the time of Professor Carlson’s article, the only kind of chattel paper
was what is now defined as “tangible chattel paper.” Compare id. § 9-102(a)(9) (2001) (defining
tangible chattel paper as chattel paper inscribed on a “tangible medium”), with id. § 9-105 (1972)
(requiring that chattel paper be a “writing or writings”). Professor Carlson’s analysis would not
apply to a purchaser of electronic chattel paper who obtains “control,” see id. § 9-105, of the
electronic chattel paper and who therefore may take priority over a buyer of the electronic chattel
paper who does not have control. See id. § 9-330(b).
231 When Professor Carlson published his article, Article 9 of the U.C.C. governed the sale of
chattel paper but not the sale of promissory notes. Revised Article 9 now governs the sale of
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(2) The power of a seller who continues to act as the servicer and
who therefore collects the proceeds of the receivables.232
(3) The future power of a bankruptcy trustee to avoid a sale of
accounts and chattel paper that has been perfected by filing a
financing statement if the buyer fails to file a continuation statement
at the five year intervals.233

These are thin “interests” indeed. I do not think them sufficient
interests to cause the receivables to be included in the property of the
estate of their seller. Further, if retention of these powers were
sufficient to defeat a sale in a securitization, they would also be
sufficient to defeat every sale of receivables.
a.

Seller’s Power to Sell Tangible Receivables in Its Possession

The first of Professor Carlson’s retained “interests”—the power of
a seller in possession of tangible chattel paper or promissory notes to
resell to a second purchaser who takes possession—runs afoul of §
541(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. This section provides that in the case
of property items held in trust by the debtor, property of the estate does
not include the beneficial interest held by the non-debtor beneficiary.234
When a seller retains possession of these tangible receivables, it does so
in trust for the buyer,235 and if the seller were to sell the tangible
receivables, it would hold the proceeds in trust for the buyer. If a seller
who retains possession of the receivables becomes a debtor in
bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee would succeed to the seller’s right to
promissory notes, see id. § 9-109(a)(3), defines a “security interest” to include a buyer’s interest
in the promissory note, see id. § 1-201(a)(35), and provides that a sale of a promissory note is
perfected upon attachment of the security interest, see id. § 9-309(4). A purchaser for value who
takes possession of a promissory may have priority over a prior buyer whose interest is perfected
other than by possession. See id. § 9-330(d). If that purchaser in possession is a buyer, that
priority eliminates the first buyer’s ownership interest.
232 See Carlson, Rotten Foundations, supra note 8, at 1061, 1091-96.
233 See id. at 1061-62, 1096-1099; see also U.C.C. § 9-515(a) (providing that, with some
exceptions, a filed financing statement is effective for a period of five years after the date of
filing); id. § 9-515(c) (providing that, at the end of the specified period, the effectiveness of a
filed financing statement lapses unless before the lapse a continuation statement is filed); id. § 9515(e) (providing that the timely filing of successive continuation statements continues the
effectiveness of the initial financing statement continues for additional five-year periods).
234 See 11 U.S.C § 541(d) (2000):
Property in which the debtor holds, as of the commencement of the case, only legal
title and not an equitable interest, such as a mortgage secured by real property, or an
interest in such a mortgage, sold by the debtor but as to which the debtor retains legal
title to service or supervise the servicing of such mortgage or interest, becomes
property of the estate under subsection (a)(1) or (2) of this section only to the extent of
the debtor’s legal title to such property, but not to the extent of any equitable interest in
such property that the debtor does not hold.
235 The documents will explicitly so state.
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possession, but the trustee has no power to sell the receivables. It can
sell property of the estate after notice and a hearing236 or, if it authorized
to do business, in the ordinary course of business,237 but the property of
the estate is only the right to possession under the sale documents.238
The trustee also can sell property items in which the estate and a third
person has an interest under certain conditions, but none of these
conditions would permit sale of the tangible receivables.239 Of course,
the trustee could in fact sell the receivables and apply the proceeds
without regard to the rights of the owner of the receivables or proceeds,
but such actions would be ultra vires. Under the Bankruptcy Code, with
the exception of § 363(f) and a few other sections not relevant to this
discussion,240 the trustee has no power to use or to sell property interests
that are not part of the property of the estate.
Professor Carlson recognizes this argument.241 He answers by
stating that the relevant provision of § 541 of Bankruptcy Code cannot
be read literally because then a debtor in possession that was a retailer
could not sell inventory in the ordinary course of business free of the
security interest. His larger point is that, in his view, the Bankruptcy
Code is contradictory and requires the good will of bankruptcy judges to
make it coherent.242
I disagree. I think the Bankruptcy Code is by and large coherent,

236 See supra note 52 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2000) (providing that the “trustee, after
notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of business,
property of the estate”)).
237 See supra note 52 (quoting § 363(c)(1) (providing that if the business of the debtor is
authorized to be operated, “the trustee may sell or lease of property of the estate in the ordinary
course of business without notice or a hearing”)).
238 See supra note 61 (quoting § 541(a)(1) (providing that property of the estate consists of the
“interests of the debtor in property”).
239 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2000):
(f) The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of this section free and
clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate, only if—
(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of
such interest;
(2) such entity consents;
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is to be sold is
greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such property;
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding, to accept a
money satisfaction of such interest.
Id.
240 See id. § 363(g) (authorizing the trustee to sell property free and clear of any vested or
contingent right in the nature of dower or curtesy); id. 363(h) (stating that notwithstanding the
limitations in § 363(f); supra note 239, authorizing the trustee to sell both the estate’s interest and
the interest of any co-owner in property in which the debtor had an undivided interest as a tenant
in common, joint tenant, or tenant by the entirety, if certain conditions were met).
241 See Carlson, Rotten Foundations, supra note 8, at 1089. However, Professor Carlson starts
with § 541(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and not § 541(d).
242 See id. at 1091.
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at least in its treatment of property interests.243 For example, in the case
of a retailer-debtor in possession who must sell inventory free of a
secured party’s security interest to stay in business and reorganize, the
Bankruptcy Code expressly allows the debtor in possession to do so.244
I discuss other examples in the next section below. Hence, there is no
need to disregard either § 541(a)(1), as Whiting Pools did, or §§ 541(b)
or (d), as Professor Carlson suggests must be done, to make the other
provisions of the Bankruptcy Code work together well.
b.

Seller/Servicer’s Power to Collect Receivables

Professor Carlson’s second retained power also does not defeat a
true sale, whether in a securitization or as a whole loan sale. Professor
Carlson argues that a seller/servicer who collects receivables has a
property interest in the receivables that brings the receivables into the
bankruptcy estate.245 In making that argument, he must go through
several steps. I believe that there are flaws in each step that prove to be
fatal to his argument.
First, he correctly notes that §§ 363(b) and (c) authorize the trustee
to use only property of the estate, and property of the estate consists of
the debtor’s interest in collateral subject to the security interest, not the
collateral itself.246 He also states, “Such an argument overturns the
fondest beliefs of the debtors’ bar and twenty years of everyday
experience.”247 This statement is true only because people in every day
experience, including bankruptcy practitioners and bankruptcy judges,
confuse the popular concept of property as the “thing”—usually, the
“debtor’s thing”—with the legal concept of property, as “the interest in
the thing.”248 The Bankruptcy Code has explicitly adopted the legal
concept of property in its definition of property of the estate as “the
interest of the debtor in property.”249 Under the express definition of
243 See generally Plank, Bankruptcy Estate, supra note 50 at 1213-16, 1219-34, 1259-67
(showing that the use of the definition of the property of the estate as the “interests of the debtor
in property” was deliberate and, with only a few exceptions, consistent and coherent).
244 See supra note 239 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1) (2000), which provides that trustee may
sell property free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity other than the estate, if
applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of such interest).
Under U.C.C. § 9-307, a buyer in ordinary course takes free of a security interest created by a
seller in favor of secured party in inventory. This provision satisfies the requirements of 11
U.S.C. § 363(f)(1).
245 See Carlson, Rotten Foundations, supra note 8, at 1091-96.
246 See id. at 1068-69
247 See id.
248 See generally Plank, Bankruptcy Estate, supra note 50, at 1193-95, 1200-13.
249 See supra note 61 (quoting the definition of § 541(a)(1)); Plank, Bankruptcy Estate, supra
note 50, at 1216-34 (analyzing the drafting history and language of § 541 to demonstrate the
conscious choice of Congress to define property of the estate through the legal concept of
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property of the estate, a trustee may only use “the interest of the debtor”
in a property item,250 not the property item itself.251
Professor Carlson then points out that § 363 distinguishes “cash
collateral” from all other collateral, which he terms illiquid collateral.252
He correctly notes that “cash collateral” means cash and the like “in
which the estate and an entity other than the estate have an interest.”253
He then incorrectly asserts “Section 363(a) expressly states that the
trustee may use the whole of the collateral—the secured party’s portion
and the debtor’s portion.”254 This statement is incorrect. Although §
363(a) does define cash collateral as the thing in which the debtor and
another has an interest, § 363(a) does not authorize anyone to use cash
collateral. Similarly, § 363(b) and (c)(1) authorize the trustee to use
“property of the estate.” Property of the estate is not the “cash
collateral;” it is the “interest of the debtor in the cash collateral.”
Sections 363(b) and (c) do not authorize the trustee to use “cash
collateral.”
The definition of the term “cash collateral” serves a limited, and
property).
250 Actually, the use of the term “property” should be interpreted to mean “property interest.”
Hence, if a debtor owns a car subject to no other interest, her property interest is an
unencumbered ownership interest. If she has granted a security interest to a secured creditor, she
has an equity interest in this totality of a property interest, and the lender has a security interest in
this totality of a property interest. In real estate law, this totality is called a “fee simple absolute.”
STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 59, § 2.2, at 28.
251 Some take the view that the term “property of the estate” in § 363(b)-(c) must have a
broader meaning of “property interest in which the debtor has an ownership interest.” See
DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 383 (3d rev.
ed. 2001), in which the authors state: “‘Property of the estate’ is here a reference to property in
which the estate has an interest—i.e., any property in the possession or control of the trustee or
debtor—even though in other contexts (see, e.g., §541(a) . . . ) the term refers only to the debtor’s
or estate’s interest in property.” The author’s justify this Dewsnup-ian mode of interpretation.
See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (erroneously giving “secured claim” a different
meaning in 11 U.S.C. § 506(d) (2000) than from its definition in § 506(a) as follows: “Were this
not the case, despite authorization to use ‘property of the estate’ under § 363, the debtor could not
use property subject to a perfected lien, say the debtor’s bulldozer as the bulldozer embodies both
the debtor’s interest and that of the secured creditor. Such absurdity is avoided by a less than
precise parsing of the provision.” See id. at 383-84. As discussed in the text, such improper
manipulation of precisely defined terms is not necessary to enable to the trustee to use the
debtor’s interest in the property.
252 See Carlson, Rotten Foundations, supra note 8, at 1066-67, 1072.
253 11 U.S.C. § 363(a):
In this section, “cash collateral” means cash, negotiable instruments, documents of
title, securities, deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents whenever acquired in which
the estate and an entity other than the estate have an interest and includes the proceeds,
products, offspring, rents, or profits of property and the fees, charges, accounts or other
payments for the use or occupancy of rooms and other public facilities in hotels,
motels, or other lodging properties subject to a security interest as provided in section
552(b) of this title, whether existing before or after the commencement of a case under
this title.
Id.
254 See Carlson, Rotten Foundations, supra note 8, at 1072-73.
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limiting, purpose. Aside from the definition, the term “cash collateral”
appears in the Bankruptcy Code in only two places. Section 363(c)(2)
limits the trustee’s power to use property of the estate—including the
debtor’s interest in cash collateral. This section states that the “trustee
may not use, sell, or lease cash collateral under paragraph (1)” unless
each entity that has an interest in the cash collateral consents or the
court authorizes such use, sale, or lease.255 Section 363(c)(4) requires
the trustee to segregate and account for cash collateral in the trustee’s
possession, custody, or control.256 These provisions protect the interests
of an entity other than the debtor in the cash collateral; they do not
authorize the use of “cash collateral.”
The limiting purpose of the term “cash collateral” becomes more
obvious when we consider its precise definition. Unlike the definition
of “cash proceeds” in Article 9 of the UCC, which simply defines “cash
proceeds” as cash equivalents,257 “cash collateral” means cash and its
equivalents only if another party has an interest. If the debtor owns
cash and its equivalents, but no other entity has an interest, it is not
“cash collateral.” The debtor’s interest in this cash and its equivalents is
property of the estate.
The operation of § 363(b) and (c) and the differences between
liquid and illiquid collateral also explain the specific purpose of the
definition. If a company owned a truck subject to a security interest,
and became a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee could use,
sell or lease the debtor’s interest in the truck out of the ordinary course
of business only with court approval under § 363(b) but in the ordinary
course of business without court approval under § 363(c)(1).258 The
estate’s interest in the truck consists of the debtor’s equity interest, that
is, title to the truck and the debtor’s right to possess and use the truck.259
The filing of the bankruptcy petition and the ensuing non-payment of
the secured loan would be a default that, outside of bankruptcy, would
allow the secured creditor to repossess the truck and stop the debtor’s
use of the truck. In bankruptcy, the automatic stay prevents the secured
creditor from interfering with the trustee’s right to use the debtor’s
equity interest in the truck, that is, the right to use the truck. If the
trustee’s use of the debtor’s equity interest in the truck adversely affects
255
256

See supra note 52 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1)-(2)).
See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(4) (stating that, “[e]xcept as provided in paragraph (2) of this
subsection, the trustee shall segregate and account for any cash collateral in the trustee’s
possession, custody, or control”).
257 See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(9) (defining “Cash proceeds” as “proceeds that are money, checks,
deposit accounts, or the like”).
258 See supra note 52 (quoting §§ 363(b)(1) & (c)(1)).
259 It may be awkward to refer to the trustee using the debtor’s equity interest, that is, its right
to use the truck, and it may be easier to think in terms of the trustee using the truck, but tolerating
a little awkwardness is preferable to the mischief that arises from giving a defined term a meaning
different from its definition.
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the secured creditor, however, the secured creditor may seek adequate
protection of its interest.260 Because the trustee’s ordinary use of the
estate’s interest in the truck would not normally destroy the secured
creditor’s interest in the truck (and other types of illiquid property),
putting the burden on the secured creditor to seek adequate protection
seems appropriate.
Cash and its equivalent are different. If the debtor had cash or its
equivalent that was not encumbered, upon filing of the petition, the
trustee could use that complete ownership interest in the cash in the
ordinary course of business. However, if the cash or its equivalent is
subject to a security interest, that is, if it is “cash collateral,” the trustee
could quickly dispose of that cash free of the security interest.261 The
purpose of the definition of “cash collateral” and the restriction on use
of “cash collateral” is simply to reverse the burden from the secured
creditor to the trustee. If the trustee wants to use the debtor’s interests
in the cash collateral, the trustee must seek permission from either the
secured party or the court.
Section 363(c)(2) prohibits use of the “cash collateral” and not use
of “the estate’s interest in the cash collateral.” The latter phrase is more
accurate. The incorrect use of the term “cash collateral” is an instance
of inconsistency in the Bankruptcy Code. Professor Carlson’s basic
point is that the Bankruptcy Code is inconsistent, and therefore property
interests depend on the goodwill of bankruptcy judges to maintain
coherence.262 I believe Professor Carlson pushes this point too far. As
discussed above, the Bankruptcy Code in a few instances fails to
distinguish the interest in the thing and the thing, and in these cases
bankruptcy judges must resolve the inconsistency. In an overwhelming
number of places, however, the Bankruptcy Code is consistent.263
Slight imperfections—the existence of an inconsistency in a few
sections—do not destroy the general coherence of the Bankruptcy Code.
In particular, this particular inconsistency in § 363(c)(2) does not negate
the preceding analysis. A prohibition on the use of “cash collateral” in
§ 363(c)(2) is not an authorization to use “cash collateral” under §
363(c)(1). Under § 363(c)(1), the trustee may only use property of the
estate, that is, the debtor’s interest in the cash collateral.
260 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (providing that “on request of an entity that has an interest in
property used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be used, sold, or leased, by the trustee, the court,
with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to
provide adequate protection of such interest”).
261 See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 9-330(d) & 331 (providing when a good faith purchaser who takes
possession of a negotiable instrument takes free of a security interest); id. § 332 (providing that a
transferee of money or of funds from a deposit account takes the money or funds free of a
security interest unless the transferee acts in collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the
secured party).
262 See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
263 See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
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When a company owns receivables subject to a security interest
and becomes a debtor in bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee may use the
debtor’s equity interest in the receivables, including the proceeds of the
receivables. The proceeds will most likely be cash collateral.264 If a
company does not own receivables but has a contractual right to service
the receivables and it becomes a debtor in bankruptcy, the servicer’s
right to service the receivables become part of the property of the estate,
and the trustee may assume or reject the servicing contract.265 The
servicer, however, has no property interest in the receivables. At best, it
might have possession of tangible receivables, and it will typically have
possession for a short time of collections on the receivables. This
possession, however, is held for the benefit of the owner of the
receivables.
The Bankruptcy Code expressly recognizes this
relationship between the servicer and the owner in § 541(d). This
section states that, when a person who has legal title to but not a
beneficial interest in a property item, including “a mortgage secured by
real property, or an interest in such a mortgage, sold by the debtor but as
to which the debtor retains legal title to service or supervise the
servicing of such mortgage or interest,” only the legal title and not the
beneficial interest becomes part of property of the estate.266 The
definition of “cash collateral” does not expand the servicer/debtor’s
interest in the collections—the “cash collateral”—or the trustee’s right
to use the debtor’s interest in the collections or the receivables.
In this regard, receivables are similar to the truck discussed above.
If an owner of a truck contracts with another person to drive the truck—
be it a company or an individual—the driver has the right under the
contract to drive the truck and also a possessory interest in the truck
consistent with such use. If the driver becomes a debtor in bankruptcy,
the trustee may use those rights. The right of the trustee to exercise the
debtor’s rights, however, does not cause either the truck or the owner’s
rights in the truck to become property of the estate.
Unlike the trustee for the contract driver of the truck, however,
under § 363(c)(2), the trustee for a servicer/debtor may not even use the
servicer’s possessory interest in collections of the receivables—the cash
collateral—unless the owner of the receivables consents or the owner
receives adequate protection of its ownership interest. Further, even
with adequate protection, the trustee’s use of the possessory interest in
the collections must be consistent with its obligations under the

264 See supra note 253 (defining cash collateral). Because cash collateral includes promissory
notes, receivables in the form of promissory notes, such as single family mortgage loans, would
also be cash collateral.
265 See 11 U.S.C § 365(a) (authorizing the bankruptcy trustee to assume or reject an executory
contract).
266 See supra note 234 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(d)).
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servicing agreement. If the trustee assumes the debtor’s obligations
under the servicing agreement, the trustee may continue to collect the
proceeds of the receivables, to pass them on to the owner, and to receive
the servicing fees. If the trustee rejects the servicing agreement, it must
relinquish all of its power to service the receivables and to possess the
collections.
The definition of “cash collateral” provides the owner of the
receivables greater protection of its interest in the collections than the
protection that the owner of the truck receives. The definition, however,
does not bring into property of the estate receivables owned by someone
other than the debtor or collections on those receivables, simply because
a debtor is a servicer. This is true regardless of whether the servicer
were a prior owner of the receivables or a servicer who never had an
interest in the receiveables. Indeed, if Professor’s Carlson’s second
argument were valid, all servicing arrangements would be undermined,
not just those servicing arrangements of sellers who retain servicing
rights.
Professor Carlson tries another line of attack. He asserts that the
power to collect the receivables is “clearly” a property interest in the
receivables themselves.267 Professor Carlson’s use of the word
“clearly” clearly indicates that this proposition is not so clear. Further,
his only support for this proposition, In re Modern Settings, Inc.,268 is
weak.269 In re Modern Settings, Inc. considered the question of whether
the trustee for a debtor could settle a claim for negligence.270 A
corporation, whose principals were also the principals of the debtor,
objected to the settlement, claiming that the debtor had assigned the
claim to it before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Although no
notice of the assignment had been given to the obligor, the court
assumed for purposes of the case that there had been an effective
assignment—a matter disputed by the trustee.
The court also
acknowledged that, under New York law, notification was not necessary
for an effective assignment.
Nevertheless, the court stated that, “where no notice of the
267
268
269

See Carlson, Rotten Foundations, supra note 8, at 1096.
74 B.R. 358 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1987).
In addition, relying on Modern Settings, another court stated in dicta that “the notification
[to the obligor] would have taken the account receivable out of the estate.” See Dewhirst v.
Citibank (Arizona) (In re Contractor’s Equip. Supply Co.), 861 F.2d 241, 245 n.8 (9th Cir. 1988).
This is dicta because Dewhirst involved an assignment as security for a debt.
270 See Modern Settings, 74 B.R. at 359. The debtor sustained a $5,364,674 burglary loss.
The debtor’s insurers paid to the debtor $3.875 million and in the name of the insured debtor sued
A.D.T. Company, Inc., for alleged gross negligence in maintaining the debtor’s alarm system.
A.D.T. made an offer of settlement in an amount of more than $1 million. Id. at 359. The court
stated that this settlement “if consummated, will be divided between the insurers who paid a
portion of the loss, and the debtor (or the debtor’s assignee) in proportion to the amount of net
loss sustained by each.” See id.
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assignment is given to the obligor, the assignor retains an interest in the
assigned claim sufficient to enable it to accept payment thereon and to
discharge the claim, although by so doing it may incur liability to the
assignee.”271 The court thus held that this power was an interest in
property that became property of the estate upon the filing of the
petition under § 541(a)(1).272 The court concluded that the bankruptcy
trustee had the sole right to collect the payment of the settlement of the
negligence claim and that the release discharged the claim.273 Further,
the court in Modern Settings stated in dicta that the assignee was stayed
from giving notification of the assignment after the bankruptcy petition
was filed.274
I do not think Modern Settings is good law for several reasons.
First, the court assumes the conclusion. The court did not cite any
authority for the proposition that the “power” to discharge a claim is
property or an interest in property.275 In asserting that “the assignor
retains an interest in the assigned claim sufficient to enable it to accept
payment,” it cited Associates Discount Corp. v. Commander.276 This
case merely repeats the rule that an assignor can discharge a receivable
until the obligor receives notification. It does not characterize what the
assignor’s power is or refer to this power as an interest or a right in
property. Indeed, the case notes that the exercise of such a power is
“wrongful.”277 Even if the Bankruptcy Code authorized the trustee to
exercise such power by compromising a claim, does it sanction the
wrongful use of such power?
Second, I do not think that such a power is an “interest in property”
that could become property of the estate. An assignor’s power to
discharge the obligor’s obligation does not have any of the attributes of
property. The power cannot be transferred by the assignor because the
assignor cannot divest himself of this power. The power has no value
and is not otherwise recognized under state law as a property interest.
The sole purpose of the rule giving the assignor the power to discharge
the obligor is to protect the obligor from double payment. This rule
makes good sense. Between two innocent people, who should bear the
risk of bad behavior by the assignor? The answer is the assignee should
bear the risk. The assignee can prevent the bad behavior by notifying
271
272
273

See id. at 360.
See id. at 360-61.
In addition, the court of appeals in In re Contractors Equipment Supply Co., 861 F.2d 241,
245 n.8 (9th Cir. 1988) stated in dicta that, in the case of a true assignment, notification would
take an account receivable out of the estate.
274 Modern Settings, 74 B.R. at 361.
275 See also Greey v. Dockendorff, 231 U.S. 513, 516 (1913) (upholding the assignment of
accounts for security against a trustee in bankruptcy and requiring the trustee to remit the
proceeds of the assigned accounts to the assignee).
276 244 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1963).
277 See Assocs. Discount Corp., 244 N.Y.S.2d at 105.
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the obligor. The obligor should not bear the risk because the obligor
has no ability to protect itself.
Third, unlike the assignment of the negligence claim in Modern
Settings, the assignment of receivables in securitizations is generally278
governed by Article 9 of the UCC. Article 9 expressly grants an
assignor limited power to modify the obligations of the obligor.
Specifically, section 9-405 provides that, until notification of the
obligor, the assignor can modify a contract “in good faith.”279 The
assignor has no other “power.” Instead, section 9-404(a) merely
provides that the rights to a receivable are subject to any defense or
claim in recoupment arising from the transaction that gave rise to the
receivable.280 A defense under this section includes the defense of
payment by the obligor. Even if one views section 9-404(a) as codifying
the common law,281 it directly expresses the basic purpose for the rule:
to allocate the risk of bad behavior by the assignor to the assignee, not
the obligor. In sum, the power of an assignor to accept a payment of a
278 The claim in Modern Settings, which was a claim for damages for negligence in
maintaining a burlar alarm system, Modern Settings, 74 B.R. at 359, would probably qualify as a
“commercial tort claim” under Article 9 of the U.C.C. §§ 9-102(a)(13) (defining “commercial tort
claim” as “a claim arising in tort with respect to which (A) the claimant is an organization; or (B)
the claimant is an individual and the claim (i) arose in the course of the claimant’s business or
profession; and (ii) does not include damages arising out of personal injury to or the death of an
individual”); 9-102(a)(2) (providing that “account” does not include . . . (ii) commercial tort
claims”); 9-102(a)(42) (providing that the term “general intangible,” which includes a payment
intangible, “means any personal property, including things in action, other than . . . commercial
tort claims”).
279 See U.C.C. § 9-405 (2001):
(a) A modification of or substitution for an assigned contract is effective against an
assignee if made in good faith. . . . This subsection is subject to subsections (b)
through (d).
(b) Subsection (a) applies to the extent that: (1) the right to payment or a part thereof
under an assigned contract has not been fully earned by performance; or (2) the right to
payment or a part thereof has been fully earned by performance and the account debtor
has not received notification of the assignment under [§] 9-406(a).
(c) This section is subject to law other than this article which establishes a different
rule for an account debtor who is an individual and who incurred the obligation
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.
(d) This section does not apply to an assignment of a health-care-insurance receivable.
Id.
280 See id. § 9-404(a):
(a) Unless an account debtor has made an enforceable agreement not to assert defenses or
claims, and subject to subsections (b) through (e), the rights of an assignee are subject to:
(1) all terms of the agreement between the account debtor and assignor and any
defense or claim in recoupment arising from the transaction that gave rise to the
contract; and
(2) any other defense or claim of the account debtor against the assignor which
accrues before the account debtor receives a notification of the assignment
authenticated by the assignor or the assignee.
Id.
281 Section 9-404(a) appears to reflect the common law. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 338(1) (2002).
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receivable in trust for the assignee is not a separate “interest in
property” in its own right, giving the assignor a property interest in the
payment that becomes part of the property of the estate of the assignor.
At best, the assignor who actually has received a payment has mere
possession or control of the proceeds, but the assignee owns those
proceeds.282
Nor is the power of an assignor to accept a payment of a receivable
in trust for the assignee an interest in the receivable sufficient to bring
the entire receivable into the bankruptcy estate of the assignor. The
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf283
precludes an argument to the contrary. In this case, the Court rejected
the argument that a bank’s administrative hold on a checking account
violated the automatic stay against an act to exercise control over
property of the depositor’s bankruptcy estate. The Court noted that a
bank account consisted of “nothing more or less than a promise to pay,
from the bank to the depositor . . . and [the bank’s] temporary refusal to
pay was neither a taking of possession of [the debtor’s] property nor an
exercising of control over it, but merely a refusal to perform its
promise.”284 In other words, the interest of the debtor in a bank
account—the property of the estate—is not an interest in some separate
property item, but only the rights that the debtor had under his contract
with the bank that established the account. In the case of the collection
of a receivable by a seller/servicer, the seller/servicer may have the right
to collect a payment on a receivable and this contract right is a property
interest. But this contract right does not give the seller/servicer an
interest in the receivable itself.
c.

Lapsed Perfection and Trustee’s Avoidance Power

Finally, Professor Carlson argues that the future, theoretical,
contingent power of a bankruptcy trustee to avoid a sale of accounts and
chattel paper that becomes unperfected if the buyer fails to file a
continuation statement is an interest in property that subjects the entire
account or chattel paper to “bankruptcy jurisdiction.”285 Assuming that
Professor Carlson is equating “bankruptcy jurisdiction” with “inclusion
in property of the estate,” I disagree that this power is a sufficient
interest in property to make an account or chattel paper part of the
282 See U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(2) (providing that a security interest, which includes a buyer’s
interest in receivables, see id. § 1-201(b)(35), “attaches to any identifiable proceeds of collateral,”
which includes receivables that have been sold, see id. § 9-102(a)(35)).
283 516 U.S. 16 (1995).
284 Id. at 21.
285 See Carlson, Rotten Foundations, supra note 8, at 1061-62, 1096-1107; see also supra note
233 (describing the provisions of the UCC requiring the filing of continuation statements).
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property of the estate.
A buyer of an account must file a financing statement to perfect its
ownership interest,286 and a buyer of chattel paper must either file a
financing statement or take possession of the chattel paper to perfect its
ownership interest.287 Financing statements are generally effective for
five years.288 To retain its perfected status, the buyer whose ownership
interest is perfected by filing must file a continuation statement every
five years.289 If the buyer fails to maintain perfection by filing the
necessary continuation statements, the buyer’s interest in the account or
chattel paper would become subordinate to a person who becomes a lien
creditor while the buyer’s interest in the account or chattel paper is
unperfected.290 If the seller becomes a debtor under the Bankruptcy
Code while the buyer’s interest is unperfected, the bankruptcy trustee
can avoid the sale under its power as a hypothetical lien creditor under §
544(a).291 If so, the trustee can bring the buyer’s interest in the account
into the property of the seller’s bankruptcy estate.292
No one disputes that if a buyer had failed to maintain perfection by
filing a continuation statement and the buyer’s interest becomes
unperfected because of lapse of the financing statement, and the seller
then files for bankruptcy, the seller’s bankruptcy trustee can recapture
the accounts (and chattel paper, to the extent perfection is only by
filing) that the seller sold. Professor Carlson, however, posits a more
rarified situation: a seller of accounts or chattel paper becomes a debtor
in bankruptcy while the buyer’s interest is perfected by filing. At that
point, the bankruptcy trustee has the potential, future right to avoid the
sale if, during the case, the end of the five-year period perfection draws
near and the buyer fails to file a continuation statement before the end
of the five-year period, which the buyer could file under the Bankruptcy
286 See U.C.C. § 9-310(a) (providing that, except as otherwise provided in Article 9, a
financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests, which includes a buyer’s interest
in accounts, see id. § 1-201(b)(35)).
287 See id. §§ 9-312(a) (providing that a security interest in chattel paper may be perfected by
filing); 9-313(a) (providing that a secured party may perfect a security interest in tangible chattel
paper by taking possession of the collateral, including chattel paper that has been sold); see also
id. § 9-102(a)(12)(B) (defining collateral to include chattel paper that has been sold).
288 See supra note 233 (describing the provisions of U.C.C. § 9-515(a)).
289 See id. (describing the provisions of U.C.C. § 9-515(c)(e)).
290 See U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2) (providing that a security interest is subordinate to the rights of a
person that becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected).
291 See 11 U.S.C § 544(a)(1) (providing that the trustee has, as of the commencement of the
case, the rights and powers of, or may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor that is voidable
by, a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of the case, and
that obtains at that time a judicial lien on all property on which a creditor on a simple contract
could have obtained such a judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor exists).
292 See id. §§ 550(a)(1) (providing that to the extent that a transfer is avoided under § 544 the
trustee may recover the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property,
from the initial transferee); 541(a)(3) (providing that property of the estate includes any interest in
property that the trustee recovers under § 550).

PLANK.GALLEY

1718

5/25/2004 4:02 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:5

Code.293
Although these conditions seem remote, they could arise.294
Nevertheless, unlike the contingent future interest, such as remainders
and executory interests that Professor Carlson refers to for analogy,295
this potential power is not an interest of the debtor in property.
Therefore, it can not become property of the estate. The trustee’s
avoidance power under § 544(a) is not an interest of the debtor in
property at the time of the commencement of the case. It arises by
operation of the Bankruptcy Code.296 To the extent that the trustee’s
avoidance power arises under state law by virtue of being a “lien
creditor” with an interest superior to an unperfected secured party,
including a buyer of receivables,297 this is not an interest of the debtor in
property. It is only an interest of a lien creditor of the debtor.
A buyer who fails to maintain continuous perfection in its
receivables by filing is vulnerable not only to a lien creditor and a
bankruptcy trustee. Such a buyer is also vulnerable to a second
purchaser. A second buyer who buys the same receivables from the
seller and who perfects its security interest will achieve priority over the
first buyer if the first buyer’s interest becomes unperfected.298 UCC
Article 9, revised in 2001, bolsters this priority rule by stating that the
seller of accounts and chattel paper has the express power to resell any
accounts or chattel paper previously sold if the prior sale is not

293 See id. §§ 362(b)(3) (providing that the automatic stay does not stay “any act to perfect, or
to maintain or continue the perfection of, an interest in property to the extent that the trustee’s
rights and powers are subject to such perfection under section 546(b)”); 546(b)(1)(B) (providing
that the rights and powers of a trustee are subject to “any generally applicable law that . . .
provides for the maintenance or continuation of perfection of an interest in property to be
effective against an entity that acquires rights in such property before the date on which action is
taken to effect such maintenance or continuation”).
294 Securitizations are often structured to require a law firm to deliver either annually or every
five years an opinion describing what steps the secured party needs to take to maintain perfection
of a security interest or advising the secured party that no further steps are necessary for the next
year or five-year period. I have drafted and consulted on these opinions. Occasionally, I have
seen security interests become unperfected because of a failure to file a continuation statement.
So far, I have not experienced a lapsed financing statement that was a problem for a securitization
because a search has shown no intervening lien creditors or security interests. But, somewhere
out there a lapsed financing statement could result in the subordination of a buyer of receivables.
295 See Carlson, Rotten Foundations, supra note 8, at 1061 (referring to contingent future
interests and the Rule Against Perpetuities).
296 See supra note 291 (describing § 544(a)(1), which creates the trustee’s power as a
hypothetical lien creditor).
297 See also U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(51)(C) (2001) (defining a “lien creditor,” which takes priority
over an unperfected security interest, see U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2), to include a bankruptcy trustee as
of the filing of the petition).
298 See id. §§ 9-322(a)(2) (providing that a perfected security interest has priority over a
conflicting unperfected security interest); 9-515(c) (providing that, if a security interest “becomes
unperfected upon lapse, it is deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser of the
collateral for value”).
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perfected.299
This power of a seller to resell accounts and chattel paper that had
been previously sold is a power of some kind. It too is not, however, an
“interest in property.” It has none of the attributes of a property interest.
Most importantly, it is not transferable. It exists solely by virtue of a
statutory requirement, which I have criticized before,300 that an owner of
accounts (and an owner of chattel paper not in possession) must file
continuation statements. The seller can never divest itself of this
power.301 It is like my power to breath or to vote; I could attempt to sell
either of those two powers, but I could not effectively vest them in my
transferee. In addition, the seller’s contingent, future power to resell the
accounts or chattel paper is not a power that is relied upon or recognized
in the marketplace as a property interest.302 If such a power is not an
interest of the debtor in property, it cannot become property of the estate
that the trustee can use or sell.303 The most that the trustee in
bankruptcy for a seller/debtor can do is avoid the sale of the accounts or
chattel paper if the contingency arises during the case.
3.

Limited Effect of Professor Carlson’s Retained Powers

Even if Professor Carlson’s retained powers were sufficient to
defeat a sale of receivables, they are of limited consequence for
securitizations. They do not undermine the legal foundations of
securitization in general. At best they would prevent only certain kinds
299 See id. § 9-318(b) (stating, “For purposes of determining the rights of creditors of, and
purchasers for value of an account or chattel paper from, a debtor that has sold an account or
chattel paper, while the buyer’s security interest is unperfected, the debtor is deemed to have
rights and title to the account or chattel paper identical to those the debtor sold.”); see also James
J. White, Chuck and Steve’s Pecadillo, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1743 (2004).
300 See Thomas E. Plank, Sacred Cows and Workhorses: The Sale of Accounts and Chattel
Paper Under Article 9 of the U.C.C. and the Effects of Violating a Fundamental Drafting
Principle, 26 CONN. L. REV. 397, 487-88 (1994) [hereinafter Plank, Sale of Accounts] (criticizing
the lapse of financing statements and the requirement for the filing of continuation statement in
the case of sale of accounts and chattel paper).
301 Presumably, the seller could attempt to assign the power. However, after such an
assignment, if the contingency arose—the first buyer failed to file a continuation statement—the
seller could still sell the accounts or chattel paper to a second buyer notwithstanding the
assignment.
302 Accordingly, it does not even have the status of a governmental benefit, that has been
treated like a property interest for purposes of the due process clause of the United States
Constitution. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-62 & n. 8 (1970) (holding that
termination of welfare benefits without a hearing violated the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment on the grounds that welfare benefits as statutory entitles were “important
rights” and also noting that it “may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like
‘property’ than a ‘gratuity,’ that at least have value to the recipient but otherwise do not meet the
attribute of a property interest, such as transferability”).
303 See supra note 52 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1)-(2) (2000), which authorizes the trustee
to use, sell, or lease property of the estate).
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of securitization.
First, the buyer can eliminate the seller’s power to transfer chattel
paper or promissory notes either by taking possession—often done in
securitization transactions, especially in the case of sellers who do not
have a high credit rating—or by having the chattel paper or promissory
note marked to indicate the buyer’s interest.304 The buyer can eliminate
the seller’s powers as servicer to collect the receivable by requiring a
different servicer and giving notice to the obligor that it should direct
payments to the new servicer. This may not be such a hardship.
Although the seller is also the servicer in many transactions, in many
others the servicer is either a separate affiliate or an unaffiliated third
party.305 Preventing sellers from acting as servicers to obviate Professor
Carlson’s arguments seems to be unnecessary restrictions. These
restrictions would serve only to limit the choices available to the parties
without providing any concomitant benefit for society. But if necessary
to eliminate Professor Carlson’s arguments, these limitations could be
implemented.
The future power of a trustee to avoid a sale of accounts306 or the
power of the seller to resell the sold accounts if the buyer does not file a
continuation statement at the required five-year intervals would only
adversely affect the sales of accounts that have a maturity date that
approaches five years. Securitization of trade receivables and health
care receivables, which have short term maturities, would avoid this
problem. One answer—consistent with Professor Carlson’s article—is
the truly fantastic position that the mere possibility that a sixty-day
receivable could still be outstanding in the years following the sale307
gives the bankruptcy trustee the present power to recapture the short
term receivables as property of the estate. If so, then under Professor’s
304 One requirement for priority for a subsequent purchaser of chattel paper or a promissory
note under UCC 9-330(b)(d) (2001) is that the purchaser take possession of the chattel paper or
promissory note “without knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the [prior] secured
party.” See id. § 9-330(b)-(d). However, UCC § 9-330(f) provides: “For purposes of subsections
(b) and (d), if chattel paper or an instrument indicates that it has been assigned to an identified
secured party other than the purchaser, a purchaser of the chattel paper or instrument has
knowledge that the purchase violates the rights of the secured party.”
305 Many securitizations involve an unaffiliated master servicer who subcontracts with the
seller or its affiliated servicer. If necessary, the master servicer could be prohibited from
subcontracting with the seller.
306 Buyers of chattel paper could avoid this fantastic future power of the bankruptcy trustee
altogether by taking possession of the chattel paper and therefore perfecting its “security interest.”
See U.C.C. § 9-313(a) (2001) (providing that a “secured party” may perfect a “security interest”
in tangible chattel paper by taking possession).
307 I say “years following the sale” because presumably the securitization would include a
continuous sale of short term receivables for a period of years perfected by the filing of a
financing statement at the beginning of the transaction, as in the case of the trade receivables
securitization in In re LTV Steel Co., 274 B.R. 278 (N.D. Ohio 2001). See LTV Receivables
Purchase Agreement, supra note 121, § 2.01, at 391, and related defined terms at 450, 468, 476,
481 (providing for a five-year commitment to purchase receivables).
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Carlson’s theory, there could be no securitization of accounts.
There remain two simple solutions to save the securitization of
accounts from Professor’s Carlson’s theory. First, revising Article 9 to
eliminate the filing requirement to perfect a sale of accounts308 would
eliminate the trustee’s and seller’s putative retained power. Sales of
accounts would then resemble sales of payment intangibles or
promissory notes, which are automatically perfected upon
attachment.309 The second solution is eliminating the need to file
continuation statements for sales of accounts or chattel paper.310 If a
court were to accept Professor Carlson’s argument, I expect that state
legislatures would move quickly to adopt either of these solutions.
Recall the immediate reaction when the United States Court of Appeals
ruled in Octagon Gas Systems, Inc. v. Rimmer (In re Meridian Reserve,
Inc.)311 that an account that had been sold still remained part of the
seller’s property and therefore became part of the seller’s bankruptcy
estate because Article 9 defines a security interest to include a buyer’s
interest in accounts.312 Oklahoma, whose law was the applicable state
law, quickly amended Article 9 to reverse the effect of Octagon Gas.313
The Permanent Editorial Board of the Uniform Commercial Code
issued a commentary repudiating Octagon Gas.314 Finally, revised
Article 9 repudiated Octagon Gas.315
In sum, I believe that the lien-sale distinction that Professor
Carlson seeks to dismantle remains valid in bankruptcy. Under § 541,
property of the estate is only the interest of the debtor in a property
thing, not the thing itself. Property interests sold by a seller do not
become part of property of the seller’s bankruptcy estate if the seller
becomes a debtor. The legal foundations of securitization—well
established principles of state law and the language of the Bankruptcy
308 I actually think this would be a good thing. See Plank, Sale of Accounts, supra note 300, at
475-82.
309 See U.C.C. § 9-309(3)(4) (2001) (providing that a sale of a payment intangible and a sale
of a promissory note are perfected when they attach).
310 See Plank, Sale of Accounts, supra note 300, at 488 (proposing such elimination).
311 995 F.2d 948 (10th Cir. 1993).
312 Id. at 957 (holding “that because, under Article 9, a sale of accounts is treated as if it
creates a security interest in the accounts, accounts sold by a debtor prior to filing for bankruptcy
remain property of the debtor’s estate” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
313 Oklahoma amended its version of the former UCC section 9-102, which provides that
former Article 9 of the U.C.C. applied to the sale of accounts and chattel paper, to add a new
subsection (4) that stated: “This article does not prevent the transfer of ownership of accounts or
chattel paper. The determination of whether a particular transfer of accounts or chattel paper
constitutes a sale or a transfer for security purposes is not governed by this article.” See 1996
Okla. Sess. Laws, Ch. 56, § 21.
314 See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE U.C.C., A.L.I., COMMENTARY NO. 14
(Section 9-102(1)(b) (1994)).
315 See U.C.C. § 9-318(a) (2001) (providing that a “debtor that has sold an account, chattel
paper, payment intangible, or promissory note does not retain a legal or equitable interest in the
collateral sold.”)
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Code—are very secure. If courts respect the language of the
Bankruptcy Code, as they are bound to do, securitization is safe.
Further, even if there were a few squeaky boards316 in the legal structure
supporting securitization, those boards can be avoided. If one of those
boards317 were in fact rotten, it can be replaced. Even if Professor
Carlson’s arguments were to prevail, they would not establish that the
foundations of securitization are rotten.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF SECURITIZATION
Having criticized Professor Carlson’s rarified attack on
securitization, I now present my own rarified argument on the
constitutional foundations of securitization. The argument is rarified
because very few courts or scholars have addressed the limits on
Congress’s power under the Bankruptcy Clause.318 If the foundations of
securitization rested only on an interpretation of Congress’s
constitutional authority, its foundations would indeed be shaky.
However, the mundane basis for the secure foundations of securitization
described in Part II above is consistent with my view of the limits of
Congress’s Bankruptcy Power.
In my view, Congress’s power to “establish . . . uniform Laws on
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”319 is limited
to adjusting the relationship between a debtor that is insolvent in some
broad sense320 and that debtor’s creditors. Accordingly, neither
Congress nor the federal courts may alter the nonbankruptcy rights of
other entities who have a relationship with the debtor but who are not
creditors (which I call “Third Parties”), with one exception described
below.
These limits on the “subject of Bankruptcies” follow logically from
the meaning of the term “bankruptcies” when the Constitution was
adopted and inductively from the various legislative responses to
bankruptcies before the adoption of the Constitution. First, in the latter
half of the eighteenth century, the meaning of the word “bankruptcy”
used in the Bankruptcy Clause was synonymous with the meaning of
“insolvency.” Both “bankruptcy” and “insolvency” meant the condition
316 I am referring to Professor Carlson’s first two retained powers, see supra notes 228-32 and
accompanying text.
317 I am referring to the trustee’s power to avoid a sale that becomes unperfected and the
seller’s power to effect second, perfected sale of the same accounts if the first sale becomes
unperfected.
318 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (empowering Congress to “establish . . . uniform Laws on
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States”).
319 See id.
320 See infra note 342 and accompanying text (defining “insolvency” broadly).
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of being unable to pay one’s debts, as defined in contemporary
dictionaries, and these terms were used interchangeably in a variety of
legislative acts and other documents.321 Accordingly, the textual
meaning of the “subject of Bankruptcies” is the “subject of debtors who
are unable to pay their debts.”
Second, the English and American legislatures of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries addressed the problem of debtors’ inability to
pay their debts through a variety of laws that only attempted to adjust
the relationship between an insolvent debtor and his or her creditors.
These laws consisted of the English Bankrupt Acts,322 the English
Insolvency Acts, generally titled “An Act for the Relief of Insolvent
Debtors,”323 and the great variety of laws enacted in the American
colonies and early states.324 Although these laws differed in their
specifics, they all had common features and limitations. For the most
part, these laws established a collective proceeding for the debtor and
all the creditors in which commissioners, justices of the peace,
assignees, or in some cases judges gathered and liquidated substantially
all of the debtor’s property and distributed the proceeds pro rata to the
creditors.325 In a few instances, these laws forced all creditors to accept
an arrangement negotiated between the debtor and a majority of the
creditors.326 None of these laws attempted to do more than alter the
relationship between the debtor and the creditors. No legislation
regulated or created the debtor-creditor relationship, or the property
rights or contract rights underlying that relationship.
321 See Thomas E. Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1063, 1077-78
(2002) [hereinafter Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism].
322 These Acts consisted of the 1570 Statute of 13 Elizabeth, 13 Eliz., c. 7 (1570) (Eng.), the
1604 Statute of 1 James, 1 Jam., c. 15 (1604) (Eng.), the 1623 Statute of 21 James, 21 Jam., c. 19
(1623) (Eng.) and the 1732 Statute of 5 George II, 5 Geo. 2, c. 30 (1732) (Eng.). The 1732
Statute of 5 George II revised and expanded, without significant change, several earlier Bankrupt
Acts that had expired, primarily the 1705 Statute of Anne, 4 Ann., c. 17 (1705) (Eng.), which
itself modernized the bankruptcy system. The 1732 Statute of 5 George II, originally scheduled
to expire in 1735, was renewed periodically (with a few minor amendments) and then became
permanent in 1797 by 37 Geo. 3, c. 124 (1797) (Eng.); see also Plank, Bankruptcy and
Federalism, supra note 321, at 1079-82 (summarizing the provisions of these acts).
323 See, e.g., 2 & 3 Ann., c. 16 (1703) (Eng.) (“An Act for the Discharge out of Prison such
Insolvent Debtors” who will serve in the army or navy); 6 Geo., c. 22 (1719) (Eng.) (act for
“Relief of insolvent Debtors”); 11 Geo., c. 21 (1724) (Eng.) (same); 2 Geo. 2, c. 20 (1729) (Eng.)
(act for “Relief of Insolvent Debtors”); 21 Geo. 2, c. 31 (1748) (Eng.) (same); 28 Geo. 2, c. 13
(1755) (Eng.) (same); 9 Geo. 3, c. 26 (1769) (Eng.) (same); 12 Geo. 3, c. 23 (1772) (Eng.) (same);
14 Geo. 3, c. 77 (1774) (Eng.) (same); 16 Geo. 3, c. 38 (1776) (Eng.) (same); 18 Geo. 3, c. 52
(1778) (Eng.) (same); 21 Geo. 3, c. 63 (1781) (Eng.) (“An Act for the Discharge of certain
Insolvent Debtors”); see also Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, supra note 321, at 1082-83
(summarizing the provisions of these acts).
324 See also Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, supra note 321, at 1085-87.
325 See id. at 1078-89; see also Thomas E. Plank, Why Bankruptcy Judges Need Not and
Should Not be Article III Judges, 72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 567, 576-90, 596-606 (1998) [hereinafter
Plank, Bankruptcy Judges].
326 See Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, supra note 321, at 1087.
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The language of the Bankruptcy Clause and these English and
American bankruptcy and insolvency acts suggests to me four principles
for determining Congress’s ability to adjust the relationship between an
insolvent debtor and the debtor’s creditors. These are: (i) the DebtorCreditor Adjustment Principle, (ii) the Non-Expropriation Principle, (iii)
the Non-Interference Principle, and (iv) the Debtor-Insolvency
Principle. Under these principles, the foundations of securitization are
secure. To the extent that these principles constrain Congress, they
similarly constrain federal courts in bankruptcy.327 Federal courts in
bankruptcy may not develop federal common law bankruptcy rules,
even in the name of “equity,” that Congress could not prescribe.328
Under the Debtor-Creditor Adjustment Principle, Congress has
complete discretion to adjust the debtor-creditor relationship. It may
curtail the nonbankruptcy rights of a debtor for the benefit of that
debtor’s creditors, and it may curtail the nonbankruptcy rights of some
or all of those creditors against the debtor for the benefit of the debtor or
some or all of the other creditors. For example, Congress may provide
that any property interest that the debtor could use to satisfy her debts
outside of bankruptcy may, but need not be, distributed to creditors in
bankruptcy. Congress may also provide that any liability of the debtor,
regardless of how remote or contingent, may be reduced, subordinated,
or discharged. Congress may also delay or modify any creditor
remedies.329
Under the Non-Expropriation Principle, however, Congress may
not expand the rights of debtors or their creditors beyond that necessary
to adjust their relationship. Accordingly, Congress may not diminish
the rights of Third Parties, that is, those persons who are outside of the
debtor-creditor relationship.
Nor may Congress diminish the
nonbankruptcy rights of the debtor or the creditors for the benefit of
these Third Parties. For example, Congress may not (a) create rights or
property interests for insolvent debtors or their creditors that do not
exist under nonbankruptcy law; (b) appropriate property interests of
Third Parties for distribution to creditors, including disregarding
inherent limitations in property interests of the debtor that inure to the
benefit of a Third Party; (c) alter the substantive legal relationship
between a debtor and a Third Party; or (d) create a liability that does not
exist under nonbankruptcy law or expand an existing liability.330
In this regard, any person may be both a creditor and a Third Party.
An example is the landlord of a tenant who becomes a debtor under the
327 See Thomas E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 633
passim (2004) [hereinafter Plank, Erie and Bankruptcy].
328 See id. at 662-68.
329 See Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, supra note 321, at 1089-91.
330 Id. at 1091-92.

PLANK.GALLEY

2004]

5/25/2004 4:02 PM

THE SECURITY OF SECURITIZATION

1725

Bankruptcy Code. If the tenant owed rent due before the tenant became
a debtor, the landlord is a creditor with respect to that prepetition
claim.331 On the other hand, the landlord is a Third Party and not a
creditor with respect to the rights and duties of the landlord and the
debtor/tenant under the lease after the filing of the petition. In applying
these principles, courts must distinguish the respective roles of a
creditor and a Third Party.
The Bankruptcy Code and federal courts generally conform to
these two principles, although, in my view, the Bankruptcy Code
violates that the Non-Expropriation Principle in a few instances not
relevant to securitization.332 Therefore, under the Non-Expropriation
Principle, and consistent with the Bankruptcy Code, if an originator
sells receivables to an SPE that is a separate legal entity, in compliance
with generally applicable nonbankruptcy law, neither Congress nor
federal courts may disregard the sale of the receivables or the
separateness of the SPE. They may not do so even if the economic
effect of the sale to the SPE, which then borrows on a secured basis, is
similar to a direct secured loan to the originator. Under the DebtorCreditor Adjustment Principle, Congress can adjust the relationship
between a debtor and a secured creditor, including the relationship
between an SPE and its secured creditors. Congress may not, however,
eliminate a true sale to a separate legal entity.
There is one narrow limitation on the Non-Expropriation Principle:
the Non-Interference Principle. This principle allows Congress and
federal courts to prevent a Third Party from using its nonbankruptcy
entitlements solely to interfere with the bankruptcy process.333 It also
331 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(10)(A) (2000) (providing that a creditor is an “entity that has a claim
against the debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor”);
id. § 101(5) (defining a claim as a right to payment or a right to an equitable remedy for breach of
performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment); id. § 301 (providing that a voluntary
case under the Bankruptcy Code is commenced by the filing with the bankruptcy court of a
petition by an entity eligible to be a debtor and that the commencement of a voluntary case
“constitutes an order for relief”); id. § 303 (providing for the filing of an involuntary petition by
creditors against an eligible person and for the later entry of an order for relief by the bankruptcy
court either in the case of an unconstested petition or in the case of a contested petition after
hearing and a determination that (1) the debtor is generally not paying such debtor’s undisputed
debts or (2) the appointment of a custodian for the debtor’s property within 120 days before the
filing of the petition).
332 These include the abrogation of the rights of a Third Party as (a) a co-tenant with an
enforceable agreement not to partition property held in co-tenancy, (b) a party to a lease or
executory contract who has a generally enforceable right to restrict or prevent assignment of the
debtor’s rights under the contract or lease, (c) a creditor who has an independent claim against an
entity that is a co-obligor with the debtor, (d) a tenant by the entirety, and (e) holder of a right to
dower or courtesy. See Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, supra note 321, at 1089-91; Plank,
Erie and Bankruptcy, supra note 327, at 668-74 (arguing that non-debtor co-obligor releases
approved by bankruptcy courts violate the Non-Expropriation Principle).
333 See Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, supra note 321, at 1092-93; see also Hayhoe v.
Cole (In re Cole), 226 B.R. 647, 651-52 654 nn.6-7, (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (holding that
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allows them to prevent a Third Party from using the filing of a
bankruptcy petition by a debtor to obtain a benefit that the third party
could not obtain outside of bankruptcy. Accordingly, Congress may
abrogate, and has abrogated, “ipso facto” clauses in contracts or
nonbankruptcy law that cause a forfeiture of a debtor’s interest in the
contract or other property rights solely because the debtor has filed a
bankruptcy petition.334 In addition, in the absence of a specific statutory
provision, federal courts have legitimately prevented a Third Party from
canceling a contract when the sole reason for the cancellation was the
filing of a bankruptcy petition.335
The Non-Interference Principle is a narrow exception to the NonExpropriation Principle that only prevents direct interference with
Congress’s power to adjust the insolvent debtor-creditor relation. Many
nonbankruptcy entitlements, including a security interest, “interfere” in
some sense with the debtor’s bankruptcy. In the case of a security
interest, Congress can alter that entitlement under the Debtor-Creditor
Adjustment Principle. On the other hand, if a particular state declares
that, for all purposes, a particular thing or right is not an interest in
property, or that a particular thing or right is subject to limitations, such
as the limitations on transferability, then neither Congress nor federal
courts may overrule those judgments, even if they may impede a
debtor’s reorganization or the creditors’ proceeds.336
Hence, the Non-Interference Principle is not a basis for abrogating
properly structured securitizations. To be sure, one primary purpose of
securitization is to separate receivables from the risk of the bankruptcy
of an operating company. Nevertheless, securitization does not interfere
with the bankruptcy process. As discussed above, an SPE can and
would be expected to become a debtor in bankruptcy if the receivables
that it owns fail to generate sufficient revenues to repay the debt holders

prepetition waiver of discharge was unenforceable against debtor in bankruptcy); In re Tru Block
Concrete Prod., Inc., 27 B.R. 486, 492 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1983) (holding void as against public
policy covenant not to file bankruptcy petition in agreement among shareholders of debtor and
creditors to liquidate debtor outside of bankruptcy); see also Tracht, supra note 28, at 303-15
(1997) (describing and questioning the conventional wisdom of unenforceability of bankruptcy
waivers); David S. Kupetz, The Bankruptcy Code is Part of Every Contract: Minimizing the
Impact of Chapter 11 on the Non-Debtor’s Bargain, 54 BUS. LAW. 55, 67-69 (1998)
(summarizing law on pre-bankruptcy waivers).
334 See generally Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, supra note 321, at 1126-28 (explaining
the operation of ipso-facto clauses and the Non-Interference Principle).
335 See, e.g., Holland Am. Ins. Co. v. Sportservice, Inc. (In re Cahokia Downs, Inc.), 5 B.R.
529, 531 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1980) (prohibiting the termination of the debtor’s insurance policy
under a general discretionary termination clause because the only reason for the termination was
the filing of the petition); see also Plank, Erie and Bankruptcy, supra note 327, at 646-48
(discussing federal courts’ use of federal common law in accordance with principle).
336 See Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, supra note 321, at 1119-22 (explaining why the
abrogation of restrictions on assignment of leases violates the Non-Expropriation Principle).
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and they initiate foreclosure proceedings.337 Furthermore, a sale of
receivables by an originator to an SPE avoids more than just the risk of
the bankruptcy of the originator. It prevents other persons, such as lien
creditors or subsequent secured parties, from obtaining an interest in the
receivables that would adversely affect a first priority secured creditor.
On the other hand, to the extent that nonbankruptcy entitlements,
whether created by contract or pursuant to state law, are directed solely
at bankruptcy, Congress and courts may disregard them. For this
reason, the Asset Backed Securitization Statutes enacted by several
states that Professors Janger338 and Mann339 discuss in this Symposium
may be vulnerable to Congress’s and federal courts’ power under the
Non-Interference Principle. To the extent that their sole effect is to
exclude assets from the bankruptcy estate of a debtor in bankruptcy,
they are like the ipso-facto clause overridden by § 541(c)(1) of the
Bankruptcy Code.340 On the other hand, if these statutes have effect
outside of bankruptcy, they must be respected. As discussed below,
there may be doubts about whether bankruptcy courts would honor
these statutes.
My final principle is the Debtor-Insolvency Principle.341 I believe
that, under the Bankruptcy Clause, a person may not be a debtor in
bankruptcy unless that person is insolvent in some sense.342 This is an
337
338

See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
See Edward J. Janger, The Death of Secured Lending, 25 CARDOZO L. REV 1759 (2004)
[hereinafter Janger, Death of Secured Lending].
339 See Ronald J. Mann, The Rise of State Bankruptcy Directed Legislation, 25 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1805 (2004).
340 See supra note 61 (quoting § 541(a)(1)).
341 See generally Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, supra note 321, at 1093-95; Thomas E.
Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. REV. 487 (1996) (arguing generally
that the original understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause has not changed since the adoption of
the Constitution, and arguing specifically that insolvency is a jurisdictional requirement for
bankruptcy) [hereinafter Plank, Constitutional Limits].
342 Insolvency may be either balance sheet insolvency, that is, the debtor’s liabilities must
exceed the debtor’s assets, or cash flow insolvency, that is, the debtor must be generally unable to
pay debts as they become due. Most debtors are insolvent in both senses, but it is not uncommon
to be solvent under a balance sheet test and still not be able to pay debts as they become due. For
example, a debtor may have assets—such as land—the value of which exceeds the debtor’s
liabilities. However, the debtor may not have sufficient cash or other liquid assets to pay current
debts and may not be able to convert its illiquid assets into cash quickly enough to pays those
debts. Both concepts appear in the Bankruptcy Code. In most situations, the Bankruptcy Code
uses the balance sheet meaning of “insolvency.” See 11 U.S.C § 101(32)(A)-(B) (2000) (defining
“insolvency” for most entities as balance sheet insolvency); id. §§ 547(b)(3), 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I)
(2000) (using the balance sheet definition of insolvency in the case of preferential and fraudulent
transfers). However, municipalities may not seek relief under chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code
unless they are insolvent under a cash flow insolvency test. See id. §§ 109(c)(3) (requiring a
municipality to be “insolvent”); 101(32)(C) (defining “insolvent” for a municipality to mean that
the municipality “generally not paying its debts as they become due unless such debts are the
subject of a bona fide dispute; or . . . unable to pay its debts as they become due”). Also,
creditors may not involuntarily cause a person to become a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code
unless that person is insolvent under a cash flow test. See id. § 303(h)(1) (providing that the court
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important qualification to the Debtor-Creditor Adjustment Principle. If
a debtor is not insolvent, broadly defined,343 Congress’s discretion
under the Debtor-Creditor Adjustment Principle does not apply.
Few courts have embraced my Debtor-Insolvency Principle, and
the court in In re Marshall344 has specifically rejected it. I disagree with
the court’s analysis, but that is a discussion for another day. In any
event, if courts were to adopt my analysis, then they could more easily
prevent opportunistic behavior by solvent debtors. Bankruptcy law
alters the rights of debtors and creditors for the particular purpose of
addressing the problem of an insolvent debtor who cannot repay its
debts.
Solvent debtors, obviously, do not have this problem.
Nevertheless, they occasionally attempt to use bankruptcy law to obtain
a rule change in bankruptcy, such as rejection of an executory contract
or acceleration and summary disposal of unmatured claims,345 that they
could not obtain outside of bankruptcy. Courts reject these attempts on
the grounds that the petitions were filed in “bad faith.”346 In these
cases, however, the only distinguishing characteristic is that the debtor
was solvent, not the nature of the particular rule change.
The Debtor-Insolvency Principle and the prevention of
opportunistic behavior applies directly to securitization. If an SPE is
solvent, the parent of the SPE should not be able to cause the SPE to file
for bankruptcy. Recognition of the Debtor-Insolvency Principle would
be a more secure foundation than the requirement of the consent of the
independent director to filing a petition.347
A good illustration of how this principle strengthens securitization
is the case of In re WE Financial Co.348 In this case, the owners of a
solvent SPE caused the SPE to file for bankruptcy for the sole purpose
of accelerating the payment of the SPE’s $125 million high interest debt
that by agreement was not prepayable. The collateral securing the debt
consisted of Government National Mortgage Association mortgage
shall order relief against the debtor that controverts an involuntary petition only if “the debtor is
generally not paying such debtor’s debts as such debts become due unless such debts are the
subject of a bona fide dispute”).
343 In determining insolvency, either in a cash flow or balance sheet sense, it is appropriate to
take into account all potential contingent liabilities of the debtor, such as future tort claims.
344 See In re Marshall, 300 B.R. 507, 509 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2003).
345 See, e.g., Plank, Bankruptcy Judges, supra note 325, at 631-34 (describing the chapter 11
bankruptcy case of Krystal Co., a company whose stock was listed on the New York stock
exchange, who filed for bankruptcy for the sole purpose of accelerating, consolidating, and
adjudicating litigation claims in the bankruptcy court).
346 Plank, Constitutional Limits, supra note 341, at 545-56 (explaining the extent to which
courts refuse to permit solvent debtors from abusing the bankruptcy process to obtain a benefit
that they could not obtain outside of bankruptcy).
347 See supra notes 29-36 and accompanying text (describing the role of the independent
director in securitizations). The independent director would still be an important element in
ensuring that the SPE were a separate legal entity. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
348 No. 92-01861-TUC-LO (Bankr. D. Ariz. filed June 11, 1992).
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pass-through certificates that had appreciated in value to an amount
greater than their face amount because of a decline in interest rates.
Upon acceleration, the SPE as debtor in possession could sell the
underlying collateral,349 use the proceeds to pay off the debt, and retain
a profit of about $11 million to be distributed to its owners. The trustee
for the debt holders strenuously objected on the grounds that, among
other things, the petition was filed in bad faith. Because of the trustee’s
forceful opposition, the SPE and its owners settled this case with a
reinstatement of all but a small portion of the debt.350
The trustee’s objection on the grounds of bad faith, and the
resulting settlement, thwarted the opportunistic use of bankruptcy law
by a solvent SPE for reasons that had no relation to the purpose of
bankruptcy law.
A straightforward recognition of the DebtorInsolvency Principle would be a more effective and equally justifiable
way to preserve an SPE that was fully cash flow and balance sheet
solvent. Of course, there may be close cases, and litigating solvency
would be another cost. The Bankruptcy Code or the courts could reduce
these problems by placing the burden of proof on those who claim that
an SPE, or any debtor, is fully solvent and should not be in bankruptcy.
Congress placed this burden on creditors in the case of ordinary
preferential transfers351 because of the objective fact that substantially
all debtors are insolvent in one or the other sense.352 The most
important point is to honor the jurisdictional requirement of insolvency.
349 See supra note 239 and accompanying text (describing the power of the trustee to sell
property free of a security interest under § 363(f)(3) (2000)).
350 See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (for Order Confirming the Amended Plan as
Modified) at 2-4, In re WE Fin. Co., No. 92-01861-TUC-LO (Bankr. D. Ariz.) (filed Feb. 23,
1993); Amended Disclosure Statement of WE Fin. Co., GWS, and WE 7, Inc. Dated Jan. 11,
1993, as Modified, at 10-21, In re We Fin. Co., No. 92-01861-TUC-LO; Settlement Agreement
Dated as of September 1, 1992, at 1-3, In re We Fin. Co., No. 92-01861-TUC-LO; Bankruptcy
Case Tests Builder Bonds, 7 Mortgage-Backed Securities Letter, Aug. 10, 1992, at 1, 9, available
at 1992 WL 2747060; Ernie Heltsley, Estes Unit, in Chapter 11, Seeks Control of Bonds, ARIZ.
DAILY STAR, June 17, 1992, at 5B (containing some inaccuracy in describing the structure of the
transaction), available at 1992 WL 7629436; Ernie Heltsley, Estes Firm’s Chapter 11 Dispute
Called Threat to Bond Payments, ARIZ. DAILY STAR, June 18, 1992, at 5B, available at 1992 WL
7629465 (Jun 18, 1992); Ernie Heltsley, Bondholders to Receive Timely Payoff, ARIZ. DAILY
STAR, July 1, 1992, at 9B (referring to interim payment of interest on the funding agreements),
available at 1992 WL 7629824; Fitch Puts Amer Southwest Financial AAA CMOs on Alert Neg.,
DOW JONES NEWS SERVICE, June 19, 1992; American Southwest Financial ‘AAA’ CMOs on
Fitch Alert Negative, PR NEWS WIRE, June 19, 1992; American Southwest Financial Ends
Dispute with WE Financial Co., ARIZ. DAILY STAR, March 15, 1993, at 6D, available at 1993
WL 5743065 (Mar. 15, 1993); Abby Schultz, American Southwest Bondholders Safe After Court
Okays Plan, DOW JONES NEWS SERVICE, March 11, 1993; S&P Affirms Amer Southwest CMO
Ratings; Off Watch, DOW JONES NEWS SERVICE, March 25, 1993.
351 See 11 U.S.C § 547(f).
352 H.R. REP. NO. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 178 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6138-39 (describing the preference provisions of the bill that became the Bankruptcy Code, and
acknowledging that a bankruptcy trustee should not have to prove a fact that was almost always
true).
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V. THE FUTURE OF SECURITIZATION
The future of securitization is secure. Properly structured
securitizations comply with the requirements of both the Bankruptcy
Code and general principles of nonbankruptcy law. Securitization also
saves consumers and business huge amounts of money. As the LTV
Corporation bankruptcy demonstrates, these consumers and businesses,
or the financial services industry that services them, would not likely sit
idly by if courts were to disregard the language of the Bankruptcy Code
and these general principles and collapse a properly structured
securitization into a direct secured transaction of an originator.
On the other hand, it seems doubtful that the securitization industry
can obtain the special protections from the detrimental provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code that would eliminate the necessity for the strict, twotransaction structure of a securitization. The securitization industry
tried, but the bankruptcy of Enron Corporation derailed this effort.
For several years, Congress has been contemplating a revision of
the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy “reform” bills introduced in
2001,353 similar to the bill that Congress passed in 2000 but that
President Clinton vetoed in December 2000,354 contained § 912 on
securitization.355 This section would have modified § 541 of the Code
353 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420 107th Cong. (2001); Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 333, 107th Cong. (2001).
354 See H.R. 2415, 106th Cong. § 1 (2000). Section 1 of this bill had the caption
“ENACTMENT OF BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 2000,” and states simply that the
“provisions of S. 3186 of the 106th Congress, as introduced on October 11, 2000, are hereby
enacted into law.” On October 11, 2000, the H.R. 2415 conference committee struck all of the
House bill after the enacting clause and inserted the provisions of S. 3186, the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 2000. The text of S. 3186 is included in the H.R. 2415 conference report: H. Rept.
106-970.
355 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420 107th Cong. § 912 (2001) (entitled “AssetBacked Securitizations”):
Section 541 of title 11, United States Code, is amended—
(1) in subsection (b), by inserting after paragraph (7), as added by this Act, the
following:
(8) any eligible asset (or proceeds thereof), to the extent that such eligible asset
was transferred by the debtor, before the date of commencement of the case, to an
eligible entity in connection with an asset-backed securitization, except to the
extent such asset (or proceeds or value thereof) may be recovered by the trustee
under section 550 by virtue of avoidance under section 548(a); and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
(f) For purposes of this section—
(1) the term ‘asset-backed securitization’ means a transaction in which
eligible assets transferred to an eligible entity are used as the source of
payment on securities, including, without limitation, all securities issued by
governmental units, at least one class or tranche of which was rated
investment grade by one or more nationally recognized securities rating
organizations, when the securities were initially issued by an issuer;
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to exclude from an originator’s bankruptcy estate receivables transferred
to an SPE in a securitization in which one class of securities received an
investment grade rating if the originator had represented in a written
agreement that the assets were sold with the intention of removing them
from the estate of the debtor.356
After the collapse and bankruptcy filing of the Enron Corporation,
however, several bankruptcy academics wrote a letter to Congress on
January 23, 2002 opposing § 912 for a variety of reasons, including a
charge that § 912 would permit future Enrons.357 Other academics also
(2) the term ‘eligible asset’ means—
(A) financial assets (including interests therein and proceeds thereof), either
fixed or revolving, whether or not the same are in existence as of the date of
the transfer, including residential and commercial mortgage loans, consumer
receivables, trade receivables, assets of governmental units, including
payment obligations relating to taxes, receipts, fines, tickets, and other
sources of revenue, and lease receivables, that, by their terms, convert into
cash within a finite time period, plus any residual interest in property subject
to receivables included in such financial assets plus any rights or other assets
designed to assure the servicing or timely distribution of proceeds to security
holders;
(B) cash; and
(C) securities, including without limitation, all securities issued by
governmental units;
(3) the term ‘eligible entity’ means—
(A) an issuer; or
(B) a trust, corporation, partnership, governmental unit, limited liability
company (including a single member limited liability company), or other
entity engaged exclusively in the business of acquiring and transferring
eligible assets directly or indirectly to an issuer and taking actions ancillary
thereto;
(4) the term ‘issuer’ means a trust, corporation, partnership, or other entity
engaged exclusively in the business of acquiring and holding eligible assets,
issuing securities backed by eligible assets, and taking actions ancillary thereto;
and
(5) the term ‘transferred’ means the debtor, under a written agreement,
represented and warranted that eligible assets were sold, contributed, or otherwise
conveyed with the intention of removing them from the estate of the debtor
pursuant to subsection (b)(8) (whether or not reference is made to this title or any
section hereof), irrespective and without limitation of—
(A) whether the debtor directly or indirectly obtained or held an interest in
the issuer or in any securities issued by the issuer;
(B) whether the debtor had an obligation to repurchase or to service or
supervise the servicing of all or any portion of such eligible assets; or
(C) the characterization of such sale, contribution, or other conveyance for
tax, accounting, regulatory reporting, or other purposes.
Id. Section 912 of the House bill was identical. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 11, 107th Cong. § 912 (2001); see also Financial Contract Netting
Improvement Act of 2000, H.R. 1161, 107th Cong. § 13 (introduced in the House January 3,
2001) (using language almost identical to § 912).
356 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420 107th Cong. § 912, proposed § 541(f)(5)
(defining “transferred”).
357 See Letter from Alan Axelrod, Professor Emeritus, Rutgers School of Law, Newark, et al.
to Senator Patrick Leahy and Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner (January 23, 2002)
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criticized § 912.358 After these letters, the sponsors of the bankruptcy
legislation removed § 912. However, Professor Lipson has suggested
that § 912 could be resurrected.359
I was not a big fan of § 912. True securitizations do not need §
912.360 Further, § 912 limits its benefits to securitizations in which the
securities achieve an investment grade rating.361 As Professor Kettering
pointed out, and Professor Janger remarks, this distinction privileges
“Wall Street” over “Main Street.”362 But there is nothing unusual about
this. The Bankruptcy Code contains several provisions that protect both
the United States government363 and certain sophisticated transactions364
from the automatic stay and other provisions that increase the costs of
reproduced in AM. BANKR. INST. J., Mar. 2002, at 6 available at
www.abiworld.org/resources/research/letter1.html [hereinafter Law Professors’ Letter] (arguing
that § 912 “would institutionalize and encourage one of the practices that has led to Enron’s
failure and its harsh consequences”).
358 See Letter from Edward J. Janger, Associate Professor, Brooklyn Law School, et al. to
Senator Patrick Leahy and Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner (January 28, 2002) [hereinafter
Janger Letter], available at http:// www.abiworld.org/resources/research/lawletter.html; Kettering
Letter, supra note 113; see also Edward J. Janger, Muddy Rules for Securitizations, 7 FORDHAM
J. CORP. & FIN. L. 301 (2002) (arguing that § 912 is misguided).
359 See Jonathan C. Lipson, Enron, Asset Securitization and Bankruptcy Reform: Dead or
Dormant?, 11 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 101 (2002) (also criticizing several unjustified aspects of §
912).
360 The Law Professors’ Letter of January 23, 2002, criticizing § 912, acknowledges the
current robustness of securitization. See Law Professors’ Letter, supra note 357, at 36 (noting
that the “deliberate asset securitization is booming under current law” and that not every asset
securitization is a disguised loan); Jonathan C. Lipson, Section 912 is Dangerous, BUS. L.
TODAY, Aug. 2002, at 33. The bankruptcy reform legislation considered in the 107th Congress
has been reintroduced in the 108 Congress, and this legislation does not contain any provisions on
securitization. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2003, H.R.
975, 108th Cong.; see also Financial Contracts Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2003, H.R. 2120,
108th Cong. § 13 (omitting any provisions on securitization, unlike its counterpart in the 107th
Congress).
361 See supra note 355 (quoting § 912 and in particular the proposed § 541(f)(1) (defining of
“asset-backed securitization”)).
362 See Kettering Letter, supra note 113; see also Janger, Death of Secured Lending, supra
note 338.
363 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C § 362(b)(8) (2000) (excepting from the automatic stay an action by the
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development to foreclose a mortgage insured under the National
Housing Act); id. § 362(b)(12) (excepting from the automatic stay an action involving a chapter
11 debtor brought by the Secretary of Transportation to foreclose a preferred ship or fleet
mortgage, or a security interest held by the Secretary of Transportation in or relating to a vessel);
id. § 362(b)(13) (excepting from the automatic stay an action by the Secretary of Commerce to
foreclose a preferred ship or fleet mortgage in a vessel or a other security interest in a fishing
facility held by the Secretary of Commerce).
364 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C §§ 362(b)(6) (excepting from the automatic stay setoffs by a
commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institutions, or securities
clearing agency of certain debts in connection with commodity contracts, forward contracts, or
securities contracts); 362(b)(7) (excepting from the automatic stay the setoff by a repo participant
of certain mutual debts under a repurchase agreement); 362(b)(17) (excepting from the automatic
stay the setoff by a swap participant of certain mutual debts under a swap agreement); 556, 559660 (authorizing the termination or liquidation of certain commodities contracts, forward
contracts, repurchase agreements, or swap agreements, even under “ipso facto” clauses).
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secured creditors. My objection to § 912 is that it would reduce the
pressure for reform of the Bankruptcy Code that would provide greater
respect of secured creditors rights, which I propose in Part VI below.
The Delaware Asset Backed Securities Facilitation Act365 and the
Texas nominal sale amendment to Article 9 of the UCC366 and their
clones, discussed by Professor Janger and Professor Mann in this
Symposium, may not provide significant structural help to
securitizations. A bankruptcy court might not exclude from an
originator’s bankruptcy estate receivables transferred to an SPE in a
securitization if the transfer fails to meet the standard of a true sale
under general legal principles.
Indeed, these state law attempts to exclude receivables if the
transfer is in substance a grant of true security interest may produce
more bad law. To respond to these efforts, bankruptcy courts may go
too far in ruling that federal bankruptcy law, and not state law,
determines whether assets may be included in the bankruptcy estate.367
This line of reasoning would be unfortunate. Bankruptcy law can
determine whether an interest in property created by nonbankruptcy law
365

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2703A (Supp. 2003):
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, including, but not limited to . . . § 9623 of the title, “Right to redeem collateral,” which became effective July 1, 2001, to
the extent set forth in the transaction documents relating to a securitization transaction:
(1) Any property, assets or rights purported to be transferred, in whole or in part,
in the securitization transaction shall be deemed to no longer be the property,
assets or rights of the transferor;
(2) A transferor in the securitization transaction, its creditors or, in any insolvency
proceeding with respect to the transferor or the transferor’s property, a bankruptcy
trustee, receiver, debtor, debtor in possession or similar person, to the extent the
issue is governed by Delaware law, shall have no rights, legal or equitable,
whatsoever to reacquire, reclaim, recover, repudiate, disaffirm, redeem or
recharacterize as property of the transferor any property, assets or rights purported
to be transferred, in whole or in part, by the transferor; and
(3) In the event of a bankruptcy, receivership or other insolvency proceeding with
respect to the transferor or the transferor’s property, to the extent the issue is
governed by Delaware law, such property, assets and rights shall not be deemed
to be part of the transferor’s property, assets, rights or estate.

Id.

366

TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9-109(e) (Vernon 2002):
(e) The application of this chapter to the sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment
intangibles, or promissory notes is not to recharacterize that sale as a transaction to
secure indebtedness but to protect purchasers of those assets by providing a notice
filing system.
For all purposes, in the absence of fraud or intentional
misrepresentation, the parties’ characterization of a transaction as a sale of such assets
shall be conclusive that the transaction is a sale and is not a secured transaction and
that title, legal and equitable, has passed to the party characterized as the purchaser of
those assets regardless of whether the secured party has any recourse against the
debtor, whether the debtor is entitled to any surplus, or any other term of the parties’
agreement.
367 See, e.g., Plank, Erie and Bankruptcy, supra note 327, at 682-84 (discussing the ambiguous
treatment of property interests by the Supreme Court in Chicago Board of Trade v. Johnson, 264
U.S. 1 (1924)).
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should be included in or excluded368 from the property of the estate.
Only nonbankruptcy law—primarily state law—can determine whether
something is an interest in property or who may have an interest in
property.369
Bankruptcy courts may also disregard these statutes on the ground
that they seem to be directed only at federal bankruptcy power. This
may or may not be a legitimate reason. The statutes are not expressly
limited to just bankruptcy cases. In the case of the Texas nominal sale
amendment, the Texas Bar commentary mentioned the necessity for
certainty in addressing the Texas usury law.370 Under the Delaware
Act, the provision that a transferor does not retain a right to redeem is
used to enable accountants to treat transfers by financial institutions as
sales under Financial Accounting Standard 140 when the lawyers
cannot give a true sale opinion on the transfer.371 Moreover, both types
of statutes seem to abrogate the normal rights of debtors who have
pledged assets to secure a debt. Nevertheless, it may be that, in fact,
these statutes have no effect outside of bankruptcy. If the transfer by an
originator is in substance still only a pledge and not a sale, calling it a
sale does not make it one, even if the state allows the parties to call it a
sale.
These statutes might be helpful in close cases. For example, under
current case law, when an originator sells receivables for fair market
value but retains 100 percent recourse for obligor default, some courts
will nevertheless uphold the sale and others will not.372 These statutes
368 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C § 522(b) (2000) (allowing an individual debtor to exempt from property
of the estate certain interests in property).
369 See Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, supra note 321, at 1092, 1099-1100; Plank, Erie
and Bankruptcy, supra note 327, at 679-84.
370 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9-109 State Bar Committee cmt. 2.
371 Under FAS 140, supra note 63, ¶¶ 9(a), 27-28, at 4, 21, one of the requirements for sale
treatment is legal isolation from the transferor’s estate if the transferor becomes a debtor under
the Bankruptcy Code or, in the case of banks and other insured depository institutions, becomes
subject to receivership or conservatorship by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the
“FDIC”). See infra note 389 (describing the FDIC’s ability to become a conservator or receiver
of a FDIC-insured depository institution). Under the FDIC’s regulation, “Treatment by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as Conservator or Receiver of Financial Assets
Transferred by an Insured Depository Institution in Connection with a Securitization or
Participation,” see infra note 394 and accompanying text (discussing the regulation), a federally
insured depository institution could obtain sale treatment for accounting purposes without a true
sale opinion.
However, another element of FAS 140 is that the transferor not retain control over the
receivables transferred. FAS, 140, supra note 63, ¶¶ 9(c), 50-54, at 5, 30-31, & 153 (defining a
clean up call). Accountants became concerned that, even though the FDIC would not attempt to
recover receivables pledged to an SPE in a securitization, and therefore the receivables were
legally isolated from the receivership estate, the transferor retained its right of redemption under
state law, that is, U.C.C. § 9-623 (2001) and therefore retained “control” over the transferred
assets. Section 2703A(2) of the Delaware Asset-Backed Securitization Facilitation Statute, see
supra note 365 (quoting the statute), removes that right.
372 See supra note 82.
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might push more courts toward upholding the sale. But if an originator
sells for less than fair market value, retains credit recourse and retains
either an express right to surplus proceeds or an option to repurchase the
receivables at a reduced price, the originator’s rights will be included in
its bankruptcy estate notwithstanding the state statutes. It would not be
a stretch to apply the Whiting Pools federal common law rule to the
underlying receivables.
In my view, one motivation for these statutes, as well as the illfated § 912,373 is a desire to accommodate originators and investors who
desire greater flexibility in structuring securitizations and in avoiding
the bankruptcy premium on secured credit.
Sellers in some
securitizations may wish to retain a portion of benefits of ownership—
such as the ability to get the receivables back. Similarly, investors will
want greater protections than those afforded solely by the assets.
Originators may be willing to provide these protections against risk,
such as recourse for defaults greater than historical loss or changes in
the yield to the purchaser, to obtain a higher purchase price for the
receivables or to avoid having the SPE pay a third party a greater
amount to cover some particular risk that arises.
There may exist securitizations having too many features that are
inconsistent with a true sale of receivables to an SPE that is a separate
legal entity. One of these days, an originator of one of these
transactions may become a debtor under the Bankruptcy Code and may
successfully challenge the securitization structure. A bankruptcy court
might recharacterize the transfer of receivables as a pledge or
consolidate the SPE with the originator/parent because of the
problematic features.
This result would not destroy securitization. Just as the Supreme
Court’s disapproval of an accounts receivable financing transaction in
Benedict v. Ratner374 did not destroy accounts receivable financing but
instead strengthened it,375 the collapse of a securitization with
problematic features will only strengthen those securitizations that do
not have those features. The market would adjust. Those transactions
that contain problematic features may be downgraded either by the
rating agencies or by the market. After some period of uncertainty and
adjustment, those transactions without the problematic features would
be unaffected. After all, although some have tried to impute to
373
374

See supra note 353-59 and accompanying text.
268 U.S. 353 (1925). In this case, the Court invalidated an assignment of accounts as
security for a loan arrangement in which the assignor retained control over the accounts. The
Court reasoned that allowing the assignor to retain control over the accounts pledged as security
was inconsistent with the notion of a lien on property and therefore was fraudulent as a matter of
law. See id. at 360-61.
375 See 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 8.3, at 257-61
(1965).
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securitizations the misuse of SPEs by Enron,376 the Enron debacle, its
misuse of SPEs, and the susceptibility of the Enron SPE transactions to
consolidation or abrogation of the sale of assets377 do not appear to have
damaged securitizations.
Parties to securitizations sometimes become frustrated by the
requirements for a properly structured securitization. Underlying this
frustration is a belief, evidenced in their daily business lives, that
secured credit is a great benefit for them, their clients, and society and
that the bankruptcy premium in direct secured lending required by the
Bankruptcy Code is inefficient and irrational. It is my hope that the
continuing success of securitization, including the tremendous cost
savings, without any demonstrable harm to unsecured creditors, will
induce a reform of the Bankruptcy Code that will recognize the full
value of a secured creditor’s security interest.
VI. THE FUTURE OF SECURITY
Securitization demonstrates the costs and inefficiency of the
bankruptcy premium on secured credit. I think it possible to reform the
Bankruptcy Code to eliminate the bankruptcy premium on all secured
credit. The reforms I suggest would also, I believe, make the
reorganization process more efficient. To the extent that the broadest
reforms are not palatable, more narrowly tailored reforms directed
toward the pledge of receivables would at least reduce the bankruptcy
premium on these transactions. They could even remove the necessity
for the complicated, two step transactions required now, involving a
sale to an SPE that is a separate legal entity.
A.

Respecting the Value of the Secured Creditor’s Property Interest

My broadest suggestion is to reverse, by legislation, the Supreme
Court’s decision in United Savings Ass’n.378 In this case, the Court held
that the right of an undersecured creditor to adequate protection does
not include interest payments to compensate the creditor for the delay of
376
377

See supra note 357.
See, e.g., Second Interim Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner, at 1-3, 12-13,
passim; In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y filed Jan. 3, 2003) (copy on file
with the author) (concluding that Enron used SPEs to manipulate its financial statements in
violation of generally accepted accounting principles and failed to make appropriate disclosures
of its SPE transactions required by law, and that many of the transactions were susceptible to
substantive consolidation of the SPEs with their parents or to abrogation of the transfer of assets
to the SPEs as not having been true sales).
378 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
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foreclosure caused by the bankruptcy case. I think the decision is
correct as a matter of statutory analysis.379 The result follows from the
general rule in § 502(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code that creditors are not
to receive interest on their claims380 and the special exception for
secured creditors in § 506(b), who receive interest only to the extent that
the value of the collateral exceeds the amount of the claim.381
This rule adversely affects an undersecured creditor. Assume that
a debtor owes a creditor a debt of $120 that accrues interest at a rate of
12 percent annually and that is secured by collateral worth $100. In
bankruptcy, the secured creditor will not receive interest on either its
claim or the value of the collateral. Absent the automatic stay, the
creditor could foreclose the security interest, apply the $100 value of the
collateral to its debt, and at least reinvest the $100. The automatic stay
of acts to recover a claim382 prevents the foreclosure. If the collateral is
necessary for reorganization, the creditor cannot obtain relief from the
stay.383 Accordingly, the creditor must continue to loan, interest free,
$100 to the debtor.384 The creditor must make up the loss from other
borrowers or go out of business.
I would revise § 506(b) to provide that the undersecured creditor is
entitled to the payment of interest (or adequate protection of such
payment) on the lesser of the creditor’s claim or the value of the
collateral securing the creditor’s claim. Until the undersecured creditor
obtains relief from the automatic stay, the interest rate for an
undersecured creditor would be the greater of the contract rate or the
market rate. This rule is designed to prevent the debtor from engaging
in opportunistic behavior, that is, continuing to fight relief from the stay
when the contract rate is lower than the market rate. When the contract
rate is higher than the market rate, the rule prevents the debtor and the
bankruptcy judge from underestimating the market rate.385 However,
after the secured creditor gets relief from the automatic stay or the
trustee abandons the debtor’s equity interest in the collateral to the
secured party,386 the secured creditor is no longer entitled to interest.
379 But see David Gray Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 577, 601-10 (1989) [hereinafter Carlson, Postpetition Interest] (criticizing the
Court’s analysis).
380 See 11 U.S.C § 502(b) (2000).
381 See id. § 506(b).
382 See supra note 50 and accompanying text (quoting and discussing the provisions of the
automatic stay that prevent a secured creditor from foreclosing its security interest).
383 See supra note 56 (quoting § 362(d)(2) providing for relief from the automatic stay).
384 See also Carlson, Rotten Foundations, supra note 8, at 1064, 1102-03 (noting that
Congress intended that secured creditors contribute value to the debtor’s reorganization effort that
they would otherwise retain under nonbankruptcy law).
385 If the contract rate were truly higher than the market rate, the debtor could obtain
refinancing and pay off the undersecured creditor.
386 See 11 U.S.C § 554(a)(b) (providing that, after notice and a hearing, the trustee on her own
motion or at the request of a party in interest, “may abandon any property of the estate that is
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This rule would prevent the secured creditor delaying foreclosure to
extract value from the debtor.
This rule would put additional financial pressure on debtors trying
to reorganize. I think this pressure is appropriate. If the collateral is
truly necessary for reorganization, the debtor should be allowed to
continue to use the collateral. On the other hand, if reorganization is
good for the debtor and the unsecured creditors, they should pay for the
use of the secured creditor’s collateral. If it does not make sense for
them to pay, then the debtor should not be in reorganization. It should
liquidate. Until it allows the undersecured creditor to foreclose, the
undersecured creditor should receive compensation for its inability to
obtain the value of its interest in the collateral. If this change in law is
too broad, then it should at least apply to receivables.
B.

Quick Liquidation of Receivables

In addition to the broader rule for all undersecured creditors
described above, I also propose an amendment that directly relates to
receivables. I would provide that the automatic stay does not extend to
any action by a creditor to liquidate receivables that have been pledged
as security for a debt so long as the liquidation is conducted in a
commercially reasonable fashion.387 The exclusion would extend to
tangible receivables in the possession of the debtor.
This rule would not eliminate securitizations but it would eliminate
the necessity, for the most part, in having a sale to a separate SPE. The
originator could issue debt securities directly. Those investors who
require the timely receipt of current interest may still need to use the
current two transaction securitization structure to avoid the interruption
of the cash flow by the automatic stay. On the other hand, because
investors will be assured the ultimate payment of interest or will be able
to foreclose on the collateral, the reduction in the costs to the originator
of direct secured lending may outweigh the costs of the securitization
structure for many transactions. For example, the originator’s debt
securities could obtain an investment grade rating if there were
sufficient collateral to ensure that any delays in liquidating the collateral
would not prevent the holders of the debt securities from receiving the
full value of their investment. The major risk for these direct debt
securities would be a prepayment risk if the originator became a debtor
in bankruptcy. Prepayment is a risk for which the market imposes a
premium. The only question would be whether the prepayment risk
burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate”).
387 See Tracht, supra note 28, at 354-55 (arguing that borrowers should be able to waive
bankruptcy protections in securitizations).
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premium would be greater than or less than the costs of the current two
transaction securitization.
This rule change raises one concern. If the secured creditor is
oversecured, it has no incentive to maximize the sale proceeds. In the
case of used goods as collateral, this concern probably outweighs the
desirability of quick foreclosure so that the collateral can be put to
productive use. Receivables, however, present a different case.
Receivables are more liquid, and there is an active market for almost all
kinds of receivables. Moreover, sales by the bankruptcy trustee out of
the ordinary course of business require court approval.
This
requirement gives participants in the bankruptcy case an opportunity to
object to a sale simply to obtain greater leverage in the case.
Accordingly, even with the imperfect incentives in the case of creditors’
sales, foreclosure sales by oversecured creditors may in fact produce
more than the regulatory sales conducted by bankruptcy trustees.
My proposal would bring the Bankruptcy Code in line with the
regulatory regime for insolvent financial institutions. State and national
banks and state and federal savings associations are not subject to the
Bankruptcy Code.388 When one of these depository institutions that is
insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (the “FDIC”)
becomes insolvent, the FDIC is usually appointed as receiver or
conservator.389 The FDIC has broad powers as a receiver or conservator
of a depository institution. These include the power to succeed to all
388
389

See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2), (d).
Pursuant to § 11(c)(2)(A)(ii) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, the FDIC must be
appointed as the receiver whenever a receiver is appointed for the purpose of liquidation an
insured federal depository institution, including a national bank and a federal savings association.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii) (2000). The FDIC may also be appointed as a conservator of a
federal depository institution when one is appointed to conserve its assets pending either
appointment of a receiver for liquidation of the institution or the return of the institution to normal
business. See id. § 1821(c)(2)(A)(i). The Comptroller of the Currency decides when to appoint a
receiver or conservator of a national bank. See id. §§ 191, 203. The Office of Thrift Supervision
decides when to appoint a receiver or conservator of a federal savings institution. See id. §
1464(d)(2).
For state banks and savings associations that are insured by the FDIC, the FDIC may be
appointed as a receiver or conservator. See id. § 1821(c)(3)(A). If a state bank is a member of
the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Reserve Board decides when to appoint the receiver or
conservator. See id. § 248(o). State statutes also provide for the appointment of the FDIC as
receiver. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 3220, 3221 (West 1999) (appointment as a receiver of
insured state bank); 8253 (appointment as a receiver of insured state savings association); MD.
CODE ANN., FIN. INST. §§ 5-605 (Michie 1998) (appointment as a receiver of insured state
banking institution (bank, trust company, and savings bank)); 9-709 (appointment as a receiver of
insured state savings and loan association); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 634 (McKinney 2001)
(appointment as a receiver of insured state banking organization (including banks, trust
companies, savings banks, and savings and loan associations)).
In some circumstances, the FDIC may appoint itself as a conservator or receiver of an
insured state institution even if the state authorities do not seek such appointment. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 1821(c)(4). The FDIC may also appoint itself as conservator or receiver of any insured
institution to prevent loss to the deposit insurance fund. See id. § 1821(c)(10).
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rights, titles, powers, and privileges of the institution, to operate the
institution, to exercise the functions of the institution’s officers,
directors and stockholders, to pay obligations of the institution, and, as
receiver, to liquidate the institution and to determine claims.390
Nevertheless, the act granting the FDIC these broad powers does
not contain any automatic stay and it does not contain any general
turnover power. If the creditor has possession of property items,
whether as the result of a pledge or repossession, it may liquidate the
collateral so long as it does so in a commercially reasonable manner.391
The FDIC may also repudiate contracts to which the institution is a
party if the FDIC determines that performance of the contract would be
burdensome, and the disaffirmance or repudiation would promote the
orderly administration of the institution’s affairs.392 These avoidance
powers, however, do not permit the avoidance of any legally
enforceable or perfected security interest in the assets of any institution
except when an interest was taken in contemplation of the institution’s
insolvency or with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the institution or
the creditors of the institution.393 Further, the FDIC has issued a
regulation providing that the FDIC may not exercise its authority to
disaffirm or repudiate contracts to recover or recharacterize as property
of the institution or the receivership any financial assets transferred by
the institution in connection with a securitization if the transfer meets all
conditions for sale accounting treatment under generally accepted
accounting principles other than the “legal isolation” condition.394 This
financial institution insolvency regime is friendlier to secured creditors.
These institutions commonly engage in securitizations, obtain ratings,
and avoid some of the structural costs of a securitization.
The greater flexibility to the financial institutions does not seem to

390
391

See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)-(3).
See Letter from John L. Douglas, General Counsel of the FDIC 89-49 [1989-1990 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,265, at 55,457 (Dec. 15, 1989). In this letter, the
General Counsel opined that the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of
1989, which substantially revised federal law relating to bank conservatorships and receiverships,
does not contain an automatic stay provision similar to that found in the Bankruptcy Code, and
that a secured creditor of a federally insured bank for which a receiver had been appointed may
undertake to liquidate the creditor’s properly pledged collateral by commercially reasonable “selfhelp” methods, so long as there has been a default in the underlying agreement other than the
mere appointment of a receiver. The General Counsel’s letter notes, however, that if some action
is required by the receiver or if the liquidation of the collateral would require judicial action, then
the creditor would have to follow the claims procedure set forth in the FDI Act. Accordingly,
when the FDIC has control of property of the institution subject to a security interest, an
automatic stay would not be necessary.
392 See 11 U.S.C. § 1821(e).
393 See id.
394 See “Treatment by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation as Conservator or Receiver
of Financial Assets Transferred by an Insured Depository Institution in Connection with a
Securitization or Participation,” 12 C.F.R. § 360.6 (2003).

PLANK.GALLEY

2004]

5/25/2004 4:02 PM

THE SECURITY OF SECURITIZATION

1741

harm their unsecured creditors, of which the FDIC is often the largest
by virtue of the insurance coverage of deposits up to $100,000 for each
depositor.395 It will not hurt the unsecured creditors of originators of
receivables who are eligible to be debtors under the Bankruptcy
Code.396 Because a debtor cannot use its interest in cash collateral
without the consent of the secured party or providing adequate
protection to the secured party, my proposal would only prevent use of
the proceeds of the receivables when the secured creditor receives a
security interest in other collateral. Preventing the debtor from using
the secured creditor as an involuntary debtor in possession financer and
requiring the debtor to obtain a voluntary debtor in possession financer
seems like a good thing to me.
CONCLUSION
The legal foundations of securitization are very secure. These
foundations are firmly established, deeply rooted legal principles: the
sale of property and the establishment of separate legal entities.
Securitization saves businesses and consumers large amounts of money,
and as a result it has created its own constituency. This constituency
will not sit idly by if properly structured securitizations are attacked by
opportunistic originators that become debtors. If improperly structured
securitizations are collapsed in bankruptcy, such a collapse will not
weaken securitization. It may in fact strengthen it. Finally, that
securitization appears to be an end run around the risks of the
bankruptcy of the originator is a good thing. It reveals the hidden costs
that the Bankruptcy Code imposes on businesses and consumers debt
who borrow on security. This revelation may lead to reform of the
Bankruptcy Code that would benefit all.

395
396

12 U.S.C. §§ 1811(a), 1821(a) (authorizing deposit insurance by the FDIC).
Or, for those who think secured credit hurts unsecured creditors, my proposal does not hurt
unsecured creditors any more.

